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Abstract
This Comment addresses the recruitment of Colombian children into the insurgent armed
groups and the Colombian government’s attempts to respond to the issue. Part I provides an
overview of the worldwide child soldier epidemic, specifically of the Colombian child soldier.
Part I also addresses the general history of the civil strife in Colombia and the impact on the lives
of the country’s children. Part II describes the existing international laws that protect civilians
and children during internal armed conflicts, as well as those laws that address child combatants
specifically. Part II also analyzes the Colombian government’s response to the child soldier situa-
tion within the country’s borders and the legislative provisions and protections afforded Colombian
children. In addition, Part II addresses the Colombian government’s attempts to address the child
soldier issue in the country’s national legislation. Part III argues that the Colombian legislation
falls short in attacking the root causes of the problem. Part III proposes that in order to erad-
icate this abuse, Colombia needs to actively implement international standards, strictly enforce
existing national laws, and aggressively pursue and punish the guilty parties in order to begin the
eradication of the Colombian child soldier problem.
COMMENT
RECLAIMING THE "LITTLE BEES" AND THE "LITTLE
BELLS": COLOMBIA'S FAILURE TO ADHERE TO AND
ENFORCE INTERNATIONAL AND DOMESTIC LAWS IN
PREVENTING RECRUITMENT OF CHILD SOLDIERS
Veronica Escobar*
INTRODUCTION
A teenage boy from a rural town in Colombia was ap-
proached by a man who offered him work as a field hand for
four thousand Colombian pesos a month. In need of money to
help support his family, the boy agreed to go with the man.
Once he arrived in the mountains, he realized that there was
neither a field hand nor was there any money. The boy had un-
willingly been recruited into an armed insurgent group. When
he asked to go home, the guerrillas told him that the only way he.
would leave the mountains was dead.'
* Fordham Int'l L.J., Notes & Articles Editor, J.D. Candidate, 2003, Fordham Uni-
versity School of Law. B.A., summa cum laude, Fordham College at Rose Hill. I would
like to thank the Editors of Volume 26, especially Inna Nazarova, Julie Wald, Cara
Hirsch, and Meng-Jieh Chiang for their helpful comments and support, as well as my
friends, who kept asking "How's the Note?" and managed to keep me going. I am
grateful to Marina Michelutti, one of the Journa's LL.M. Graduate Fellows, for taking
time out of her busy schedule to verify the accuracy of my Colombian law translations
- a tedious task. My sincere thanks to Professor Martin Flaherty for sharing his knowl-
edge of international humanitarian law with a novice. I dedicate this Comment to my
parents, and thank them for their love and support, and for showing me, as a child, the
importance of looking at the bigger picture and wider horizons in my future. May the
children of Colombia, my parents' homeland, who continue to be victimized in a long-
standing war, see their own big picture and look towards a bright horizon full of peace
and opportunity.
1. See Angela Mafia Pardo, Crece el Reclutamiento de Niilos, EL TIEMPO Crrv NOTICIAS,
Oct. 9, 2001, available at http://www.mindefensa.gov.co/prensa/temas/ninos/non-
notna1091001reclutamientobogota.html (relating story of "Jesus," seventeen-year old
former child soldier who took part in three armed combats). Statistical information
provided by a national social welfare agency that assists former child soldiers found that
the number of children it has helped has increased by 100%, as the children's ages have
decreased. Id. In 1999, the agency helped 100 young people; in 2000 it helped approx-
imately 246; and up until October 2001, it helped 165 young people. Id. The national
social welfare agency also reported helping children around the ages of eleven and
twelve, when it had been used to only seeing children between the ages of fourteen and
seventeen. Id.
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Commentators discuss that there are approximately 300,000
children involved in armed conflict around the world - in State
armed forces, as well as illegal armed groups. 2 The majority of
these children are younger than eighteen, but some are ten
years old and younger.' Experts note that the increased em-
ployment of children in armed conflict marks a qualitative shift
in the nature and conduct of warfare - from international to
national in scope.'
2. See Steven Hick, The Political Economy of War-Affected Children, 575 ANNALS 106,
114 (2001) (stating that wars, armies, rebel, paramilitary, and military groups have ab-
ducted or recruited approximately 300,000 children). See also Graca Machel, The Im-
pact of Armed Conflict of Childien, INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON WAR AFFFCTIED CHIL-
DREN 9 (Sept. 2000), available at http://www.globalmarch.org/virtuallibray (stating
that estimated figure of 300,000 child soldiers reflects number of children being used
in combat at any one time). As conflicts flare up and children are killed, wounded,
grow older, and are replaced by other children, the cumulative total is much higher
and the destruction carries over from one generation to the next. Id. See also Protection
of Children Affected by Armed Conflict: United Nations ("U.N. ") General Assembly Note by the
Secretary General, 54th Sess., Agenda Item 112, at 6, U.N. Doc. A/54/430 (1999) [herein-
after Protection of Children] (stating that in addition to 300,000 children recruited for
armed conflict, two million children have been killed in conflict situations). Over one
million have become orphans, over six million have been seriously injured or perma-
nently disabled, and over ten million have suffered grave psychological trauma over the
last decade. Id.
3. See also Machel supra n.2, at 9 (defining child soldier as any child, boy or girl
tinder age of eighteen who is compulsorily, forcibly, voltntarily recruited or otherwise
used in hostilities by armed forces, paramilitaries, civil defense units, or other armed
groups). See also Protection of Children, supra n.2, at 7 (stating that children are perpetra-
tors in addition to victims of violence). Children are either systematically recruited or
kidnapped to become child soldiers. Id. They are voiced to become the instruments
that express the hatred of adults towards each other. Id. See also Hick, supra n.2, at 114
(defining child soldiers as children under age of eighteen who are forcibly or volunta-
rily recruited or used in armed conflicts by State military or insurgent armed groups).
4. See Protection of Children, supra n.2, at 6 (pointing out that several developments
mark this transformation in the nature of warfare). Almost all major armed conflicts in
the world today are civil wars and can last many years. Id. These armed conflicts are
characterized by widespread social breakdown and lawlessness, small arms and light
weapons proliferation, indiscriminate use of anti-personnel landmines and involvement
of multiple and often semi-autonomous armed groups. Id. at 13. See also Machel, supra
n.2, at 5 (identifying several causes of modern day wars). The fight over natural re-
sources, like diamonds in South Africa or narcotics trade in Colombia, are some exam-
ples. Id. Global businesses, legal and illegal, have made war possible and profitable. Id.
International weapons sales, especially of small arms, perpetuate these wars. The
poorest communities are now gaining ready access to small arms. Id. Serious financial
problems and debt have forced developing countries to restructure their economies,
thereby cutting basic services to the community and reducing the size of the public
sector. Id. As a result, they have weakened their own economies and have allowed for
the emergence of other actors who seek power and monetary gain. Id. See also Hick,
supra n.2, at 108 (calling this new type of warfare "intranational wars" - wars within
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Colombia has experienced internal armed conflict for over
forty years.5 The two primary insurgent groups responsible for
the fighting in Colombia are the left-wing guerilla forces and the
right-wing paramilitary groups.' The biggest casualties have
been civilian lives, including children who have been victims and
witnesses to atrocities, and perpetrators of violence against
others. 7 Commentators agree that the problem of using chil-
dren as combatants is an alarming one in Colombia, where it is
reported that there are at least 6,000 children within the ranks of
the illegal armed forces.8
Nations). These new wars should be examined concurrently with changes occurring in
the world's political and economic order. Id. The political and economic environ-
ments in war-torn countries have three common characteristics - free trade and for-
eign investment, forced structural adjustment, and diverging per capita incomes be-
tween countries. Id. The end of the Cold War has also helped to increase the sale of
weapons worldwide. Id.
5. See U.N. Economic and Social Council Official Resolution (ESCOR), Mission Re-
port on the Visit to Colombia from 30 May to 6June 1999, 56th Sess., Agenda Item 13, Annex
11 at 34, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2000/71 (2000) [hereinafter Colombia Mission] (reporting
visit of U.N. Special Representative to Colombia from May 30 to June 6, 1999). The
report categorized the internal conflict as being of "low intensity," disproportionately
affecting outlying areas and peasant populations while having less impact upon the lives
of residents in major urban centers. Id. at 35. See also RUSSELL CRANDALL, DRIVEN BY
DRUGS: U.S. POLICY TOWARD COLOMBIA 54 (2002) (stating that most of Colombia's polit-
ical analysts or violentologists who study the country's history trace current internal
conflict to violence that erupted in 1930s and 1940s). See also FRANK SAFFORD & MARCO
PALACIOS, COLOMBIA: FRAGMENTED LAND, DIVIDED SOCIETY 345 (2002) (commenting
that Colombia's history of violence can be traced to La Violencia or "The Violence"
which began in 1940s). See also Karl Penhaul, A Spiraling Devastation, CRIMES OF WAR
MAGAZINE: COLOMBIA: TRAFFIC OF TERROR (Aug. 2001), available at http://www.crimesof
war.org/colombia-mag/mag-index.htm. (commenting on origins of Colombia's mod-
ern day conflict). It is traced back to the 1940s during La Violencia - a civil war
between the members of the liberal and conservative political parties. Id. The fighting
was triggered by the assassination of presidential candidate and political leader Jorge
Gait'An in 1948. Id. Although the riots began in the Colombian capitol of Bogot, it
spread to the countryside. Id.
6. See Alexandra De La Asunci6n, Comment: Colombia: The Ignored Humanitarian
Crisis, 31 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L.REv 439, 447-48 (2001) (detailing players in Colombia's
internal conflict, which include not only guerrillas and paramilitaries, but Colombian
military). The Colombian armed forces consists of 146,300 soldiers - 121,000 belong-
ing to the army, 27,000 the Navy, and 7,300 the Air Force. Id. at 449.
7. See Colombia Mission, supra n.5, at 36 (reporting on Special Representative's first
hand account of disproportionate effect conflict had on Colombian children in past
forty years).
8. See Pardo, supra n.1 (explaining that this figure includes guerrilla groups and
illegal auto-defense groups). See also Unidad de Paz, Segun ONG, el conflicto armado afecta
a seis millones de niflos colombianos, EL ESPECTADOR, Apr. 24, 2002, available at http://www.
mindefensa.gov.co/prensa/temas/ninos/ninnotna240402ninosconflictosavechildrens.
html (stating that armed conflict affects, directly or indirectly, one-third, or six million,
788 FORDHAMINTERNATIONALLAWJOURNAL [Vol. 26:785
Commentators observe that increasing numbers of children
have been drawn into combat as participants in the various
armed groups.9 Either due to a lack of alternatives or as a result
of forced recruitment, these children's childhoods are severely
compromised.' 0 The children risk reprisals and threats in the
event they separate from an armed group. 1
This Comment addresses the recruitment of Colombian
children into the insurgent armed groups and the Colombian
government's attempts to respond to the issue. Part I provides
an overview of the worldwide child soldier epidemic, specifically
of the Colombian child soldier. Part I also addresses the general
history of the civil strife in Colombia and the impact on the lives
of the country's children. Part II describes the existing interna-
tional laws that protect civilians and children during internal
armed conflicts, as well as those laws that address child combat-
ants specifically. Part II also analyzes the Colombian govern-
ment's response to the child soldier situation within the coun-
try's borders and the legislative provisions and protections af-
forded Colombian children. In addition, Part II addresses the
Colombian government's attempts to address the child soldier
issue in the country's national legislation. Part III argues that
the Colombian legislation falls short in attacking the root causes
of the problem. Part III proposes that in order to eradicate this
abuse, Colombia needs to actively implement international stan-
dards, strictly enforce existing national laws, and aggressively
of seventeen million Colombian children). The children are affected either because
they are combatants, demobilized child soldiers, part of the displaced population, or
because they live in areas of high conflict. Id. The 6,000 child soldier figure is con-
servative, and an actual accurate figure is "impossible" to calculate. Id. See also Coali-
tion to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers, Child Soldier Global Report 2001, available at http:/
/www.child-soldiers.org [hereinafter Child Soldiers] (reporting that total of 14,000 Co-
lombian children are in armed insurgent groups, both guerrillas and paramilitaries).
9. See Colombia Mission, supra n.5, at 36 (discussing disproportionate effect armed
conflict had on Colombian children and how past forty years of violence have seriously
affected Colombian children's lives).
10. See Pardo, supra n.5, at 36 (expressing observations made by Special Represen-
tative upon visiting with children during his visit to Colombia). See also Lisa Alfredson,
Child Soldiers, Displacement and Human Security, 3 DISPLACEMENT FORUM: CHILDREN AND
SECURITY 17-18 (2000), available at http://www.unidir.ch. (commenting that children
may be subjected to political and economic pressures, that provide little alternative
than to "voluntarily" join an armed group).
11. See Colombia Mission, supra n.5, at 36 (expressing observations made by Special
Representative during his eight-day visit to Colombia in summer of 1999).
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pursue and punish the guilty parties in order to begin the eradi-
cation of Colombian child soldier problem.
I. "WAR AFFECTED CHILDREN". THE CHILD SOLDIER
EPIDEMIC IN COLOMBIA AND BEYOND
Commentators note that although military groups have
used children as soldiers throughout history, recruitment of chil-
dren as soldiers has increased in recent years throughout the
world.12 Experts note that complicating the situation is the fact
that the longer the conflicts persist, the greater the probability
that the guerilla forces will recruit children.' 3
A. World-Wide Use of Children As Soldiers
Today, in approximately fifty countries, children are suffer-
ing as a result of armed conflict and its consequences. 4 Chil-
dren constitute a disproportionately large percentage of the
world's displaced population-approximately fifty percent of the
populations uprooted within their own countries as a result of
internal armed conflicts. 5 Commentators agree that protecting
12. See Amy Beth Abbott, Note, Child Soldiers-The Use of Children as Instruments of
War, 23 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L.REv. 499, 508-09 (2000) (discussing that increase in
number of recruits is mainly due to internal and local nature of today's conflicts, as well
as fact that conflicts occur in populated areas where there is greater and easier access to
children). See also Machel, supra n.2, at 6 (commenting that modern warfare is ex-
tremely violent, employing any means from rape, to ethnic cleansing, to genocide).
The armed actors perpetrate assaults on children and their communities. Id. In turn,
the children can eventually become soldiers and perpetrate violence themselves. Id.
13. See Abbott, supra n.12, at 511 (contending that as time passes, and number of
casualties and conflicts increases, there is desperate search for new soldiers). This
makes volunteers difficult to find especially after witnessing the effects of war on their
predecessors. Id. Rebel leaders then turn their attention to younger people to fill the
ranks. Id.
14. See Protection of Children, supra n.2, at 5-6 (reporting that children are being
killed, orphaned, maimed, displaced, raped and sexually abused, as well as deprived of
schooling and adequate medical attention). See also Machel, supra n.2, at 19 (stating
that typical perpetrators of sexual violence in armed conflict are either government
forces or insurgent armed groups). These sexual attacks are used as a humiliation and
terror tool during armed conflict. Id, It is also detrimental to the physical and emo-
tional development of children. Id. Sexually transmitted diseases ("STDs") and HIV/
AIDS are immediate dangers. Id.
Although children are also killed during direct combat (as child soldiers), more
die from malnutrition and disease. Id. at 21. Armed conflicts cut off food supplies,
destroy crops and agricultural systems. Id.
15. See Protection of Children, supra n.2, at 6 (reporting that twenty million of world's
displaced population consists of children). See also Machel, supra n.2, at 12 (placing
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these children has become more difficult in recent years because
of the internalization and localization of global conflicts, often
grounded in nationalist, ethnic, and/or religious dissension.' 6
Guerilla groups have targeted and exploited children, thereby
failing to respect international human rights law that provides
protection for children in times of armed conflict. 7
Conscription, abduction, or coercion are among the various
methods used to recruit child soldiers. 8 Scholars explain that
number of total displaced children at twenty million). This constant movement is dis-
ruptive and dangerous because these children are deprived of security and exposed to
danger. Id. See also Alfredson, supra n.10, at 17 (discussing that children who are dis-
placed from their families or communities are at greatest risk of being recruited by
armed forces and groups). At the same time, child soldiers are also at a great risk of
becoming internally displaced persons ("IDPs"). Id. These children are displaced an
average of six to seven years, during which time they lack (adequate) access to educa-
tion, health care, and a balanced diet. Id. at 18. At the same time, former child soldiers
are vulnerable to displacement. Id. at 19. Those who escape, are captured or demobil-
ized and sometimes cannot return to their families or communities. Id. Because many
of these children's families are also displaced and/or killed, attempts at reunification
are complicated. Id. at 20.
16. See Abbott, supra n.12, at 508 (commenting on changing face of warfare in
recent decades). See also Protection of Children, supra n.2, at 6 (pointing out that several
developments mark this transformation in nature of warfare). Almost all major armed
conflicts today are fought internally. Id. They are long lasting, and are fought between
inhabitants of the same Nation. Id. These wars are identified by lawlessness, the in-
crease in use and accessibility of weapons, use of landmines, and fighting between sev-
eral armed and/or insurgent groups. 1d. See also Machel, supra n.2, at 5 (identifying
factors leading to present day civil wars). Natural resources like diamonds and narcot-
ics trade are causes of modern day conflicts. Id. Legal and illegal businesses have also
increased the profitability and possibility of war. Id. International arms sales have also
helped to stimulate war to such an extent that even the poor have access to small arms.
Id. Because so many of these countries have faced serious financial difficulties that
necessitated their economic restructuring, there was a negative impact on basic commu-
nity services and the size of the public sector. Id. As a result, these countries now have
weak economies that spurred the rise of insurgent groups looking for power. Id. See
also Hick, supra n.2, at 108 (naming this new type of war "intranational war"). Politics
and economics have also influenced these wars, and can be identified by three common
characteristics-heavy foreign investment, forced economic restructuring, and marked
differences in per capita incomes between countries. Id.
17. See Abbott, supra n.12, at 508-09 (relating that insurgent groups consider chil-
dren to be expendable, less demanding and easier to manipulate than adult soldiers).
18. See Machel, supra n.2, at 9 (explaining that "voluntary" is misleading term).
While these young people may appear to choose military service, the choice is not exer-
cised freely. Id. They may be driven by any of several forces, including cultural, social,
economic, or political pressures. Id. See also Abbott, supra n.12, at 516 (explaining that
term "voluntary enlistment" is used loosely). Often extrinsic factors are the real moti-
vating force for many children. Id. Living in a culture of violence, desperation for
food, and the need for either security or desire to avenge the deaths of family members
may prompt "voluntary" recruitment. Id. Because of these factors one needs to deter-
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once in the ranks, children make obedient and cheap soldiers
who instill terror in civilians and opposing forces.' 9 The
proliferation of automatic weapons and lightweight arms has
only increased the desirability and utility of these children in live
combat z° In addition to their use as soldiers, children provide
sexual services, and are employed as spies, messengers, porters,
'and cooks.2 1 In recent years, insurgent groups have increasingly
mine whether this enlistment is really voluntary. Id. Children lack the capacity to de-
termine their best interests, to independently form opinions, or to analyze competing
beliefs. Id. at 517. In some countries, the armies seize and force all children to fight.
Id. They remove children at gunpoint from poor and marginalized backgrounds from
buses, cars, marketplaces, churches. Id. They deliberately subject them to brutality,
sexual abuse, and psychological manipulation and sever all ties to the children's com-
munities to prevent resistance to forcible recruitment. Id. at 514. See also Alfredson,
supra n.10, at 17 (stating that while some children volunteer, others are drafted or forci-
bly recruited). Id. The lines between compulsory, voluntary, or forced recruitment are
blurry. Id. Lack of food, high levels of insecurity, and even a sense of family or na-
tional/ethnic loyalty may "compel" children to join. Id. at 21. For children without
families or separated from them due to the conflict itself, the assurances of food, shelter
and protection offered by the armed forces is a lure. Id. Others join after witnessing
violence perpetrated against their own families, and in hopes of seeking revenge or out
of a sense of entitlement. Id.
19. See U.N. General Assembly Security Council (GAOR) Report of the Secretary-
General, Children and Armed Conflict, 55th Sess., Agenda Item 112, at 15 U.N. Doc. A/
55/163-S/2000/712 (July 19, 2000) [hereinafter Children and Armed Conflict] (attribut-
ing this to adolescents, who are in middle of identity formation and are vulnerable to
involvement in armed conflict).
20. See Machel, supra n.2, at 32 (reporting that there are one half billion small
arms and light weapons that fuel conflicts around world - one for every twelve peo-
ple). There are many different kinds of weapons: revolvers, self-loading pistols, assault
rifles, submachine guns, anti-personnel landmines and light machine guns. Id. The
weapons are light and simple to use. Id. See also Abbott, supra n.12, at 510-11 (stating
that as result of international arms trade, children can use assault weapons as effectively
and easily as adults because weapons are inexpensive, light and simple enough for chil-
dren to use). This, coupled with drug and alcohol abuse, can turn these children into
combatants. Id. Leaders promote drug use as a way to recruit children to fight and to
desensitize them to the atrocities of war. Id. As a result, these children prove more
useful in battle. Id. See also Protection of Children, supra n.2, at 10 (stating that there is
correlation between availability of arms and increased violence against children). It has
made children into vehicles of violence. Id. See also Sibylla Brodzinsky, Colombia's child
soldiers swap guns for home, TIMES (U.K.), available at http://www.timesonline.co.uk (re-
lating story of fifteen-year old former child soldier who stated that although he liked
being guerrilla, being in combat and using weapons, he disagreed with killing of inno-
cent civilians). When this demobilized child soldier received orders to blow up an army
truck carrying civilians, he stopped a car on the road and asked to be taken to the
nearest army base. Id.
21. See Alfredson, supra n.10, at 17 (discussing that child need not be soldier in
order to be considered part of armed group). Children perform military and non mili-
tary tasks, like scouting, spying, sabotage, training, drill, acting as decoys, couriers,
guards, porters, sexual slaves, and carrying out forced domestic tasks and forced labor.
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employed children, because of their small size and agility, in the
task of planting and searching for landmines. 22
Commentators agree that even if these children do manage
to escape their situations, reintegration into society is a difficult
process. 23  Those who survive are often physically injured and
psychologically scarred, having lost years of schooling and social-
ization.2 4 Some are shunned, while others face the difficult task
Id. See also Hick, supra n.2, at 114 (reporting that number of children used in "support-
ive services" is unknown). See also Protection of Children, supra n.2, at 7. See also Lisa
Alfredson, Sexual Exploitation of Child Soldiers: An Exploration and Analysis of Global Dimen-
sions and Trends, available at http://www.child-soldiers.org [hereinafter Sexual Exploita-
tion] (discussing prevalence of sexual exploitation of children in armed forces and
groups). Between 1998 and 2001, child soldiers were being utilized in at least eighty-
seven countries. Id. at 2. Female child soldiers were used in forty-nine of these eighty-
seven countries. Id. For girls, the incidence of sexual exploitation is very high; it occurs
in approximately seventeen of those forty-nine countries, while taking into account that
there might be some under-reporting of cases. Id. Even though more countries use
male child soldiers, the reported cases of male sexual exploitation are more rare and
difficult to verify. Id. The regions of the world where sexual abuse of child soldiers is
highest are those of high or long-standing conflict. Id. at 3. This is supposedly related
to three factors: a) armed conflict increases the likelihood of recruiting girls; b) con-
flicts increase the likelihood of economic and social structure breakdowns, and increase
the likelihood of voluntary recruitment by youths; and c) sexual violence under the
latter conditions instills fear in the children and may ensure their obedience. Id. at 3-4.
22. See Abbott, supra n.12, at 507 (stating that military groups often use child
soldiers to clear unexplored areas). Children's size and inexperience make them espe-
cially vulnerable to becoming victims of landmines. Id. See also Protection of Children,
supra n.2, at 7 (stating that approximately 800 children are killed or maimed by
landmines every month). See also Machel, supra n.2, at 28 (reporting that while most
mines are hidden killers and are impossible to see, "butterfly mines" and brightly
colored bombs hold attraction for children). Anti-personnel landmines are designed
to attack adults, but primarily to maim and not to kill. Id. For the smaller anatomies of
children, the explosion of even the smallest mine can be lethal. Id.
23. See Abbott, supra n.12, at 515-16 (stating that once child escapes, guerrilla
groups will brand child as deserter, and can subject him or her to immediate execu-
tion). Even if the child were to receive adequate therapy and to be reunified with his or
her family, complete reintegration depends upon education, vocational opportunity,
and economic security. Id. See also Machel, supra n.2, at 23 (pointing out that children
witness and experience terrible atrocities during combat). The physical, sexual, and
emotional violence to which they are exposed has a negative impact. Id. It can destroy
their homes, communities and break their trust in adults. Id. See also Alfredson, supra
n.10, at 20 (commenting that former child soldiers are at risk for re-recruitment and
reprisals by very group they formed part of as well as opposition groups).
24. See Children and Armed Conflict, supra n.19, at 15 (commenting on after effects of
child involvement in armed conflict). See alsoAlfredson, supra n.10, at 18 (commenting
that child's association with armed group can put him or her in serious danger - risk
of attack by enemy groups, physical or psychological harm, disability, drug addiction,
pregnancy, sexually transmitted diseases, homelessness, and death is high when chil-
dren are involved with armed groups).
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of resuming their roles in the community as students, workers,
and family members.25
B. Guerillas and Paramilitaries: The Colombian
Government's Formidable Foes
Commentators agree that Colombia is the only country in
the Americas in which guerilla war remains a significant prob-
lem. 26 Colombia has been beset by intense internal conflict for
over fifty years. 27 National security units, guerrilla forces, and
paramilitary groups are the main parties involved.28
25. See id. at 15 (stating difficulties faced by child soldiers after demobilization in-
cluding physical injury and psychological trauma). See also Alfredson, supra n.10, at 18
(stating that demobilized child soldiers may suffer from psychological trauma, social
alienation, and an inability to reintegrate into society).
26. See FRANK SAFFORD & MARCO PALACIOS, COLOMBIA: FRAGMENTED LAND, DIVIDED
SOCIETY 362 (2002) (providing statistical information on cost in human lives in Colom-
bia's internal conflict). In 1997 alone, approximately 200,000 people were forcibly dis-
placed from their homes as a result of armed warfare between the guerrillas and
paramilitaries. Id. Between 1975 and 1995, the internal conflict caused 11,000 deaths
and 23,000 murders and executions. Id. Those 33,000 deaths are only 10% of the total
number of killings during those twenty years. Id. See generally Gonzalo Sanchez G.
Problems of Violence, Prospects for Peace, in VIOLENCE IN COLOMBIA 1990-2000: WAGING WAR
AND NEGOTIATING PEACE (Bergquist, et al., ed. 2000) (discussing multiplicity of Colom-
bia's violence in origins, objectives, geographic locations, methods of operation, and
strategies, as well as overall effect it has had on Colombian society).
27. See SAFFORD & PALACIOS, supra n.26, at 345 (commenting on era known as "La
Violencia" or "The Violence" which began in the 1940s and marked the beginning of
internal conflict and violence in Colombia). See also THE COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELA-
TIONS AND THE INTER-AMERICAN DIALOGUE, Toward GREATER PEACE AND SECURITY IN Co-
LOMBIA: FORGING A CONSTRUCTIVE U.S. POLICY 6 (2000) [hereinafter INDEPENDENT TASK
FORCE REPORT] (reporting that Colombia, country characterized by rampant violence
and insecurity, has one of highest homicide rates in world). An average of 25,000
Colombians die each year from acts of violence and half of the world's kidnappings take
place in Columbia. Id.
28. See INDEPENDENT TASK FORCE REPORT, supra n.27, at 6 (commenting that Fu-
erzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia ("FARC") or the "Revolutionary Armed
Forces of Colombia" and Ejercito de Liberacion Nacional ("ELN") or the "National
Liberation Army" have deep political roots, dating back to 1960s). The rural-based
FARC, the larger of the two groups with approximately 15,000 combatants, is strong
militarily and financially. Id. The ELN's roughly 3,000-5,000 fighters are concentrated
in the Northeast; the ELN derives much of its income through kidnapping and extor-
tion. Id. Both groups have combined revenues of at least several hundred million dol-
lars a year. Id. There are paramilitary groups which emerged in response to these insur-
gent groups and the government's inability to deal with the conflict. Id. The
paramilitaries are also strong militarily and financially with between 5,000 and 7,000
members. Id. The most powerful of these groups is the Autodefensas Unidas de Co-
lombia ("AUC") or the "United Self-Defenses of Colombia." Id. There is debate as to
the extent that these insurgent and paramilitary groups continue to be political actors
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1. The Left Wing Insurgency: The Revolutionary
Armed Forces of Colombia and the
National Liberation Army
The largest guerilla groups in Colombia are the Fuerzas Ar-
madas Revolucionarias de Colombia ("FARC") or the Revolu-
tionary Armed Forces of Colombia, followed by the Ejercito de
Liberaci6n Nacional ("ELN") or the National Liberation Army.29
The FARC is an outgrowth of the Colombian Communist
Party20 Commentators note that the Cuban Revolution strongly
or whether their behavior could classify them as criminal groups. Id. There is a mea-
sure of truth to both characterizations. Id. They are large and fractured forces; the
motivations and objectives of their many smaller units, spread throughout the large
country, vary widely. Id. The evidence suggests that they use criminal activities as
means of furthering their economic and political interests. Id. at 7.
29. See VIOLENCE IN COLOMBIA 1990-2000: WAGING WAR AND NEGOTIATING PEACE,
supra n.26, at 282-83 (noting that FARC evolved in response to government offensives in
1950s against Communist-led rural enclaves in Colombia). The ELN was founded in
the early 1960s and was inspired by the Cuban Revolution. Id. See also Arturo Carrillo-
Suarez, Hors de Logique: Contemporary Issues in International Humanitarian Law as Applied to
Internal Armed Conflict, 15 AM. U. INT'L L.REV. 1, 13 (1999) (stating that FARC is esti-
mated to have between 10,000 and 15,000 troops organized into sixty-two rural fronts,
three urban fronts, and nine "elite" units). The FARC possesses a unified central com-
mand structure called the "General Secretariat," headed by Manuel "Tirofijo" Maru-
landa Velez, one of the founding members of the FARC in 1964. Id. He and six other
members divide responsibilities according to subject and region, and are supported by
a general staff. Id.
The ELN contains at least 5,000 armed forces, and is divided into approximately
thirty-five rural fronts, five urban fronts, and several urban militias. Id. at 15. The top
leadership is organized in the National Directorate, which is headed by two veteran
guerrillas. Id. Below them is the Central Command, which is comprised of the leaders of
the ELN's military fronts who enjoy more autonomy than their FARC counterparts. Id.
30. See Ricardo Vargas Meza, The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and
the Illicit Drug Trade, TRANSNATIONAL INSTITUTE ("TNI") (1999), available at http://www.
tni.org/drugs/pubs/farc.htm (discussing history of FARC). The history of the regional
guerrilla movements in Colombia began with the peasant struggles of the 1920s and
1930s. Id. The peasants were reacting to the harsh working conditions imposed on
them by coffee plantation owners. Id. The authorities used force against the peasants,
which set the stage for the peasant resistance that evolved into the armed self-defense
groups of the 1940s. Id. The politics and strategies of many peasant groups had their
origins in socialism and communism. Id. The period known as "La Violencia" began
fifty years ago with the murder of political leader Jorgl E. Gaitdn and it lead to rural
violence. Id. The peasant self-defense groups and guerilla groups became the Commu-
nist Party's predominant mode of action during the Violence. Id. The peasant resis-
tance combined the self-defense model with guerrilla warfare. Id. The two groups used
these two approaches until 1964, when the FARC declared that it would use the armed
struggle as part of a political strategy to seize power. Id. Armed opposition in Colombia
was bolstered by the exclusionary stance of the Colombian political system. Id. Grass-
roots groups, popular movements, and demonstrations of opposition were criminal-
ized. Id. Social and political support for the guerrillas peaked during the 1980s, nour-
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influenced the ELNs formation: 1
Guerillas mainly target rural towns and villages.32 Experts
ished by a lack of opportunity for political participation and legal opposition. Id. The
traditional conflict based on land conflicts and violence was recast as a component of a
process that views as its objective the struggle for power. Id. See also CRANDALL, supra
n.5, at 59 (discussing that early guerrilla groups were linked to Communist Party and
evolved into modern groups in existence today). See also Jorge Esquirol, Can Interna-
tional Law Help? An Analysis of the Colombian Peace Process, 16 CoNN. J. INT'L L. 23, 28
(2000) (relating origins of FARC, which are traced to Communist Revolution). The
origins of guerrilla groups in general in Colombia, however, can be traced to the "Na-
tional Front." Id. at 28. The five-year war between both parties known as "La Violencia"
began on April 9, 1948. Id. Peace came when the electorate system was revised, and the
two political parties in Colombia, the Conservatives and Liberals, who seemed unable to
share power, agreed to run the country in alternating administrations - the National
Front. Id. The sitting administration would agree to appoint equal numbers from each
party to government posts. Id. During this time guerrilla groups emerged in reaction
to the political exclusion engendered by the National Front. Id. It secured the place of
the two main parties, but left out other politics. Id. Guerrillas claim they are a reaction
to this "restricted system"- although there is debate as to how closed the system is or
was. Id.
31. See CRANDALL, supra n.5, at 62 (commenting that ELN resembled more tradi-
tional Latin American revolutionary group, along lines of Fidel Castro's movement in
Cuba in 1960s). The ELN wanted to emulate the "foco" strategy - in which a group of
educated leaders wins the trust of the local community and turns them into revolution-
aries, like Fidel Castro did in Cuba. Id. During the early part of the 1960s, ELN mem-
bers traveled to Cuba to learn how to incite revolution. Id. at 62-63. The ELN was
formally founded in 1964, and gained fame when in 1966 a priest named Camilo Torres
joined the ELN. Id. at 63. Beginning in the 1980s, the ELN changed strategies and
started focusing on economic nationalism, by targeting foreign oil executives, bombing
oil pipelines and accusing state-owned oil companies of selling Colombia's patrimony.
Id. See also Esquirol, supra n.30, at 30 (pointing out that some ELN's most revered
leaders were ex-Catholic priests). The group's theological leaders are responsible for
the ELN's repeated appeals to international humanitarian law and pronouncements
against the drug trade. Id. A more radical faction with fewer ethical qualms
counterbalances them. Id at 31 See also VIOLENCE IN COLOMBIA, supra n.26, at 283 (re-
porting that beginning in 1980s ELN specialized in sabotage of oil pipelines and kid-
napping of oil executives).
32. See Esquirol, supra n.30, at 31 (stating that guerrillas are typically more guarded
around large urban centers and seats of elite power). See also Carrillo-Suarez, supra
n.29, at 13 (evidenced by fact that sixty-two of guerrillas fronts are located in rural
areas). See also CRANDALL, supra n.5, at 62 (commenting that FARC knew it was not
powerful enough to overthrow Colombian government so they dispersed throughout
country). The FARC believed that extra attacks in more areas would be the best strategy
to compensate for their lack of troops. Id. But see Vice Presidencia de la Reptlblica,
Programa Presidencial de Derechos Humanos y DIH, Breve Apreciaci6n de la Comuna 13
Medell~n (Antioquia), Oct. 12, 2002, available at http://www.derechoshumanos.gov.co
[hereinafter Comuna 13] (discussing urban violence perpetrated by Colombian insur-
gent groups in city of Medellfn in Department of Antioquia). According to the Na-
tional Police, the FARC urban militias have 150 militants, while ELN fronts have ap-
proximately 300 members. Id. Paramilitary groups are also a presence in other com-
munities within what is known as "Comuna 13." Id. Comuna 13 reported 373
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note that their war effort is aimed at local police and municipal
officials more so than the military directly.3 The illegal drug
trade, in which guerrillas are actively involved, has also helped to
strengthen the guerilla forces militarily and financially. 4
homicides from January 1 to August 31, 2002, and it was estimated that by the end of
2002, there would be 559 homicides reported. Id. Comuna 13 has approximately
128,620 inhabitants, so it would translate into 434 homicides for every 100,000 people
- which is twice the numbers projected for Medellfn (184 for every 100,000 inhabi-
tants) and six times the figures projected for Colombia (sixty-eight for every 100,000
inhabitants). Id. See also Juan Forero, Colombia Takes Aim at Rebels in its Cities, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 4, 2002, at 6 (commenting that Comuna 13 and its 130,000 inhabitants have
homicide rate fifty-five times that of New York City). For some, Comuna 13 signifies an
urban war. Id.
33. See Esquirol, supra n.30, at 31 (stating guerrillas targeting of towns and villages
is part of overall FARC military strategy). By controlling local authorities, guerrillas
attempt to ensure their effective control over political offices and area finances. Id. See
also CRANDALL, supra n.5, at 90 (commenting that FARC has normally avoided direct
Colombian military confrontation but that FARC acquisition of more soldiers and high
tech weaponry has allowed FARC to directly confront Colombian military). There is
also evidence that FARC is contemplating increased acts of urban terrorism, like car
bombings. Id. See also Carrillo-Suarez, supra n.29, at 13 (stating that although FARC
operates throughout different regions of country, they predominate in Southern terri-
tories of Colombia where their military presence is strongest, and they are defacto au-
thority in many areas. Id. at 14.
34. See INDEPENDENT TASK FORCE REPORT, supra n.27, at 7 (alleging that drug trade
fuels and benefits FARC in complex, but important ways). The data points to rising
production, high levels of trafficking, and increasing signs of consumption. Id. See also
SAFFORD & PALACIOS, supra n.26, at 362-63 (contending that illegal drugs and oil have
contributed to increased income of insurgent groups). This is one key to their power
and the spread of their forces. Id The cultivation of poppies and coca is in the hands
of settlers over whom the FARC has strong control. Id. The movement of cultivators
may not have been able to obtain the size, intensity, and influence that it had without
FARC support. Id. See also Gonzalo Sanchez G., Introduction: Problems of Violence, Pros-
pects for Peace, in VIOLENCE IN COLOMBIA: 1990-2000, supra n.26, at 24 (reporting that
drug trade, or extractions imposed on it, represent primary source, roughly 50%, of
FARC income (second most important source is kidnapping)). It represents 20%, the
third most important source of income for the ELN (the first being extortion from oil
companies, the second, kidnapping). Id. See also CRANDALL, supra n.5, at 90 (stating
that guerrilla involvement in drug trade is limited to taxing drug shipments or charging
cultivators tax). This provides hundreds of millions of dollars to the FARC annually in
addition to revenue collected from kidnapping and other illegal activities. Id. The
FARC has an annual income of approximately US$500 million a year. Id. See also Var-
gas Meza, supra n.30 (discussing that since 1990s, Colombian coca plantations have
comprised area estimated to be as large as 150,000 hectares). An estimated 300,000
people are directly dependent on the coca economy. Id. At the same time, these same
zones are controlled by guerrillas who earn a significant amount of their income by
levying taxes on medium, large scale farmers, intermediate coca products, merchants,
and the processing labs and secret air strips used to ship cocaine. Id. The guerrillas use
these funds to strengthen their logistical and communications capacity. Id. See also
John Otis, Special Report: Rebel Held: The Rebel Sanctuary, Hous. CHRON., Aug. 3, 2000,
available at http://www.chron.com/content/chronicle/special/01/farc/index.html
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2. The Right Wing Counter Insurgency: The United
Auto-Defenses of Colombia
The largest umbrella paramilitary group is the Autodefensas
Unidas de Colombia ("AUC") or the United Self-Defenses of Co-
lombia.35 Commentators note that certain paramilitary groups
[hereinafter Rebel Sanctuary] (stating that CIA satellite photographs show that coca
plantations in the region grew from 14,900 acres in 2000 to 19, 600 acres in 2001). The
FARC earns millions of dollars by taxing and providing protection to drug farmers and
traffickers). Id. See also Jeremy McDermott, Colombia's most powerful rebels, BBC NEWS,
available at http://new.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/americas (commenting that FARC taxes
every stage of narcotics business, from chemicals used in processing to charging fee to
transport drugs from airstrips under their control. Id. FARC makes approximately
$300 million dollars a year from these operations, adding the income they obtain from
kidnapping and extortion. Id. It makes them the richest insurgent group in the world.
Id. See generally John Otis, Special Report: Rebel Held: Is the FARC a Drug Cartel?, Hous.
CHRON., Aug. 3,2001, available at http://www.chron.com/content/chronicle/special/
01/farc/index.html (commenting over debate on whether FARC is drug cartel and how
acknowledging such fact would pose danger to United States-backed economic aid
plan).
35. See Documents, in VIOLENCE IN COLOMBIA 1990-2000, supra n.26, at 246 [herein-
after Documents] (stating that self-defense groups or paramilitary groups developed into
powerful fighting forces during 1990s). The AUC, in one of their founding documents,
circulated on June 26, 1997, states that they are a "civil defense organization in arms"
that has evolved due to the socio-economic, political and cultural contradictions found
in Colombian society, which they claim worsened due to the State's inability to guaran-
tee Colombian people their Constitutional rights and liberties. Id. The AUC claimed
that the State was solely responsible for the rise of the guerrilla groups that terrorize
innocent Colombian people. Id. at 246-47. They called on the State to take initiative
and implement social reforms so that Colombia and her people can regain peace, se-
curity, and enjoyment of life. Id. See also Jeremy McDermott, Colombia's Growing
Paramilitary Force, BBC NEWS, Jan. 7, 2002, available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/l/hi/
world/americas/1746943.stm (discussing formation of AUC). Formed in 1997, the
AUC likes to trace its origins to the self-defense groups formed under national legisla-
tion in 1968, which allowed the government to use citizens to return order. Id. It may
be more accurate to trace their beginnings to the paramilitary armies built up by drug
lords, like Fidel Castaso. Id. As drug lords became land owners buying up land, they
took over and set up their own self-defense groups to protect their own interests. Id.
They faced kidnapping and extortion threats from the guerrillas. Id. When the FARC
killed Castafio's father, the family swore revenge. Id. Carlos Castafio, Fidel's brother, is
the present head of the AUC, which he inherited from his brother, killed in a guerrilla
ambush in 1994. Id. Carlos Castahio has built up the paramilitary forces from 300 in
1994 to approximately 9000 today. Id. In 1997 he formed the AUC as an umbrella
group that welcomed anyone willing to kill guerrillas-local warlords, drug traffickers,
and disaffected members of security forces. I., See also Martha Elvira Soto & Orlando
Restrepo, An Interview with Colombian Paramilitary Leader Carlos Castafio, EL TIEMPO,
(June 30, 2002), reprinted in WORLDPRESS, July 15, 2002, available at http://wwww.world-
press.org/article model.cfm?articleid=756&dont=yes (stating that when asked how
many men were part of AUC, Castahio replied by saying "fifteen thousand, and you can
count them whenever you want"). Id. See generally Ana Carigan, Into the Abyss: The
Paramilitary Political Objective, CRIMES OF WAR MAGAZINE: CCLOMBIA: THE TRAFFIC OF TER-
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were begun as self-help groups to protect landowners from gue-
rilla groups.36 Others began as private armies or security to the
drug traffickers.17 Currently, all of these groups are virtually in-
distinguishable, and have become full-fledged fighting forces.3"
By some estimates, paramilitaries are deemed responsible
for the majority of human rights abuses in Colombia.39 Their
ROR (2001), available at http://www.crimesofwar.org/colombia-mag/index-mag.html
(discussing Colombian paramilitary movement).
36. See Ministerio de Defensa Nacional, Los Grupos Ilegales de Autodefensa en Colom-
bia, REPtBLICA DE COLOMBIA 8 (Dec. 2000), available at http://www.mindefensa.gov.co
[hereinafter Illegal Auto Defense Groups] (stating that some auto defense groups were
actually formed legally under norms that existed at time that allowed for formation of
vigilante and security groups in communities). Subsequently, many of these groups
changed course and were declared outside the margins of the law. Id. Although many of
these groups were founded as a response to civilian discontent with guerrilla abuses,
because of their direct and continuous participation in the hostilities these groups are
considered part of the internal armed conflict. Id. at 11. See also CRANDALL, supra n.5,
at 84 (commenting that during 1960s and 1970s as guerrillas gained power they began
demanding taxes from landowners in guerrilla inhabited areas to continue funding
their operations). This levying of taxes continued until the 1980s, but landowners cre-
ated self-defense groups to counter the guerrillas. Id. at 84-85. This type of paramilitary
group was institutionalized by the government in the 1960s, and received State military
assistance. Id. See also Esquirol, supra n.30, at 34 (discussing emergence of paramilitar-
ism). See also McDermott, supra n.35 (stating that although paramilitary groups claim
different origins, they have their roots in being armies built up by drug lords who later
needed them to protect their land).
37. See Illegal Auto Defense Groups, supra n.36, at 8 (stating that initial purpose of
auto-defense groups was to guard rural properties of heads of drug cartels, who bought
land to launder drug money). See also McDermott, supra n.35 (claiming origins of
paramilitaries to be rooted in drug trade). See also CRANDALL, supra n.5, at 85 (stating
that during last decade another more powerful and influential paramilitary group rose
to power). These groups evolved from drug traffickers' attempts to fight guerrilla har-
assment. Id. Today, although these paramilitary groups supposedly no longer have
drug cartel ties, they are supported by drug money and continue their fight to rid rural
Colombia of the guerrillas. Id. See also Esquirol, supra n.30, at 34 (reporting that yet
other groups were formed as vigilantes engaged in "social cleansing" of street children
and other undesirables).
38. See Illegal Auto Defense Groups, supra n.36, at 10 (providing that paramilitary
groups grew steadily in 1990s). They had approximately 850 members in 1992, which
jumped to 6000 members in 1999, and to more than 8000 in 2000. I. See also CRAN-
DALL, supra n.5, at 88 (reporting number of AUC members to be 8000 in 2000 and
increasing to 14,000 in 2001). See also Carrillo-Suarez, suptra n.29, at 17 (stating that
AUC is spread out over twenty-nine fionts). Although they are regionally organized, the
groups coordinate strategy through a general staff or "war council." Id. The fighting
force is made up of three types of units: stationary groups (local self-defense associa-
tions), and support groups, and mobile units with the capability to travel throughout
the country. Id.
39. See Esquirol, supra n.30, at 34 (reporting that paramilitaries are responsible for
number of paramilitaries are responsible for approximately 70% of human rights abuse
cases). See also Carigan, supra n.35 (reporting figure to be around 80%). Castafio is the
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preferred method of warfare is the massacre of townspeople sus-
pected of sympathizing with the guerillas.4 ° Paramilitary groups
are responsible for the majority of politically related killings.41
subject of twenty-two arrest warrants for massacres, kidnapping, assassinations and drug
trafficking. Id. See also McDermott, supra n.35 (stating that AUC has grown in strength
and influence due to links with army and financing by business interests and landown-
ers who have tired of guerrilla extortion). With this rise in strength and influence has
come an increase in massacres, the murders of left-wing intellectuals, union workers,
human rights workers, and journalists. Id. The paramilitaries have provoked massive
displacements through their policy of massacres and terror. Id. They arrive in towns
where a guerrilla influence is present with a list of suspected guerrilla sympathizers. Id.
Those people are killed, in front of their families and in an explicit manner. Id. The
message is clear, support the guerrillas and your life is in danger. Id.
40. See Illegal Auto Defense Groups, supra n.36, at 15 (reporting that principal form of
action is use of terror against civilian population paramilitaries accuse of being guerilla
sympathizers). The ultimate motive of these groups is to force a massive displacement
of the population, to "clean" the area. Id. Once these groups are established, they be-
gin to extort money from the population in the form of monthly payments on property
or a tax on businessmen in the occupied area. Id. See also Carigan, supra n.35 (provid-
ing description of so-called "death squads" visit). Heavily-armed men arrive by trucks
day or night and block all entries and exits to the town or village. Id. They proceed to
assemble the people in a public place, like a town square. Id. The hooded figure, the
informant, with a list of names selects people from the crowd, and identifies them as
"guerrilla auxiliaries." Id. To be called an auxiliary, it is enough to have sold something
to a guerrilla, to have been a guerrilla's schoolteacher, or to be wearing the wrong
clothing. Id. These individuals are taken to the place of torture and execution. Id.
Before the paramilitaries leave, they may demand meals, loot and set fire to homes, and
threaten others with their return. Id. See also Carrillo-Suarez, supra n.29, at 17 (stating
that paramilitaries attack guerrillas by targeting civilians, whom they view as guerrilla
sympathizers). The paramilitaries "systematically" engage in death threats, executions,
massacres, torture, and forced disappearances as a way to spread terror. Id. at 18. See
also Documents, supra n.26, at 251 (espousing views of AUC on civilian populations role
in the armed conflict). The AUC claims that civilians played a pivotal role in the pre-
sent conflict. Id. They are either active sympathizers who take on responsibilities for
the guerrillas or passive sympathizers who pretend to not hear, see or know anything.
Id. at 252. The AUC claims that people are motivated to act in this way because of fear,
blackmail, pressure from the guerrillas, convenience or unspoken sympathy for guerril-
las. Id. Both types of sympathizers are as important as active combatants. Id. Distin-
guishing combatants from sympathizers and other non- combatant participants in the
conflict is complicated. Id. at 253. Therefore the AUC calls for all actors in war to
respect the rights of non-combatant civilians. Id. See also Human Rights Watch, Colom-
bia: Terror from All Sides, from Testimony of Jose Miguel Vivanco, Executive Director
Americas Division, Human Rights Watch, Apr. 24, 2002, available at http://www.hrw.
org/backgrounder/americas [hereinafter Terror from All Sides] (stating that AUC had
committed more than one hundred massacres in 2001).
41. See Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, U.S. Dep't of State, Country Re-
ports on Human Rights Report 2001, Colombia Section, Washington D.C. 2002, available at
http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2001/wha/8326.htm [hereinafter U.S. Dept of
State Rep. 2001] (reporting that NGOs attributed majority of political and social cle-
ansings killings, and forced disappearances in 2001 to paramilitary groups). See also
Terror from All Sides, supra n.40 (stating that AUC committed at least 1,015 killings in
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There is also evidence that shows the cooperation and support
of the State armed forces in paramilitary activities. 4 2
2001 - at least 50% of all political killings). See also Human Rights Watch, War Without
Quarter: Colombia and International Humanitarian Law, in HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH REPORT:
1998, available at http://www.hrw.org/reports98/Colombia [hereinafter War Without
Quarter] (reporting Carlos Castafio admitted targeting leftist politicians solely on their
views). The AUC claims that as long as guerrillas kill security force members or rela-
tives of paramilitaries, they will consider politicians and trade union leaders prime
targets. Id. In 1997, Castafio reaffirmed this stance by stating his troops would kill
perceived guerrilla supporting political candidates. Id. See also Esquirol, supra n.30, at
34 (discussing that insurgent groups have also targeted human rights workers, pro-
peace activists, and political centrists in Colombia's major cities).
42. See INDEPENDENT TASK FORCE REPORT, supra n.27, at 8 (reporting that there are
major questions about links between military/State security forces and paramilitar-
ies). U.N. reports, the U.S. State Department, and non-governmental organizations
("NGOs") have suggested that direct connections between both State security forces
and paramilitaries have been established in some instances. Id. At the very least, the
military looked the other way when the paramilitaries committed atrocities. Id. See also
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH WORLD REPORT 2002 133, available at http://www.hrw.org [her-
inafter HRW 2002] (recounting several incidents during 2001, where massacres oc-
curred and residents reported that Colombian armed forces and police looked other
way as paramilitaries entered their villages). Certain military units and police detach-
ments continued to promote, work with, support, profit from, and tolerate paramilitary
groups, treating them as allies. It. At their most brazen, these relationships involved
active coordination between government and paramilitary units; communication via ra-
dios, cellular phones, and beepers; intelligence sharing, including names of suspected
guerilla collaborators; sharing of fighters, including State soldiers serving in the
paramilitary and paramilitary commanders staying on military bases; sharing of vehicles,
transporting fighters; coordinating army roadblocks, which allowed paramilitary fight-
ers to pass; and money payments made from paramilitaries to military officers for their
support. Id. See also Asunci6n, supra n.6, at 450 (stating that paramilitaries are often
illegally armed and trained by high ranking Colombian armed forces members.) See
also McDermott, supra n.35 (stating that paramilitaries owe their increase in growth
and influence, partly due to their links to army, and that substantial evidence exists to
show cooperation between army and paramilitaries). This is in spite of the fact that the
Colombian government has tried hard to sever the links between the two. Id. See also
The Curse of the Vigilantes, ECONOMIST, Apr. 19, 2001, available at http://www.economist.
com (stating that paramilitaries operate without interference close to bases of armed
forces). The Colombian government states that it is taking action against the
paramilitaries and their military co-conspirators. Id. From December 1999 to October
2000, they claimed to have killed seventy-six paramilitaries, and captured 248. Id. Yet,
out of one group of security officers that were fired in 2000, twenty-three joined the
paramilitaries. Id. In February 2001, a retired army general was sentenced by court
martial to forty months in jail for failing to prevent a paramilitary massacre in 1997. Id.
Yet the colonel who "blew the whistle" was also given the same sentence. Id. See also
Carigan, supra n. 35 (describing events of "Naya Massacre" that took place in 2001).
Human rights advocates denounced the government's failure to protect a massacre
they had been warned about. Id The residents of the town had been asking for protec-
tion for months, and the Organization of American States ("OAS") Human Rights
Commission had instructed the Colombian government to extend special protection
the Naya residents. Id. The U.N. Human rights office had alerted the authorities two
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In addition, the flourishing drug trade has aided the grow-
ing strength of paramilitaries.43 Their rapid growth runs parallel
to the increase in narcotics trafficking." This is evidenced by
the close geographic proximity of illegal cultivation areas and
paramilitary groups.45
3. The Colombian Government: A War on All Fronts
Commentators agree that during his presidency, Andr&s
Pastrana Arango made the peace process his top priority.46 In
days before the massacre that a "300 strong" paramilitary force was advancing into the
region. Id. The army did nothing to protect the people of Naya. Id. See also CRANDALL,
supra n.5, at 88 (arguing that paramilitaries are becoming more independent of State
armed forces and are more self-interested). Paramilitaries use the military when it is
convenient and fight alone when it is not. Id.
43. See INDEPENDENT TASK FORCE REPORT, supra n.27, at 7 (stating that industry
fuels and benefits paramilitary forces, like guerillas, in important ways). The data
points to rising production, high levels of trafficking, and increasing signs of consump-
tion. Id See also SAFFORD & PALACIOS, supra n.26, at 362-63 (stating that illegal drugs
and oil contributed to increased income of insurgent groups). See also Illegal Auto
Defense Groups, supra n.36, at 12-13 (stating that paramilitaries have copied guerillas in
many ways, particularly in how they finance their operations - through drug trade).
This has lead to fierce and violent territorial disputes between both groups for the
control of land. Id.
44. See Illegal Auto Defense Groups, supra n.36, at 12 (stating that although paramilita-
ries have found other methods for financial support, they have not broken their ties
with drug traffickers). It is also claimed that paramilitary groups have also established
an extortion system in cocaine cultivation zones under their control, allowing them to
partly derive income from narco-trafficking. Id. at 14. AUC leader Carlos Castaflo ad-
mitted that directly or indirectly, 70% of AUC income is derived from trafficking. Id.
Paramilitary groups also provide security for traffickers and their properties. Id. See also
Karl Penhaul, A Spiraling Devastation, CRIMES OF WAR MAGAZINE: COLOMBIA: TRAFFIC OF
TERROR (Aug. 2001), available at http://www.crimesofwar.org/colombia-mag/index-
mag.html (stating that paramilitary forces admit receiving taxes from coca trade, but
claim it is only used to finance their campaign against FARC).
45. See Illegal Auto Defense Groups, supra n.36, at 12 (stating that where there is
abundance of "illegal resources", there are more armed paramilitaries). See also Car-
rillo-Suarez, supra n.29, at 17 (stating that there is significant evidence demonstrating
that paramilitary groups participate in, and derive income from, drug trafficking activi-
ties, although paramilitary leaders deny allegations). See also U.S. Dep't of State Rep. 2001,
supra n.41 (reporting that massacres of townspeople and their forced displacement is
part of campaign to allow paramilitaries to challenge guerrilla groups over control of
drug cultivation and other strategically important territories). See also SAFFORD &
PALACIOS, supra n.5, at 367 (stating that decline of Colombian drug mafias lead to de-
creased resources for paramilitaries). The current locations of paramilitary camps is an
indicator suggesting a continuing connection to drug trafficking. Id. Drug traffickers,
guerrillas, and paramilitaries operate in areas with similar socio-economic profiles. Id.
The violence is at its most intense in these areas when at least two of the three actors are
present. Id.
46. See Esquirol, supra n.30, at 32 (stating that although Andrfs Pastrana Arango
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an effort to promote peace negotiations, the Pastrana adminis-
tration ceded a "demilitarized zone," the size of Switzerland, in
Southern Colombia to the FARC.4 7 Unfortunately, the peace ne-
did make peace process his top priority, he was criticized for possibly doing so at ex-
pense of other questions of domestic policy). See also INDEPENDENT TASK FORCE REPORT,
supra n.27, at 12 (stating that Pastrana identified peace process as his highest priority).
Even before his inauguration in August 1998, he set out to attempt a negotiated settle-
ment with the FARC. Id. In addition to economic aid plans, Pastrana pursued the
backing of key sectors of the Colombian society. /d. at 13. There were meetings of
influential business leaders with FARC representatives, more active involvement of the
Catholic Church, and the emergence of nation-wide movements that have brought mil-
lions of Colombian citizens together to protest against the violence. Id. Yet the peace
process struggled and yielded few, if any, results. /d. at 13-14. See also CRANDALL, supra
n.5, at 72 (noting that when then President-elect Andrts Pastrana Arango met with
FARC commanders it was received with much enthusiasm by Colombians). It was be-
lieved that Pastrana could be the person to bring peace between Colombia and the
FARC. Id. See also Memorandum from Adam Isaacson, Senior Associate, Center for
International Policy, to Foreign Policy Aides 1 (Nov. 18, 2002), at http://www.cipon-
line.org/colombia (discussing election of Alvaro Uribe Velez to Colombian Presidency
in May 2002). Uribe was inaugurated into office on August 7. Id. He and his cabinet
have traveled throughout Colombia holding town meetings to discuss security, and is
considered to be intolerant of corruption. Id. He is also controversial due to his past
opposition to the peace talks during the 1990s and his summoning of legal mechanisms
to rule by decree. Id. This latter act has alarmed human rights defenders. Id.
47. See REs. 85 (1998) (Col.) (enacted), available at http://bib.minjusticia.gov.co/
biblioteca/consulta.htm [hereinafter Resolution 85] (declaring beginning of peace
process and political character of armed group is recognized and demilitarized zone is
declared). Resolution 85 reads:
Considering:
1. That the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia - FARC - has ex-
pressed its aim and a willingness for peace.
2. That the National Government, paying attention to the wishes expressed by
Colombians at the voting booths on the 26th of October 1997 in the Man-
date for Peace, Life and Liberty, has initiated talks with the aforementioned
insurgent Organization, with the objective of peacefully resolving the
armed conflict.
3. That the Government and representative members of the FARC have
agreed to initiate the peace process within the first three months of the
[Pastrana] government, and that will take place in the demilitarized zone
comprised of the municipalities of Mesetas, La Uribe, La Macarena, and
San Vicente del Caguan.
Resolves:
Article 1. Declare the initiation of conversations with the Revolutionary Armed
Forces of Colombia -FARC,
Article 2. Recognize the political character of the aforementioned Organiza-
tion.
Article 3. With the goal of bringing about peace talks with representative of
the Government and spokespersons and representatives of the FARC, as of
November 7, 1998 until February 7, 1999 a demilitarized zone will be set up in
the municipalities of Mesetas, La Uribe, La Macarena, Vista Hermosa, in the
department of Meta and San Vicente del Caguan in Caquetl department...
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gotiations with the FARC ended on February 20, 2002, amidst
alleged continuing human rights violations perpetrated by the
FARC.48 In conjunction with Plan Colombia, an economic aid
plan, Pastrana strengthened his relationship with the United
States.49 The Colombian Government maintained the support
Article 4. The present resolution is effective as of the date enacted.
Id. (author's trans.). See also CRANDALL, supra n.5, at 73 (discussing that in Pastrana's
peace efforts, he conceded a temporary zona de despeje or "demilitarized zone" the size
of Switzerland to FARC in Southern Colombia). The agreement removed all Colom-
bian military personnel from the area, effectively handing control of the area over to
the FARC. Id. The FARC set up its own local government, judiciary and police. Id.
Earnest peace negotiations in the region began in January 1999. Id. See also Sanchez,
supra n.29, at 24 (describing the demilitarized zone area as comprising five municipali-
ties in the Southern departments of Caquet;A and Macarena). The area is 41,000 square
kilometers and approximately 100,000 inhabitants. Id. See also U.S. Dep't of State Rep.
2001, supra n.41 (describing what is known as the "demilitarized zone"); Coalition to
Stop the Use of Child Soldiers, Child Soldiers: 1379 Report 23 (Nov. 2002) available at
http://www.child-soldiers.org [hereinafter Colombia 1379 Report] (stating that this was
zone that FARC occupied until February 21, 2002). On February 19, 2002, then Presi-
dent Pastrana announced that peace talks had been suspended on account of FARCs
continued violations of humanitarian and human rights law. Id.
48. See REs. 31 (Col.), DIARIO OFICIAL No. 44716 (2002), available at http://www.
imprenta.gov.co (ending FARC peace process). Resolution 31 states:
The National Government of the Republic of Colombia
In exercise of its constitutional and legal faculties, especially those conferred
by Law 418 of 1997 and continued by Law 548 of 1999
Resolves:
Article 1. Bring an end to the talks and negotiations and signing of agree-
ments that began with the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia FARC by
way of Resolution 85 of 14 of October 1998.
Paragraph. Notify the corresponding judicial authorities regarding the con-
tent of this resolution in accordance with Article 8 of Law 418 of 1997, contin-
ued by Law 548 of 1999.
Article 2. Leave without effect the recognition of the Revolutionary Armed
Forces of Colombia's FARC political character which was authorized by Reso-
lution No. 85 of 1998.
Article 3. This resolution is effective as of this date and annuls all other resolu-
tions that are to the contrary, in particular number 85 of the 14 of October
1998.
Communicate and Execute.
Id. (author's trans.). See also Colombia 1379 Report, supra n.47, at 23 (stating that this was
zone that FARC occupied until February 21, 2002). Id. On February 19, 2002, then
President Pastrana announced that peace talks had been suspended on account of the
FARCs continued violations of humanitarian and human rights law. Id.
49. See Esquirol, supra n.30, at 32 (reporting that Plan Colombia was developed
with assistance of White House advisers). See also Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs,
U.S. Department of State, Fact Sheet: Plan Colombia, Washington D.C., Mar. 14, 2001, availa-
ble at http://www.state.gov/p/wha/rls/fs/2001/index.cfm?docid=1042 [hereinafter
Plan Colombia] (providing overview of Plan Colombia). The plan was developed by the
Colombian government to meet the most pressing challenges confronting the country
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of the Colombian military, although the relationship was tense
due, in part, to continuing allegations of human rights abuse
towards civilians by the military. 0
- promoting the peace process, combating the narcotics industry, reviving the Colom-
bian economy, and strengthening the Democratic pillars of Colombian society. Id. The
Plan is worth US$7.5 billion. Id. US$4 billion of Colombian resources has been
pledged and Pastrana called on the international community to provide the remaining
US$3.5 billion. Id. The United States is providing US$1.3 billion in aid, which is in
addition a previously approved US$330 million package. Id. A considerable amount of
the US aid, US$390.5 million will go towards the expansion of counter-narcotics opera-
tions into Southern Colombia. Id. In the area of Human Rights and Judicial Reform,
the total U.S. interagency package provides US$122 million for a broad range of human
rights, judicial reform, and other programs designed to support the peace process. Id.
Specific initiatives include NGOs concerned with human rights (US$4 million);
strengthening human rights institutions (US$7 million); establishing human rights
units within the Colombian National Police ("CNP") and the Colombian Attorney's
General's office (US$25 million); training judges and prosecutors (US$7.5 million);
and providing funding to train and support Colombian law enforcement personnel in
anti-corruption, anti- money laundering, and anti-kidnapping measures. Id. See also
U.S. Dep't of State, International Information Programs, Washington File: Fact Sheet:
USAID Programs for Economic and Social Development in Colombia, Mar. 13, 2001, available at
http://usinfo.state.gov/regional/ar/colombia/usaidl3.htm [hereinafter USAID Colom-
bia] (reporting that U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) earmarked
US$30 million for IDPs, and US$2.5 million towards rehabilitation of child soldiers).
See generally U.S. AID Fact Sheet, USAID Assistance to Colombia, May 24, 2002, available at
http://www.usaid.gov/press/releases/2002/02fscolombia.html [hereinafter USAID
Fact Sheet].
50. See Esquirol, supra n.30, at 32 (commenting that military disagreed with Pas-
trana on de-militarized zone, and also acknowledged that they did not have enough
training and intelligence capabilities (militarily) to combat insurgent groups - there-
fore their operations have been mostly reactive). See also U.S. Dept of State 2001, supra
n.41 (reporting that although small percentage of total human rights abuses reported
are attributable to State security forces, government security forces continue to commit
serious abuses, including extrajudicial killings). See also US Antidrug Funds Missing, As-
SOC. PRESS, May 10, 2002, available at http://www.americas.org/news/nir/20020512-
u_s_antidrugfundsmissing.asp (reporting that this past May, following disappearance
of U.S. funds earmarked to combat drugs, Colombian antinarcotics police Chief Gen.
Gustavo Socha was re-assigned to police unit providing security to dignitaries). Two
million U.S. dollars disappeared. Id. Part of the stolen money came from the money
designated by Plan Colombia. Id. The disappearance was discovered in March, and it
was confirmed that up to twenty police officers might have been taking the money for
themselves. Id. See also Frances Robles, Colombian admiral resigns amid allegations of drug
trafficking, MIAMI HERALD, Nov. 27, 2002, available at http://www.miami.com (reporting
that controversial Colombian admiral who had had his American visa rescinded previ-
ous week resigned amid accusations). He was audiotaped discussing shipments of "cof-
fee" and having to be "very careful, because if you come to fall into this mess, it's
screwed." Id. The Colombian government accepted his resignation. Id. The Colom-
bian Inspector General's office also stated the admiral was guilty of "deliberate inertia,"
looking the other way, in a January 2001 massacre attributed to paramilitaries. Id. He
was also linked to fifty-seven murders of trade unionists, human rights workers and
community leaders in 1991 and 1992, when he was head of Navy Intelligence. Id. A
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Yet, scholars also point to the presence of impunity in Co-
lombia as a debilitating factor in the country's journey to peace
and security.5' This is partly due to the unresponsive and cor-
rupt justice system, which has not only caused Colombia's multi-
ple crises, but is also a product of them.52 Human rights abuses
continue to be a problem for the country, their main perpetra-
tors being the illegal armed groups as well as the military, police,
military tribunal found there was not enough evidence against him. Id. Despite all of
this, he was promoted to military attache in Israel in 2002. Id.
51. See U.S. Dep't of State Rep. 2001, supra n.41 (reporting.that in 2001, Colombian
government continued facing serious challenges to its control over national territory, as
internal conflict increased, and political and criminal violence continued). See also
Sanchez, supra n.26, at 12 (discussing the simultaneous growth of criminality and impu-
nity in Colombia). Violence seems to be the greatest problem affecting modern Colom-
bia. Id. It comprises 26% of the health care costs in the country, compared to 3.3% for
the rest of Latin America, and 1.5% for the rest of the world. Id. See also Alan Seagrave,
Note: Conflict in Colombia: How Can Rebel Forces, Paramilitary Groups, Drug Traffickers, and
Government Forces Be Held Liable for Human Rights Violations Where Impunity Reigns Su-
preme?, 25 NOVA L. Rsv. 525, 528 (2001) (commenting on Colombia's tumultuous his-
tory). Id. at 528. Due to the violence of the last fifty years, Colombia has been involved
in a protracted state of political violence that caused a steady decline in national secur-
ity. Id. This, in turn, is what provided the fertile ground for the rise of drug cartels,
which capitalized on the government's weakness and complicity, and the use of vio-
lence to attain their ends. Id. at 528-29. This heritage is the basis for the armed con-
flict. Id. The use of violence by all involved parties, including the government, has
accelerated "the downward spiral in human rights violations." Id.
52. See INDEPENDENT TASK FORCE REPORT, supra n.27, at 10 (identifying corrupt and
inefficient judicial system as part of Colombia's multi-layered problem). See also U.S.
Dep't of State Rep. 2001, supra n.41 (commenting that although judiciary is independent
of government influence, subordination or intimidation ofjudges, witnesses, and prose-
cutors remains common). See also Sanchez, supra n.29, at 12 (discussing the Colombian
judiciary's increasing inefficiency). Not only are there more cases to be decided, but
the Colombian judiciary has been unable to give investigative priority to its most serious
crimes, the ones against life. Id Since 1990, approximately 50% of all judicial
processes have ended in impunity. Id. Simultaneously, there has been an increase in
homicides and organized crime. Id. It is noted that only 6% of homicides are brought
to trial, and penalties are imposed in a mere 4% of those cases. Id. See also Seagrave,
supra n.51, at 527 (reporting that judiciary is virtually powerless as result of decades of
death threats and payoffs from drug traffickers, and today less than 3% of crimes are
successfully prosecuted). This impunity further weakens an already weakened execu-
tive branch. Id See also Luz Estella Nagle, LATIN AMERICA IN THE TWENTY-FIRST
CENTURY: The Cinderella of Government:Judicial Reform in Latin America, 30 CAL. W. INT'L
L.J. 345, 363 (2000) (recounting incident of one Colombian judge, who after bringing
charges against two soldiers for their involvement in civilian massacre and issuing their
arrest warrants, was forced to leave country after receiving death threats, and her father
was murdered in retaliation). But at the same time, there is also incompetence within
the system, as when court procedure is not followed, evidence is contaminated or dam-
aged, a lack of training for personnel, or more often than not bribery. Id. at 364.
Three examples are not turning over evidence; or turning it over but it subsequently
disappearing, or tipping off suspects before they are arrested. Id. at 364-65.
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and State security forces.5 ' The list of targets include politicians,
prosecutors, investigators, judges, human rights workers, jour-
nalists, and civilians. 54  Experts point to the weak State as the
source of Colombia's multiple problems.55 Scholars also opine
53. See U.S. Dep't of State Rep. 2001, supra n.41 (reporting that political and extra-
judicial killings continued to be problem during 2001). An estimated 3,700 civilians
died in such acts, committed principally by non-state agents. Id. But state agents re-
portedly committed 100 killings, including deaths that resulted from abuse of police
authority. Id. It was also reported that from January to September 2001, State security
forces committed ninety-two "intentional homicides of protected persons," and caused
death to twenty-five citizens during armed combat. Id. And during the same time pe-
riod in 2000, the security forces were responsible for 119 deaths. Id. As of December
2001, the Prosecutor General's Office reported that it had approximately 788 open
investigations of human rights violations by 1342 individuals, including 234 members of
the military and police, 770 presumed paramilitaries, 240 alleged guerrillas, and ninety
eight other civilians. i.
54. See HRW 2002, supra n.42, at 137 (reporting that during 2001, seven govern-
inent investigators were murdered by illegal paramilitary gunmen). Several key wit-
nesses to important cases were also killed while in government custody or while in the
process of supplying information to prosecutors. Id. In the first ten months of 2001,
eleven defenders were killed. Id. Some government offices attempted to protect de-
fenders, supplying bodyguards, bulletproof reinforcements for offices, and an emer-
gency response network operated by handheld radios. Id. The Interior Ministry pro-
vided protection or relocation assistance to 747 people between May and Mid Septem-
ber of 2001. Id. See generally U.S. Dept of State Rep. 2001, supra n.41 (providing detailed
report of human rights abuses in Colombia during 2001). See also Human Rights
Watch, A Wrong Turn: The Record of the Colombian Attorney General's Office 10 (Nov. 2002)
[hereinafter A Wrong Turn] (stating that investigating and prosecuting human rights
violations in Colombia is very dangerous work, and large number of prosecutors and
investigator have been killed). The report offers a few examples. Id. In 1998, after an
investigation into the paramilitaries' financing networks, twelve investigators were killed
and two were forced to flee the country. Id. In 2001, during the investigation of a
massacre, a prosecutor and three judicial investigators were murdered. Id. Between
January 2000 and November 2001, investigators received 196 death threats. Id. See also
Ministerio De Defensa Nacional, Repdblica de Colombia, Informe Anual Derechos Humanos y
DIH 2001, 23 (Feb. 2002), available at http://www.midefensa.gov.co [hereinafter Colom-
bian Defense Ministry Rep. 2001] (reporting results of government's Witness and
Threatened Persons Protection Program, purpose of which is to protect thousands of
Colombians who find themselves in either category, witness or threatened person). Ac-
cording to the report, approximately 2,344 persons benefited from the protection the
program offers. Id.
55. See INDEPENDENT TASK FORCE REPORT, supra n.27, at 10 (stating that attempts to
correct high levels of impunity met with little success). See also Sanchez, supra n.29, at
25 (commenting that both guerrillas and paramilitaries base their origins in the State's
inability to meet the needs of the country). Guerrillas claim that the State's incapacity
to meet its economic, cultural and social obligations brought about the guerrilla move-
ment. Id. Paramilitaries, on the other hand, attribute their rise to the State's inability to
guarantee public security for people's lives, property and freedom for Colombian citi-
zens. Id. The State is considered the absent enemy in the war against its two main
rivals, for it is neither a social regulator nor a guardian of order. Id. The war has
delegitimized the State and its public institutions. Id. See also William D. Shingleton,
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that the violence, criminal activities and the human rights abuses
are, to a great extent, the product of a State that has not been
capable of protecting its citizens and upholding the rule of law.56
Colombia's internal conflict has had serious repercussions,
having more than 35,000 Colombian lives in the past decade.57
In 2001, between 3,000 and 5,000 civilians were killed as a result
of the armed conflict."H The U.N. states that Colombia's IDP of
Understanding Colombia, 25 FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF. 255, 258 (2001) (stating that Co-
lombian people view their political leaders as impotent and corrupt). This view wors-
ened after it came to light that the former President Ernesto Samper's 1994 election
campaign had been partly financed by drug money. Id. In a study, an international
corruption watchdog group named Colombia one of the thirty most corrupt Nations in
the world. Id. The Colombian Parliament's failure to impeach Samper has been noted
as a visible example of Colombia's two-party system's unwillingness to attack its oppo-
nents' corruption for fear of revealing their own. Id.
56. See INDEPENDENT TASK FORCE REPORT, supra n.27, at 10 (stating that a weak
State with little physical presence in much of the country is to blame for Colombia's
problems). See also Rodrigo Uprimny Yepes, Violence, Power, and Collective Action: A Com-
parison between Bolivia and Colombia, in VIOLENCE IN COLOMBIA 1990-2000: WAGINcG WAR
AND NEGOTIATING PEACE, supra n.26, at 47-49 (drawing comparisons between Bolivian
and Colombian governments' reactions to mass violence and collective action). The
problem of violence in Colombia is a complex one, with many factors. Id. at 48. Vio-
lence does not depend exclusively on economic, social, or political factors. Id. The
weakness of the Colombian State draws the most consensus as the cause of Colombia's
problems, but it is not equivocal, since there are different interpretations as to what a
weak State is. Id. Either it means improving the military in order to control mass vio-
lence, or it refers to a lack of democracy and state of law. Id. A distinction between
power and violence is proposed. Id. Power is the ability to act collectively, while vio-
lence is an individual's use of violent instruments against other people. Id. An individ-
ual or group can use violence, while the group always shares power. Id. The violence in
Colombia is derived partly from Colombians' inability to act collectively. Id. at 48-49.
Increasing violence tends to increase fragmentation in Colombian society, so that a
decrease in the citizenry's power leads to increased violence. Id. The State should pro-
mote civil society before implementing political solutions that foster State participation.
Id. See also Shingleton, supra n.55, at 258 (reporting recent survey results claiming that
Colombian people's support for democracy had fallen from 60% in 1996 to 50% in
2000).
57. See INDEPENDENT TASK FORCE REPORT, supra n.27, at 7 (noting that although
people may disagree as to characteristics of Colombia's violent groups, resulting 35,000
deaths have been significant). See also Seagrave, supra n.51, at 529 (stating that huge
loss of life in Colombia as well as large number of displaced individuals, led to Colom-
bia's poor human rights record). See also Carrillo-Suarez, supra n.29, at 20 (citing
number of civilians killed between 1988 and 1997 at 35,000). During this time period,
the average of politically motivated killings or those presumed to be was 3,428 a year,
including combat casualties. Id. That is approximately six to seven persons a day. Id.
58. See U.S. Dep't of State Rep. 2001, supra n.41 (clarifying that figure includes com-
bat casualties, political murders, and forced disappearances). See also Colombian Defense
Ministry Rep. 2001, supra n.54, at 64 (reporting that during 2001, guerrillas and
paramilitaries were responsible for almost equal amounts of killing). The guerrillas
and paramilitaries assassinated 1,060, and 1,028 persons, respectively. Id. In relation to
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1.5 million is the third largest in the world.59 In 2001, 347,000
civilians were displaced from their homes.60 It is reported that
State agents are responsible for less than one percent of the dis-
placements, while the paramilitaries are responsible for forty-six
to sixty-three percent, and guerilla groups are responsible for
twelve to thirteen percent.6" According to the United Nations
1995, when the guerrillas and paramilitaries assassinated 467 persons, there has been a
126% increase).
59. See Defensoria Del Pueblo, Informe Defensorial Sobre el Desplazamiento Forzado por
la Violencia en Colombia 2 (2001), available at http://www.mindefensa.gov.co/der-
echoshumanos/desplazados [hereinafter Forced Displacement in Colombia Report] (re-
porting number of displaced persons within Colombia between 1996 and 2001, was
approximately 720,000 persons). In 2000, 128,843 persons were displaced, while in
2001 that figure increased to 190,454. Id. The number of displaced increased by 52%
in those two years. Id. See also U.S Dep't of State Rep. 2001, supra n.41 (stating that vast
majority of displaced are peasants, who have settled in outskirts of major cities, like
Bogota, Medellfn, Cartagena). Between 1985 and the first quarter of 2001, 26% of
displaced persons were from rural areas, 22% were female heads of household, and
57% were female. Id. See also INDEPENDENT TASK FORCE REPORT, supra n.27, at 7 (not-
ing that Colombia is preceded only by Sudan and Angola in total numbers of dis-
placed). See also Machel, supra n.2, at 12 (reporting that about one in every 150 people
on earth - for a total of forty million - are displaced by conflict or human rights
violations). Approximately half of these displaced people are children. Id. Those dis-
placed individuals who stay within their own national borders are considered "internally
displaced persons" ("IDPs"), while those forced to flee to other countries are called
"refugees." Id. See generally Seagrave, supra n.51, at 528 (citing similar statistical infor-
mation on number of displaced Colombians).
60. See U.S. Dep't of State Rep. 2001, supra n.41 (reporting figure of 347,000 civilians,
which was provided by Consultorio para los Derechos Humanos y el Desplazamiento
("CODHES") or Observatory for Human Rights and Displaced Persons, Colombian
NGO that works directly with displaced persons). Government figures differ slightly and
place the number of displaced at 275,000. Id. Calculating the number of displaced is
difficult because some persons are displaced more than once, and many of these IDPs
do not register with the government. Id. See alsoJimmie Briggs, et al., Case Study on the
Impact of Small Arms on War-Affected Children: Colombia: No Safe Haven from War 5 (2001),
available at http://www.yapi.org/publications/resourcepapers.htm (reporting that ap-
proximately two million Colombians have been displaced from their homes and com-
munities since 1985). Most of the displaced have been from rural areas where the gue-
rilla and paramilitary factions fight over control for drug crops and land. Id.
61. See U.S. Dep't of State 2001, supra n.41 (citing statistics provided by U.N., Colom-
bian government agencies, and NGOs). See generally Forced Displacement in Colombia Re-
port supra n.59, at 2 (providing detailed report of activity of displaced persons through
different departments in country, as well as description of how violent activity of guerril-
las and paramilitaries caused this massive displacement). Close to 10% of the regis-
tered displacements in the last ten years took place in departments and regions in-
volved in the peace process with the FARC and ELN. Id. at 3. The pressure faced by
the families and communities in the then demilitarized zone, the fears of forced re-
cruitment of children and military actions by the guerrillas and paramilitaries and the
state security forces in the surrounding areas could be considered the principal causes
of displacement. Id. at 3-4. In addition, the increased growth of the insurgent groups is
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Children's Fund ("UNICEF'), over one million Colombian chil-
dren have been displaced from their homes in the past decade
as a result of the armed conflict.6 2 Experts opine that children
have suffered disproportionately.6 3
C. Colombian Child Soldiers: The Weapons of Choice
1. The Guerillas "Little Bees"
Commentators report that up to thirty percent of some gue-
rilla units are made up of children.64 There are an estimated
considered a determining factor in the increased number of displaced persons. Id. at 4.
An increase in armed men allows for an increase or extension in the number of fronts,
and an increase in the number of territorial disputes. Id. at 5. Between 1996 and 2000,
the number of armed actors increased from 13,400 to more than 29,000. Id.
62. See U.S. Dep't of State Rep. 2001, supra n.41 (reporting that 70% of IDPs in Co-
lombia are under age of nineteen). See also Defensoria del Pueblo, Informe Sobre Los
Derechos Humanos de la Nifiez en Colombia Durante el Argo 2001 25, Mar. 19 2002, available
at http://www.defensoria.org. (hereinafter Children's Rights in Colombia 2001] (report-
ing that in last fifteen years, close to 1,100,000 children have been displaced by internal
armed conflict). In 2001, 93,210 minors were displaced, which is approximately
48.84% of the displaced population. Id. See also Briggs, et al., supra n.60, at 4 (contend-
ing that United Nation Children's Fund ("UNICEF") approximates that more than
75% of displaced youths who previously attended school do not return after leaving
their original homes). An estimated 66% of Colombian children who live in the con-
flict zones do not have access to secondary education. Id. The fact that teachers in
these regions have received death threats from guerillas and paramilitaries further
reduces children's access to education. Id.
63. See Children's Rights in Colombia 2001, supra n.62, at 25 (stating that forced dis-
placement is one of worst consequences of armed conflict). Forced displacement has
forced women, children and adolescents to seek refuge in large urban areas where they
lack basic necessities and have limited access to health care, education and housing. Id.
at 25-26. Children are the most affected by this because they are least able to protect
themselves in these situations. Id See also U.S. Dep't of State Rep. 2001, supra n.41 (re-
porting that only 15% of internally displaced children attend school). Ministry of De-
fense figures calculate that approximately 200 children were killed in the internal
armed conflict during 2000, and that 460 had been killed in the previous four years and
another 789 had been kidnapped. Id.
64. See War Without Quarter, supra n. 41 (reporting that number of children in mili-
tias, considered training ground for future fighters, can be as high as 85%). See also
Briggs, et al., supra n.60, at 5 (reporting that there are as many as 16,000 FARC combat-
ants throughout Colombia, approximately 20% of which thought to be under age of
eighteen). See also Defensoria del Pueblo, Repfiblica de Colombia, Boletin Niez No. 8:
La Nifiez en el Conflicto Armado Colombiano 7 (2002), available at http://www.defensoria.
org [hereinafter Children in Colombian Armed Conflict] (reporting results of study con-
ducted with eighty-six former child soldiers, where 81% belonged to FARC, 16% to
ELN, and remaining belonged to other, small guerrilla groups). The ages of the study
participants when they entered the guerrillas was between seven and seventeen. Id.
Sixty-one percent were between the ages of seven and fourteen when they joined, and
20% of those children joined before they reached the age of twelve. Id
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4,000 to 6,000 children in the Colombian ranks.65 Two thirds
are boys.6 6 Guerillas refer to child soldiers as "abejitas," or "little
bees," for the children's ability to sting before their targets real-
ize they are being attacked.67 Recent research suggests that the
FARC, the oldest and the largest insurgent group, continues to
65. See Child Soldiers, supra n.8 (providing statistical information on number of
children reportedly involved as combatants in internal armed conflict). See also Jan
McGirk, Growing Up as Guerrillas, 48 WORLD PRESS REVIEW, July 2001, available at http://
www.worldpress.org/article_model.cfin?articleid= 197&don't=yes (stating that at least
6,000 children are thought to be fighting in insurgency, and that one-third of fighting
force is female). An amateur guerrilla training video shows guerrillas, some as young as
eleven, in camouflage playing with submachine guns. Id. See alsoJuan Forero, A Child's
Vision of War: Boy Guerillas in Colombia, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 20, 2000, at A22 (reporting that
in month-long series of skirmishes between Colombian Army and rebel column in
mountains above Bucaramanga, thirty-two of seventy-seven rebel fighters captured were
under age of eighteen, and nineteen of those were fifteen and younger). Of the forty-
six killed, twenty were children. Id. Colombian military officials believe that as many as
half of the FARC fighters who comprised the original 360-member column were under
eighteen. Id. If this is so, then the figures would be much higher than 6,000. Id. See
also Frances Robles, The New Face of Colombian Leftist Guerrillas: Children, MIAMI HERALD,
Jul. 14, 2002, available at http://www.rose-hulman.edu/-delacova/colombia (stating
that after battle between military forces and guerrillas, at least thirty guerrillas had been
killed, and sixteen detained. Id. Three of the survivors were girl guerrillas, ages thir-
teen, fifteen, and sixteen. Id. Half of the dead were boys and girls not yet sixteen years
old. Id. Figures place 80% of the total number of child soldiers as FARC members. Id.
See also Angela Lucfa Pinz6n, La Guerra, Golosa Sin Cielo, UNIMEDIos, Jan. 20, 2000 (re-
porting that approximately 6,000 children are part of guerrilla ranks). Approximately
20% of total FARC ranks are children under the age of eighteen. Id. Of those children,
close to 86% claimed to have joined voluntarily. Id. Thirty-three percent were attracted
to the weaponry and uniforms that seemingly conferred social recognition on them. Id.
Another 33% were looking for social and economic security that the State could not
provide them. Id. Close to 17% were attracted to the guerrillas because of pre-existing
positive relations they had with them. Id. The remaining 8% joined out of a sense of
vengeance. Id.
66. See Nelly Mendivelso, Nit, as Entre Armas, UNIMEDIOS, Jan. 20 2000 (according
to Colombian NGO which assists approximately 214 female ex-child soldiers, 5,000 girls
remain in insurgent armed groups). Although there are no precise statistics available,
some estimates state that girls make up 20% of the guerillas and 15% of the paramilita-
ries. Id. In addition, 95% of former child combatants come from rural areas in con-
flict, with inadequate services and no education. Id. Of this group, 80% present high
levels of illiteracy and 90% are undocumented. Id. See also Briggs, et al., supra n.60, at 5
(reporting that one third of children fighting for Colombia's irregular armed groups
are female). Up to 40% of the FARC soldiers are women and girls. Id. Experts believe
that the majority of girls, up to 80%, join voluntarily. Id.
67. See War Without Quarter, supra n.41 (defining and describing name given to
child soldiers by adult guerrillas). See also Child Soldiers, supra n.8 (defining child guer-
rilla). See also SandraJordan, Girls go to war: Colombia sfrontline killers, OBSERVER, Jul. 14,
2002 available at http://www.observer.co.tik (stating that FARC is training girls as young
as thirteen to kill and have used women to hijack airliners).
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recruit children, including minors under fifteen.6" Most of the
children come from impoverished backgrounds, with few pos-
sibilities for advancement of any kind.69 Although the FARC and
68. See Human Rights Watch, Colombia: Beyond Negotiation: International Humanita-
rian Law and its Application to the Conduct of the FARC-EP 16 (Aug. 2001), available at
http://www.hrw.org/reports/2001/farc [hereinafter Beyond Negotiation] (reporting that
children living in "zona de despeje" - demilitarized zone occupied by FARC in depart-
ment of Caquetd are particularly vulnerable). One advocate for child soldiers said she
knew the names of over one hundred minors from the region who belong to the FARC.
Id. Many were under fifteen years old. Id. Yet, the families of children recruited by the
FARC in the demilitarized zone told Human Rights Watch that their children had not
been forced to join the FARC. Id. The parents said that promises of a better life en-
ticed the children. Id. The FARC continues to recruit children under fifteen, even
after repeatedly stating they would not do so. Id. at 18. In 1999, Olara Ottunu, U.N.
Secretary-General's special representative for children and armed conflict, met with
FARC Commander Raul Reyes, where Reyes reportedly promised that the FARC would
no longer recruit minors under fifteen. Id. See also, John Otis, Special Report: Rebel Held:
Child Warriors, Hous. CHRONICLE, Aug. 3, 2001, available at http://www.chron.com/con-
tent/chronicle/special/01/farc/index.html (stating that 30% of the FARC fighters to-
day are under fifteen, compared with 15% a decade ago). See generally Special Repre-
sentative Visit to Colombia, E/CN.4/2000/71.
69. See Coalici6n contra la vinculaci6n de nifios, nifias y jovenes al conflicto
armado en Colombia, Las Niflas en Los Grupos Armados Colombianos, 3 BOLETIN POTCH-
IPU: EL HACEDOR DE PAZ 6 (Dec. 2001) available at http://www.coalico.org [hereinafter
Girls in Colombian Armed Groups] (stating that majority of former child soldiers originally
lived in rural areas, those areas most affected by armed conflict). The characteristics of
the rural areas were lack of infrastructure and basic services, lack of schools, and paying
employment for young people, single parent homes - mostly mothers as heads of
household or children in the care of grandparents or relatives - exploitation, sexual
abuse, and family violence. Id. A strong State presence is lacking in these areas; yet,
there is a large number of guerillas and other insurgent groups. Id. See also Tim John-
son, Colombia's Child Soldiers, MIAMI HERALD, Jan. 23, 2000, available at http://www.
miami.com/herald/special/news/specialreport/docs/058718.htm (reporting that
while military officers accuse FARC and ELN, of forcibly recruiting children, experts say
most youngsters join voluntarily, frustrated by lack of educational opportunity and
other factors). Some 600,000 children under the age of twelve do not have access to
schooling in Colombia. Id. For every one hundred children that begin elementary
school, only forty finish. Id. See also Children's Rights in Colombia 2001, supra n.62 (re-
porting that 42% of Colombian population, 16,800,000, is under the age of eighteen).
Close to 60% of the population lives below the poverty line, while 9% of those live in
conditions of utter misery. Id. More than 2,800,000 school-aged children do not attend
school, approximately 20% of the child population. Id. 1,000 children were assassi-
nated in 2000. Id. It is also reported that an alarming 200,000 are involved in the
cultivation of illegal narcotics in the areas of internal conflict. Id. See also Otis, supra
n.68 (stating that some of these children are orphans who have nowhere to go). Others
have family in the FARC and see joining as kind of a legacy. Id. Others enlist to escape
poverty or domestic violence and sexual abuse. Id. Some children may see the FARC as
a "surrogate family" where they are provided for. Id. Experts state that many of these
children do not realize the dangers, because rebel-controlled areas seem so peaceful.
Id. They do not imagine being sent into battle. Id. Many end up deserting. Id. Be-
tween 1996 and 1999, a total of one hundred minors deserted or were captured by the
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other groups maintain that they do not recruit children under
the age of fifteen as soldiers, these groups have stated that they
make "exceptions" in certain cases. 71 Certain groups have admit-
ted to taking in younger children, only because they are the chil-
dren of current militants. 71 They insist that these children are
not placed in active combat.72 Despite these denials and qualifi-
cations, commentators state that abundant information exists to
army. Id. The number jumped to 244 in 2000. Id. See also Pinz6n, supra n.65 (com-
menting that in Colombia voluntary recruitment does not exist). If there are no educa-
tional opportunities and a lack of employment, then many of these young people feel
forced to enlist in one of the insurgent groups. Id.
70. See Child Soldiers, supra n.8 (detailing areas where children "beg insistently" to
join guerillas, but noting that there are situations where their very own mothers, who
are desperate, take their children to guerillas because their families live in misery).
According to the FARC, it is "very difficult" for them to say no to these families. Id. See
also "Comandante Mariana," Comisi6n Temitica de las FARC, Los Nifios y Nifias Par-
ticipes de la Guerra, in NI&EZ v CONFLICTO ARMADO EN COLOMBIA: MEMORIAS DE LOS
FOROS: Los Nirgos Y LAS Nr AS DE LA GUERRA 40 (Aug. 24, 2000), available at http://
www.funrestrepobarco.org.co/english/publications/publicacionesin.htm [hereinafter
FARC Commander Mariana] (stating that within FARC ranks there are great number of
youths over the age of fifteen). These children reportedly join because they seek a
better future for Colombia. Id. The FARC also claim that in many instances they accept
children because neither their families nor the State can provide for their basic needs.
Id. The FARC is not ashamed of this practice, for they merely state that society should
examine what exactly Colombia has offered them-mainly poverty, membership in ur-
ban gangs, associations with narco-trafficking groups, employment as Government mili-
tary informants, prostitutes, street vendors, drug addicts, and coca farmers. Id. Chil-
dren should not form a part of war, but the political and economic powers that be have
not given children options. Id,
71. See Child Soldiers, supra n.8 (stating one reason given by guerrillas for having
children in their ranks). See also McGirk, supra n.65 (reporting statistics compiled by
Colombia's Department of Statistics stating that 17% of guerrillas under age of eigh-
teen were born into ranks). See also Pinz6n, supra n.65 (stating the three main ways
children become part of insurgent groups). It is either voluntary, by force, or because
they are the children of current guerrillas.
72. See Child Soldiers, supra n.8 (noting that non-combat activities may be just as
dangerous as actual combat). In April 1996, police captured a fifteen-year old girl who
was apparently used to collect money extorted by the group from merchants in the
department of Caldas. Id. See also Beyond Negotiation, supra n.68, at 18 (commenting
that in late 2000, after combat between FARC and Colombian army, in operation bap-
tized "Operation Berlin," it was reported that dozens of child soldiers were among those
registered as killed or captured). The army announced that thirty-two of those cap-
tured were under seventeen, including a few under fifteen, and a third were females.
Id. According to the army, twenty of the casualties were children. Id. See also Children in
Colombian Armed Conflict, supra n.64, at 18 (reporting that as far as eighty-six former
child soldiers that participated in study, their main duties fell in four categories: 1)
military training, 2) maintaining campgrounds, 3) combat, and 4) special missions).
Thirty-five percent of the eighty-six children interviewed felt at times obligated to carry
out unwanted activities, such as military training (96%), combat/killing (81%).
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indicate that the various insurgent groups continue to recruit
children as combatants.
73
Experts note that guerillas have carried out recruitment
campaigns targeting children in elementary schools and chil-
dren's homes, promising to send the families a regular salary in
return for their children's services."4 Often, these families do
not report the forced recruitment of their children for fear of
reprisals.7" Commentators opine that guerillas recruit children
73. See Child Soldiers, supra n.8 (reporting that between January 1 and April 27,
2001, Colombian army reported fifty-three. cases of child soldiers, twenty-four were cap-
tured during military operations, while twenty-nine were deserters; of those nineteen
were girls and thirty-four were boys). See also Beyond Negotiation, supra n.68, at 18 (re-
porting speech supposedly given by FARC Commander Jorge Bricefio in demilitarized
zone, where he acknowledged that FARC had committed "errors," including the re-
cruitment of child soldiers). According to witnesses, the Commander stated children
would be returned to their families. Id. After this speech, it was reported that some
children were returned to their families, including a twelve-year old girl. Id. In Febru-
ary 2001, the FARC handed over supposed child soldiers to the U.N. Children's Fund.
Id. They also pledged to demobilize another 500 children. ML However, estimates state
that 60% of FARC forces are children under fifteen. Id See also Colombian Defense Minis-
try 2001 Report, supra n.54, at 33 (describing various methods used by insurgent groups
to recruit children). These methods include:
a) Taking children against their will, without explaining to them that they will
participate in dangerous and violent activities.
b) Creating false economic expectations, taking advantage of their lack of ed-
ucation and their poverty.
c) By threat, which at times includes death threats against their parents so
that they will be relinquished to these insurgent groups.
Id. (author's trans.) According to the Interior Ministry's Reinsertion Program, during
2000 the recruitment of children grew by 30% for boys and 35% for girls. Id.
74. See Child Soldiers, supra n.8 (according to Public Advocate in Cali, in Depart-
ment of Valle del Cauca, guerillas have gone to schooIls and'homes of children offering
to take them to war, enticing them with stories about fighting and offering to sign them
up as a type of adventure). Guerrillas have offered the families money and guarantees
of security in exchange for allowing their children to join the guerillas. Id. See also
Johnson, supra n.69 (reporting that although both sides to conflict, guerillas and
paramilitaries, deny paying combatants regular wages, they do admit to irregular sti-
pends that lure impoverished rural youth). See also Otis, supra n.68 (recounting story of
high school who had guerrillas enter his classroom to recruit his students). A conse-
quence of this was that families living within demilitarized zone decided to send their
children away. Id, See also Girls in Colombian Armed Groups, supra n. 69, at 6 (stating that
"voluntariness" of the children's enlistment/recruitment considering their life option is
not as easy topic, when war is almost only option in middle of conflict, and an aggra-
vated economic crisis, particularly in the areas of intense armed conflict). Armed
groups do not discriminate by gender when recruiting children. Id. Their only con-
cern is to increase the size of their forces. Id. For girls in particular, their main motivat-
ing factors for joining the guerrillas, is the desire to escape maltreatment, sexual abuse,
the excessive amount of domestic chores, and intra-family violence. Id.
75. See War Without Quarter, supra n.41 (reporting that in guerrilla dominated re-
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because they are considered valuable assets. 76 Some experts also
believe that the guerillas' increased recruitment of children
stems from the growth of the rival paramilitary groups.7 7 In
June 1998, the ELN agreed to halt child recruitment under the
terms of "Acuerdo de Puerto Del Cielo" (Mainz "Heaven's Gate"
Agreement), a civilian agreement; yet as of today they continue
to recruit children.78 Commentators opine that the ELN has
gions families fear reporting taking of their children). See also Colombian Defense Ministry
Report 2001, supra n.54, at 33 (stating methods used by subversive groups to recruit
children). Included among these methods, was the use of intimidation tactics on par-
ents, from taking their land, their money and even threatening to assassinate them if
they do not relinquish their children. Id.
76. See War Without Quarter, supra n.41 (reporting that a guerilla commander told
investigator's from Public Advocate's Office that children were more intrepid and had
more bravery for war). They carried out their duties much better than an adult would.
Id. See also Colombian Defense Ministry Report 2001, supra n.54, at 35 (stating that guerilla
groups recruit children because they are much easier to intimidate than adults, do what
they are told, do not demand economic compensation, and are considered the most
expendable fighting force).
77. See Otis, supra n.68 (stating that right-wing paramilitary groups have expanded
faster than FARC, with their ranks doubling in size since 1997 to 8,100). During this
same time period, the FARC grew from 15,000 to 17,000 troops. A recent military oper-
ative illustrates the magnitude of the problem. Id. In the fall of 2000, the military
carried out an operative entitled "Operation Berlin" where the military routed a gue-
rilla unit of 240 fighters near Bucaramanga. Id. According to Commander of the army
brigade that carried out the operative, half of the FARC unit's members were minors.
Of' the seventy-three guerillas killed, twenty-seven were minors. Id. Another sixty chil-
dren, ranging in age from eleven to seventeen, either deserted or were captured by the
army. Id.
78. See Mainz 'Heaven's Gate' Agreement, signed in Mainz Germany, July 15 1998,
available at http://www.ciponline.org/colombia/cielo.htm [hereinafter "Heaven's Gate
Agreement"] (noting that agreement was signed in Mainz, Germany). The Agreement
states, in part:
The Civilian society here represented, the ELN and the National Committee
for Peace, with the facilitation of the German and Colombian Episcopal Con-
ferences,
Agree to:
1. Begin the peace process with the ELN.
With respect to the participation of civilian society:
2. Recognize and support the permanent action of civil society to attain
Peace.
3. To favor the execution of investigations and propositions concerning
peace ideas that look for structural changes in the life of the Nation.
4. To arrange meetings with different sectors to consolidate what has been
attained in the Peace Process.
5. To promote the spirit of this document before the Government and con-
tinue this work in favor of peace, with the collaboration of the interna-
tional commtnity.
6. Facilitate meetings between the Government and the ELN and EPL At the
same time, promote the meeting of the signatories of this document with
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the FARC and the CGSB and other actors of war. In this sense: greet as
valuable for future peace, the meeting between the President-elect Andres
Pastrana Arango, and the Commanders of the FARC.
7. To be of service to the great national movement inspired by the Mandate
for Peace and promote its amplification and consolidation in events like
the Permanent Assembly of Civil Society for Peace.
8. To procure that civil society facilitate and look for opportunities in the
Government to demand compliance with the political guarantees and lib-
erties guaranteed by the Constitution in any part of the country.
9. Condone hostile actions and massacres of civilians financed from different
sectors and that increase by omission of action by any State agents.
10. The ELN commits to suspending the retention or depriving of liberty of
persons for financial purposes, and the ELN attempts to find other means
by which to finance their operations, as long as it culminates in attaining
peace with this organization and not its strategic weakening. Also, as of
today they will cease to kidnap minors, adults over the age of sixty-five,
and under no circumstances will pregnant women be deprived of liberty.
11. To demand an end to impunity for crimes against humanity, like forced
disappearances, massacres, genocide, and torture, and to respond com-
pletely in the spirit of international law with regard to the subject matter.
12. Based on concepts of the United Nations, to be attentive that regional
justice not overreach its legal boundaries. In the same, to insist with ur-
gency that Justice recuperate its efficaciousness, promptness, impartiality
and procedural guarantees.
13. With respect to the grave problem of the displaced population, we will
promote and support the defense of their legitimate interests and necessi-
ties, especially their safe return home, title to their property(ies), if appli-
cable, and the development of their respective regions.
14. In an attempt to separate from the attacks of the armed groups, we will
proceed with the leadership of civil society and the coordinating efforts of
the Attorney General and People's Ombudsman to identify and mark all
the resources protected by international humanitarian law: Aqueducts,
Schools, health care centers, hospitals and veterinary clinics, social service
centers.
Ambulances, fire engines, and emergency vehicles.
Vehicles, ships, or airplanes used by civilians and not in military opera-
tions; Campaigns for human and animals social rights; Educations, sports,
cultural or recreational centers and places of religious worship, and elec-
trical power plants; Installations which contain dangerous materials, like
repressed water or nuclear material.
15. The ELN reaffirms it unilateral acceptance of the recommendations made
by Amnesty International for the insurgent movements made in their 1994
Colombia report. Those recommendations are:
a. To treat prisoners, the injured and those who attempt to surrender,
with humanity, be they civilians or members of the armed forces, and
that they not be killed.
b. Deliberate and arbitrary homicides of non-combatants is prohibited
under any and all circumstances.
c. Prisoners will not be used as a way to collect a ransom or achieve some
other objective. Detained persons will identified and their safe return
guaranteed.
d. Landmines will not be used to deliberately kill or mutilate civilians.
816 FORDHAMINTERNATIONALLAWJOURNAL [Vol. 26:785
e. To investigate the alleged abuses committed by the guerrillas in order
to determine responsibility.
f. Guerrillas suspected of committing or ordering abuses, shall be sepa-
rated from any charge of authority and any service that will place them
in the position of committing such alleged abuses.
16. To promote with all the armed actors and their respective parts the re-
spect, autonomy, culture and right of neutrality of the indigenous, and
other ethnic groups and their territories.
17. Reaffirm the agreement between civil society and the ELN to respect and
have respected the rights of the children and the ELN will not incorporate
minors under the age of sixteen into their ranks. In the future the age will
be raised to eighteen.
18. To promote the ratification by Congress of the Ottawa Convention over
the prohibition of the use of anti personnel mines. Equally, it was estab-
lished that mines would not be planted in areas of risk for civilians, espe-
cially children. We demand compliance with the bombing property and
areas used by the civilian population.
19. Prisoners and detainees should be treated with dignity, and as if they were
political prisoners. We will support the non-penalization of social protest
20. [omitted]
21. [omitted]
Id. (author's trans). See also U.S Dep't of State Rep. 2001, supra n.41 (highlighting that
although ELN signed agreement to refrain from, among other things, recruiting chil-
dren into their ranks, they continue to recruit). See alsoJorge L. Esquirol, supra n.30, at
61 (stating that under auspices of Catholic Church, ELN met in Mainz, Germany with
prominent members of Colombia's political class in their capacity as private citizens. Id.
The government was not officially represented. Id. After three days, two accomplish-
ments were reached: an international humanitarian agreement and a commitment and
a schedule for peace negotiations. Id. See also Carrillo-Suarez, supra n.29, at 62 (stating
that Mainz Agreement was more of written "understanding" between group of civilians
and ELN than formal peace accord). The ELN accepted that it would unilaterally re-
spect important norms of international humanitarian law. Id. at 63. Besides their
promise to stop kidnappings for ransom, the ELN also promised to stop using anti-
personnel mines in civilian areas and the recruiting of children into their ranks. Id.
The Heaven's Gate agreement was celebrated as the first humanitarian agreement
signed by a guerilla group in Colombia, and the beginning of the peace process with
the ELN. Id. Yet it was also criticized by members of Pastrana's government, for its
selective use of humanitarian norms that failed to take into account the legal character
of the obligations involved. Id. See also Tim Johnson, Colombian Leaders, Rebels sign peace
pact, MIAMI HFRALD,Jul. 16, 1998 [hereinafter Rebel Pact] (stating that under agreement
ELN condemned "hostile actions and massacres of civilians," and pledged to respect
international humanitarian law). The agreement also pledged to halt violence against
schools, health clinics, reservoirs, fire stations and power lines, and more importantly to
stop kidnapping for profit. Id. Authorities stated that the FARC and ELN earn as much
as $300 million a year from kidnappings of businessmen, ranchers, and others. Id. See
also Colombia Signs Pact with Rebel Group, CATHOLIC WORLD NEWS - NEWS BRIEF, July 16,
1998, available at h ttp: / /www.cwnews.com/ Browse/1998/07/ 8109.h tm (reporting that
representatives of Colombian government signed 12-point agreement with leaders of
ELN). The Agreement called for the convocation of a national convention at the end of
the year, at which concrete steps toward a final peace agreement were to be discussed.
Id. Many felt that the most important feature was the ELN promise to stop the kidnap-
pings it had been using to finance their operations. Id. They would only agree to do so
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the most number of children in its ranks in relation to its total
strength.79
Children guerillas have the task of collecting intelligence,
serving as an advance shock force that is sent first into combat to
ambush the paramilitaries, soldiers, or police officers, serving
during patrols; kidnapping and guarding hostages; and making
and deploying mines.8 Mines are a favored weapon of the
FARC and the ELN, and in 2000 alone, these groups had indis-
criminately laid 50,000 mines in rural areas. t Additionally, ap-
when they found other means to secure funds. I. However, they agreed to an immedi-
ate halt in kidnappings of women, children and the elderly. Id.
79. See War without Quarter, supra n.41 (reporting that Human Rights Watch re-
ceived numerous testimonies from people familiar with ELN regarding child combat-
ants). One source told Human Rights Watch that it was common to see a unit of fifteen
adult commanders leading up to sixty-five child soldiers. Id- See also Briggs, et al supra
n.60, at 5 (reporting that proportion of children in ELN could be higher than 20%).
80. See Pinz6n, supra n.65 (reporting results of 1998 People's Defender Office
study of 180 child soldiers). Eighteen percent had killed at least once. Id. Sixty per-
cent had witnessed killings. Id. Eighty percent had seen bodies be mutilated. Seventy-
eight percent had witnessed kidnappings. I. Twelve percent had kidnapped people.
I. Eighteen percent had witnessed tortures. Forty percent had shot at people at least
once. Id. Eighty-three percent had been at the brink of death at one time or another.
Id. See also War Without Quarter, supra n.41 (asserting that one child, interviewed by the
Public Advocate's Office told them that to calm their fears, he and other children drank
milk mixed with gunpowder, stating that gunpowder gave them more energy, "like with
the desire to kill the troops passing in front of you."). A former hostage also reported
that during her captivity a fifteen-year old girl guarded her. Id. She stated that many of
the guerillas she saw in that three-month period were children. Id. See also Forero,
supra n.65 (stating that Colombian military has long contended that FARC uses chil-
dren on front lines). Soldiers have reported fighting against children. Id. According
to reports, the first wave of fighters were children between the ages of twelve and fif-
teen. I. The children are also used for intelligence gathering and to see if paths are
clear. Id. See also Colombian Defense Ministry Report 2001, supra n.54, at 33 (stating that
these children are employed in violent activities or in intelligence work). See also Chil-
dren's Rights in Colombia 2001, supra n.62 (reporting that 40% of victims of anti-per-
sonnel mines are civilians and that in last eight years 5,250 children died because of
their use). See also Presidential Program for Human Rights and IHL- Observatories on
Human Rights and IHL and on Anti-Personnel Mines, Anti-Personnel Mines in Colombia 8
(Dec. 2001), available at http://www.derechoshumanos.gov.co [hereinafter Anti-Person-
nel Mines] (stating that human cost of mines in Colombia is high, although an exact
figure has been difficult to calculate). Colombia's information collecting methods fail
to record the actual number of victims. Id. Yet provisional data does provide approxi-
mations. I. During the first ten months of 2001, the amount of landmine accidents
was 162, meaning one person had an accident almost every two days. Id. Thirty-one
victims died, while another 131 were injured or disabled for life. Id, Twenty-seven per-
cent were civilians, and the largest numbers in this group were children under eigh-
teen. Id. Five children died and twenty-seven were injured. Id.
81. See U.S. Dep't of State Rep. 2001, supra n.41 (reporting that guerillas used
landmines to defend both static positions, such as base camps, cocaine laboratories, and
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proximately 100,000 anti-personnel mines are scattered around
the Colombian countryside. 2 The children are fully armed for
most of these tasks.83 Commentators further note that girl-child
soldiers are often employed as sexual servants or "forced
wives.""
sites at which kidnap victims were being held and as indiscriminate weapons of terror).
/d. Landmines planted by guerrillas or disguised as everyday items such as soccer balls
or paint cans often resulted in the killing or maiming of civilian noncombatants. Id.
According to press reports, landmnines surrounded guerrilla bases in the demilitarized
zone. Id. The FARC used sulfuric acid in gas canisters that it employed as artillery and
continued its practice of using these canisters to attack small towns. Id. Scores of
soldiers, police, and civilians were burned indiscriminately as a result. Id. See also Colom-
bian Defense Ministry Report 2001, sup/ra n.54, at 39 (providing that more than 140 munici-
palities in twenty four departments in Colombia have been affected by presence or
suspicion of anti-personnel mines - this is approximately 13% of the national terri-
tory). The subversive and auto-defense groups have not manifested any attempt nor
acted in any way to eliminate the threat of the mines. Id. See also Anti-Personnel Mines,
supra n.80, at 6 (stating that according to Observatory, which monitors international
human rights law ("IHRL" and international humanitarian law ("IHL") in Colombia,
during first ten months of 2001 there were 243 accidents or incidents with mines in the
country). Eighty-seven percent or 211, involved anti-personnel mines. Id. Sixty-two of
these accidents left victims. Id. Responsibility for 42% (102) of these accidents or inci-
dents has not been determined. Id. Fifty seven percent (73) of the cases are attributed
to the FARC and close to twenty six percent (63) to the ELN. Id. At least three acci-
dents or incidents were associated with joint FARC/ELN operations. Id. Therefore, the
report concludes that the anti-personnel mine problem in Colombia is directly linked
to the current armed conflict. Id.
82. See Colombian Defense Ministry Report 2001, supra n.54, at 39 (reporting that ap-
proximately 100,000 anti-personnel mines are buried in the Colombian countryside,
which have been nicknamed "quiebra-patas," or leg breakers). See also Anti-Personnel
Mines, supra n.80, at 5 (stating that a preliminary estimate places number of mines in
Colombia at 70,000, of which 20,000 were laid by Colombian military forces and re-
maining by illegal armed groups, the ELN and FARC. Id. The report also stated that
considering mines had been used since "La Violencia" (the time of civil unrest in the
1940s) and that illegal groups continue to use them as weapons, the 70,000 figure, with
an annual rate of increase of 20%, is "at best hypothetical." Id.
83. See War Without Quarter, supra n.41 (reporting that former-female-child guerilla
told Public Advocate investigators that she used pistols, AK-47s, Galils, M-16s, R-15s, Uzi
submachine guns, Ingams, and 357 Magnum). She stated that in her organization,
your weapon was your life and your mother, guarding you day and night. Id. See also
Briggs et al., supra n.60, at 2 (stating that majority of violence in Colombia is conducted
with small arms, and Galil, AK-47 and M-16 serve as weapons of choice for warring
parties in Colombia). The most common weapon in use by Colombian guerillas is the
AKM - which is almost identical to the AK-47, Kalashnikov automatic rifles, and Galils.
i.
84. See Beyond Negotiation, supra n.68, at 16 (reporting that many girls who are re-
cruited into these groups are pressured to have sexual relations with male members of
group). Some are given injections as a form of birth control, and have contracted vene-
real diseases. Id. at 16-17. A Colombian mother recounted the story of her daughter
who was returned by the FARC, but arrived not only with an eye infection, anemia, and
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While the FARC claims that children are not forcibly re-
cruited, once integrated into the ranks, these children are often
unable to leave.8 5 If they do escape, they are considered de-
serters and could be subject to on-the-spot execution. 6 Schol-
blister on her feet, but had allegedly told her mother that she was forced into sexual
relations with a FARC member and contracted a venereal disease. Id. at 17. See also, Tim
Johnson, supra n.69 (asserting that adolescent girls are sometimes recruited for "special
missions" - implying their use in a sexual capacity). They are told to sleep with mili-
tary soldiers and extract information from them. Id. See also Colombian Defense Ministry
Report 2001, supra n.54, at 33 (reporting that with respect to female child soldiers, the
insurgent groups induce them to sexual activity with older male soldiers). If pregnancy
results, female child soldiers are forced to abort without adequate medical assistance,
thereby putting their lives at risk. Id. See also Briggs et al, supra n.60, at 5 (discussing
some accounts indicating that female child soldiers are deliberately sexually abused, but
experts have not found any indication of widespread sexual abuse of girls). Rather, a
"clear abuse of power" exists between the commanders and girl soldiers. Id. Both main
guerilla groups actively encourage girls to use birth control. Id. They are also en-
couraged to couple with male combatants, who in many cases are much older than the
girls. Id. See also Sexual Exploitation, supra n.21, at 4 (stating that approximately 40% of
the girls who volunteered for the FARC were escaping abuse in the home). Upon inte-
grating into the FARC found that they were expected to provide sexual services, were
treated badly because they were female, and were punished through sexual means. Id.
See also Girls in Colombian Armed Groups, supra n.69, at 6 (stating that besides other rea-
sons that may exist for children wanting to join guerrilla groups, girls imagine that
within ranks they will be treated as equals to men). They may fall in love with the
uniform or with the warrior. Id. at 6-7. Girls look to overcome the exclusion felt within
their own families, where they played domestic roles. Id. They may also want to associ-
ate their identities with those who represent power. Id.
85. See Beyond Negotiation, supra n.68, at 17 (stating that relatives of child recruits
have reported that these children must get "permission" from their commanders to
leave, and that is often difficult to obtain). See also Colombian Defense Ministry Report
2001, supra n.54, at 33-34 (reporting that once these children are in ranks, their free-
dom of thought, conscience, ethics and religion are curtailed. They are submitted to a
forced indoctrination in a subject area where there is no room for contradiction or
comparison. Id. Physically, they are made to perform tasks that they would normally be
unable to do due to their ages. Id. These include marching with heavy loads on long
trajectories, usually through rough terrain. Id. They are forced to commit acts of bru-
tality against the civilian population and police, and in the majority of the cases the
conscience of these children has been deformed, maybe forever. Id. at 34. See also
Children in Colombian Armed Conflict, supra n.64, at 11 (commenting that 55% of children
in study deserted guerrillas). The principal reasons given were: disagreeing with the
tasks they were ordered to do (fourteen), inability to see their families (seven) and
infraction of a rule (five). Id. The guerrillas had surrendered only 1% of the children
to the authorities, and this was due to health reasons. Id.
86. See Beyond Negotiation, supra n.68, at 17 (asserting that FARC applies same pun-
ishment to child deserters as adult soldiers). Their punishment is the "firing squad." Id.
See also War Without Quarter, supra n.41 (noting that if guerillas believe that children
have provided information to Colombian security forces, their punishment is death).
One mother even went as far to attempt to have her daughter's former commanders
sign a "certificate of liberty" that would be distributed to other area units, ensuring that
her daughter would not be killed. Id. See also Colombian Defense Ministry Report 2001,
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ars discuss that many children soldiers are left traumatized.8 7
2. The Paramilitaries "Little Bells"
Like guerrillas, paramilitaries also rely on children to sus-
tain and expand their operations, and according to available sta-
tistics, up to fifty percent of some paramilitary units are made up
of children called "campanitas," or little bells.88 Children, as
supra n.54, at 34 (reporting that many of these children desert to escape their inadmis-
sible obligations and all kinds of abuse, but often they will be killed when found by their
ex-compatriots). This serves as a warning to others who remain in the subversive organ-
ization. Id. See generally Otis, supra n.68 (stating that those who have been captured or
escaped often avoid going home immediately for fear that local guerillas will recognize
them). See also Brodzinsky, supra n.20 (relating story of seventeen year old Claudia who
voluntarily joined ELN at twelve, but was allowed to return home to help work on her
family's farm. Id. She was later forcibly recruited by the FARC. Id. The police cap-
tured her in 2000. Id. She cannot return to her family, because she says "everyone is
looking for me:(sic) the guerrillas because they're afraid I'll give information to the
army and the paramilitaries because they want the information I have." Id. See also
Children in Colombian Armed Conflict, supra n.64, at 20 (stating that 55% of children inter-
viewed who deserted guerrillas claimed that it was due to violation of their rights and
that they risked fleeing even if it meant they would be executed). Some of the reasons
given: they had been ordered to kill someone and could not do it, they were deprived
medical treatment, they disagreed with having to kill another guerrilla for an infraction
of the rules, or because they themselves were to be executed. Id. at 20-21. See also
Pinz6n, supra n.65 (reporting that if child soldiers decide to escape they face serious
consequences). If the child is recaptured they face a guerrilla war tribunal and could
face the death penalty for treason. Id.
87. See Pinz6n, supra n.65 (commenting that in addition to physical scars, demobil-
ized child soldiers also have emotional and spiritual scars). These scars are the ones
that are most quickly forgotten by society. Id. Children will internalize violence until
they begin to use it against themselves and people around them. Id. In addition, they
can also suffer from identity problems and sleep dysfunction. Id. See also Colombian
Defense Ministry Report 2001, supra n.73, at 34 (discussing how desertion of children from
both the guerrillas and paramilitary groups is an expression of abuses and intense "pu-
trefaction" within these organizations). This is evidence by the fact that every year the
number of child deserters steadily increases. Id. In 1998 there were 28 minors, in 2000
there were 82, and in 2001, 93. Id. A total of 203 minors have been reunited with their
families and reinserted into the community. Id.
88. See War Without Quarter, supra n.41 (providing that one former child paramili-
tary interviewed by Office of Public Advocate said that he had been forcibly recruited at
nine years of age). During the time he served, he had no communication with his par-
ents. Id. Some of the children in his group were around his age, while another five
were between ten and fifteen years old. Id. All were serving two years. Id. See also Child
Soldiers, supra n.8 (reporting that some estimates place total number of children in
paramilitary groups at 3000). It is reported that paramilitaries rely on forced recruit-
ment, including the use of leaflets calling for "compulsory military service." Id. See also
Johnson, supra n.69 (indicating that paramilitary groups relyjust as heavily on minors as
FARC does). As many as 50% of the paramilitaries in the Middle Magdalena river val-
ley, an anti-guerilla stronghold, were children. Id See also Briggs, et al, supra n.60, at 5
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young as eight years old, patrol with paramilitary units." Other
children are used as back-up troops, spies and patrolmen in
their home regions.90
3. The National Institute on Family Welfare ("ICBF"): Part of
Colombian Government's Initiative to
Reclaim Its Children
The Colombian government implemented various pro-
grams meant to assist demobilized children in making their tran-
sition back into society, and educational and vocational pro-
grams in particular.9" The Instituto de Bienestar Familiar
("ICBF") or National Institute of Family Welfare oversees all gov-
ernment child protection and welfare programs and funds non-
governmental and church programs for these children.92 In the
(calculating number of paramilitaries in AUC, largest umbrella paramilitary group, to
be as many as 8000 combatants). Id. Among them, the AUC had at least 180 children
deployed with arms as of April 2000. Id. In 1998, organizations within Colombia esti-
mated that 15% of the AUC members were children. Id. See also Pinz6n, supra n.69,
(reporting that children comprise between fifteen and 50% of troops in paramilitary
groups).
89. See War Without Quarter, supra n.41 (reporting that residents told Public Advo-
cate that paramilitaries consider service obligatory and service can last as long as two
years). Families who refuse to allow their children to provide service risk being consid-
ered sympathetic to guerillas and attacked. Id. See also Inter-Amer. C.H.R., The Rights of
the Child: Third Report on the Human Rights Situation in Colombia, OEA Ser.L/V/1I.102,
Doc. 9, Rev. 1 (1999), available at http://www.cidh.oas.org/countryrep/Colom99en/
chapter-13.htm [hereinafter OAS Colombia Report 1999] (reporting that approximately
15% of paramilitary ranks are minors). In some areas these numbers rise up to 50%.
Id. Part of the paramilitary strategy is to go to low-income areas or displaced persons
camps, offering money to entice children into joining them. Id.
90. See War Without Quarter, supra n.41 (describing tasks relegated to child soldiers
within paramilitary groups). See also OAS Colombia Report 1999, supra n.89 (reporting
that in single day in 1997, members of paramilitary group recruited fifty minors). In
other instances they are carried off by force. Id. See also Child Soldiers, supra n.8 (report-
ing later incident in March 1998, where journalists allegedly saw group of over fifty
students, including ten girls, leave their town to join the paramilitaries).
91. See Colombian Defense Ministry Report 2001, supra n.54, at 35-36 (stating that Co-
lombian government wants to create incentives to favor children's decision to desert
these subversive groups by guaranteeing them emergency humanitarian aid and offer-
ing them the possibility of employment and reinsertion into society, and legal assis-
tance, whenever necessary). See also Child Soldiers, supra n.8 (reporting that in addition
to government run programs, several other independent re-integration programs oper-
ate throughout country). See also Colombian Children in Armed Conjlict, supra n.64, at 13
(reporting results of poll taken of eighty-six participants, 77% expressing positive feel-
ings for Instituto de Bienestar Familiar ("ICBF") or National Institute of Family Wel-
fare. Id The nineteen who felt unhappy missed their families. Id.
92. See U.N. Committee on the Rights of the Child, Consideration of Reports Submitted
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past four years, the ICBF has assisted approximately 752 former
child soldiers in the guerillas and paramilitary groups."3
by States Parties under Article 44 of the Convention: Colombia, CRC/C/70/Add.5 89 (Jan.
2000) [hereinafter U.N. Colombia Report] (stating that ICBF played active role in inter-
agency process to ensure implementation of international humanitarian law, particu-
larly role of children in armed conflict). The bodies working on the issue of children in
armed conflict include not only the ICBF, who takes in these children, protects, and
rehabilitates them, but also the Red de Solidaridad, or the Social Solidarity Network,
which cares for victims of violence and through its rehabilitation program, enables
these children and young adults to obtain access to educational programs through the
Ministry of Education. Id. See also Child Soldiers, supra n.8 (reporting that in 1999, the
ICBF established special program to deal with re-integration of former child combat-
ants who have escaped or been captured). In addition, several other independent re-
integration programs operate throughout the country. Id. See also Colombian Defense
Ministry Report 2001, supra n.54, at 36 (reporting that ICBF trained 300 ex-child combat-
ants through Specialized Centers of the ICBF in diverse professions in service and tech-
nical industries). To bring the re-integration about there is coordination between the
ICBF and the National Military and Police, who are the first to receive these children
after their escape; the Judiciary in the legal proceedings; the Interior Ministry in agree-
ment with the ICBF in relation to the mechanisms to bring these individuals back into
society, and other government institutions. Id. at 36. The ICBF has guidelines as to
who qualifies for the program, and they are divided in the following categories:
I ) A child or adolescent captured by the State security forces due to member-
ship in a subversive group and who appears in front of a judge. They are
classified as forcibly demobilized (captured).
2) The child or adolescent that has deserted an armed group and presents
him/herself to a State Institution, like the Public Defender's Office, the
ICBF, the military, asking for protection. They are classified as voluntarily
demobilized. For these children, their participation in these armed groups
must be swiftly clarified so that aJudge may be made aware and they may
be granted benefits under the program.
3) Children recruited by these armed groups who turn themselves in to the
State or a domestic or international human rights group, as part of a mass
demobilization. These children should be protected and urgent attention
is needed to address their dangerous situation. (author's trans.).
Id. See also Colombia 1379 Report, supra n.47, at 25 (stating that before ICBF began its
first program, former child soldiers were at risk of being placed in closed institutions
alongside juvenile delinquents, where according to People's Ombudsmen's Office, 13%
of children were killed by other inmates between 1994 and 1996). By 2001 there were
seven programs for boys and girls. Id. In the past three years, the ICBF has received
approximately 600 former child soldiers and has developed community based pro-
grams. Id. Because of the security risks involved, many of the integration programs
locations are confidential and many of these former soldiers change their names. Id.
93. See Unidad de Paz, Ejercito revela cifras sabre nifios en conflicto, EL ESPECTADOR,
Apr. 29, 2002, available at http://www.mindefensa.gov.co/prensa/temas/ninos/nin-
notnal [hereinafter Military figures regarding child soldiers] (breaking down 752 former
child soldiers, into ninety-two that deserted and 660 that were captured). Of this
group, 512 were boys, while 240 were women, all between the ages of thirteen and
seventeen. Id. The number of children being attended to has increased 100% at the
same time their ages decreased. Id. According to ICBF figures, they serviced 100 mi-
nors in 1999, 246 in 2000, 260 in 2001, and up until April 2002, 145 children. Id. They
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II. INTERNATIONAL TREATY LAW AND NATIONAL
LEGISLATION GOVERNING INTERNAL ARMED
CONFLICT AND THE CHILD SOLDIER IN COLOMBIA
Colombia ratified the four Geneva Conventions of 1949 on
August 11, 1961.4 It acceded to both Protocol Additional I ("AP
I") and II ("AP II") to the Geneva Conventions.95 Protocol II,
which governs intense internal armed conflict, is particularly rel-
evant to the Colombian war.9 6
used to get children between the ages of fourteen and seventeen, but now they are
getting those between the ages of eleven and twelve. Id. Twelve percent of these chil-
dren suffer from physical and mental ailments. Id. They are attended to in "reception
centers" of the ICBF by specialists, who begin a medical and psychological process to re-
integrate the children into society. Id. They reside there four to six months and are
then sent to juvenile homes where their treatment is completed). Id. See also Brodzin-
sky, supra n.20 (stating that ICBF has seven safe houses where former child soldiers
reside, but that due to threats of execution, their locations are kept secret). The safe
houses offer the children vocational training, psychological help and a chance to return
to their formal studies. Id. Once their residency at the house ends, those who can and
want to, return to their families, while others are sent to foster homes. Id. Others are
given the opportunity to learn a vocation. Id. See also Colombian Children in Armed Con-
flict, supra n.64, at 21 (commenting that once children were in ICBF programs they
expressed desires to learn, work, and re-join their families). The highest priority is to
strengthen and prepare these children for autonomy, independence, citizenship and
reintegration into their families and law-abiding society. Id.
94. See Geneva Conventions of 1949 [hereinafter Geneva Conventions]. There are
four Geneva Conventions: Convention (I) for the Amelioration of the Condition of the
Wounded and the Sick in Armed Forces in the Field. Geneva, 12 August 1949; Conven-
tion (II) for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked
Members of Armed Forces at Sea. Geneva, 12 August 1949; Convention (III) relative to
the Treatment of Prisoners of War. Geneva, 12 August 1949; Convention (IV) relative
to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War. Geneva, 12 August 1949, 75
U.N.T.S. 31. See also Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 and Additional Protocols of 8
June 1977: Ratifications, available at http://www.icrc.org.
95. See Additional Protocol to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and
relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), 8
June 1977, reprinted in 16 I.L.M. 1391 [hereinafter AP I]; Protocol Additional to the
Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of
Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II), 8 June 1977, reprinted in 16 I.L.M.
1442 [hereinafter AP II]. See also Arturo Carrillo, Crimes of War Magazine: Colombia: The
Traffic of Terror: International Law and the War in Colombia, available at http://www.crimes
ofwar.org/colombia-mag/index-mag.html (commenting on international humanita-
rian law treaties ("IHL") signed by Colombia). See also Geneva Conventions of 12 Au-
gust 1949 and Additional Protocols of 8 June 1977: Ratifications, available at http://
www.icrc.org (stating that Colombia acceded to API and APII on January 9, 1993 and
August 14, 1995, respectively). See also HILAIRE MCCOUBREY, INTERNATIONAL HUMANITA-
RIAN LAw: THE REGULATION OF ARMED CONFLICTS 1 (1990) (commenting that interna-
tional humanitarian law ("IHL") or "Geneva Law," as it is also termed, is found in four
1949 Geneva Conventions and two 1977 Additional Protocols).
96. See Carrillo-Suarez, supra n.29, at 90 (commenting that most observers having
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In terms of children's rights, Colombia ratified the Conven-
tion on the Rights of the Child ("CRC") on January 28, 1991,
and adopted the CRC as national legislation in national Ley 12
de 1991 ("Law 12"). 7 Colombia signed the Optional Protocols
to the Convention on the Rights of the Child ("OP-CRC") on
September 6, 2000, but has yet to ratify it.9s Colombia ratified
the International Labour Organization ("ILO") Convention
(No. 182) on the Worst Forms of Child Labour of 1999, in its
national Ley 704 de 2001 ("Law 704"). 9'
By subscribing to the principal human rights and Interna-
tional Humanitarian Law ("IHL") treaties, Colombia must re-
spect the decisions of international legal organizations that seek
to ensure the respect of the human rights and humanitarian law
direct contact with Colombia's internal conflict assume APII applies). See also RENE
PROVOST, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS AND HUMANITARIAN LAw 94 (2002) (stating
that international norms and recent practice concur that during internal conflicts, obli-
gations are imposed on all parties involved, state and non-state parties). This is re-
flected in the language of Common Article 3 and AP II. Id. See also HILAIRE Mc-
COUBREY, INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAw: MODERN DEVELOPMENTS IN THE LIMITA-
TION OF WARFARE 253-54 (2nd ed. 1998) (commenting that AP II, Article I helped to
further define criteria necessary for internal armed conflict).
97. See Convention on the Rights of the Child, G.A. Res. 44/25, Annex, U.N.
GAOR, 44th Sess., Supp. No. 49, U.N. Doc. A/44/25/49 (1989), revised in U.N. Doc. A/
RES/44/25/Corr.1 (1990), reprinted in 28 I.L.M. 1457(1989) [hereinafter CRC]. See
Ley 12 de 1991 y Convenci6n Sobre Los Derechos de los Nifios, Jan. 21 1991 (Col.),
DIARIO OFICIAL No. 39640, Jan. 22, 1991, available at http://www.bib.minjusticia.gov.
co/biblioteca/consulta.htm (stating that Law 12 approved CRC, which was adopted by
U.N. in 1989). The CRC obligated Colombia's respect and effective compliance. Id.
See also U.N. Colombia Report, supra n.92, at 87 (stating that Colombia, upon signing CRC
made declaration where it held that preferable age for involvement in armed conflict
was eighteen rather than fifteen). Colombia would construe Article 38 to require the
age of eighteen. Id.
98. See Optional Protocols to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the
involvement of children in armed conflict and on the sale of children, child prostitu-
tion and child pornography, G.A. Res. 54/263, 54th Sess., Annex I & II, U.N. Doc. A/
54/49 (2000), entered into force Feb. 12, 2002. See also Press Release, Optional Protocol
Banning Use of Child Soldiers Comes Into Force, Special Representative of the Secre-
tary-General for Children and Armed Conflict, Feb. 12, 2002 [hereinafter Special Rep-
resentative U.N. Press Release] (stating that Colombia signed Optional Protocol on
September 6 2000).
99. See International Labour Organization ("ILO") Convention (No. 182) on the
Worst Forms of Child Labour, 1999, available at http://www.ilo.org/public/english/
standards/ipec/ratification/convention/text.htm [hereinafter Child Labour Conven-
tion]. See also Ley 704 de 2001, Nov. 21, 2001, DIARIO OFICIAL No. 44628, Nov. 27,
2001, available at http://bib.minjusticia.gov.co/biblioteca/consulta.htm [hereinafter
Law 704] (commenting that through this law Colombia was ratifying ILO Convention
on Worst Forms of Child Labor).
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norms they have adopted. These organizations include the
United Nations Commission on Human Rights ("UNCHR") and
its High Commissioner for Human Rights.' 0
A. Treaty Law and Non-International Armed Conflict
Under the traditional principles of international law, viola-
tions of human rights are attributable only to States and their
officials - even if a particular State did not commit the viola-
tions."0 ' Private actors, such as the Colombian guerilla and
100. See Carrillo, supra n.95 (commenting that Commission on Human Rights and
Human Rights Commissioner are main political organs of U.N. that promote compli-
ance with human rights and IHL norms). The High.Commissioner for Human Rights
maintains an office in BogotI. Id. Both are very active in monitoring the Colombian
war. Id. See also War Without Quarter, supra n.41 (discussing laws of war applicable to
Colombian armed conflict). The obligations of Common Article 3 are for all the par-
ties to the conflict and independent of the other parties. Id. The Colombian govern-
ment cannot excuse itself from complying on the grounds that other parties to the
conflict are in violation of Common Article 3 and vice versa. Id. In addition, applica-
tion of Common Article 3 by the government cannot be legally construed as recogniz-
ing an insurgent party's belligerence. Id. Nor does the government need to recognize
the insurgent's belligerent's status in order for article Three to apply. Id. See also Es-
quirol, supra n.30, at 42 (discussing difference between terms "insurgency" and "bellig-
erency"). Id. Local rebellions are within a state's jurisdiction. Id. at 45. More general
revolts amount to an insurgency when recognized as one by the government or a third-
party state. Id. An insurgency is subject to the full force of the State law. Id. Belliger-
ency standing means that the internal conflict has escalated to the level of a full-scale
international war. Id. Governments have wide discretion to decide whether or not to
recognize belligerency. Id.
101. See Carrillo, supra n.95 (pointing out that international law of human rights
derives principally from contemporary international agreements in which States under-
take to recognize, respect, and ensure specific rights for inhabitants of their own coun-
tries). See also LINDSAY MOIR, THE LAW OF INTERNAL ARMED CONFLICT 44 (2002) (com-
menting that human rights obligations are imposed on States and their governments).
See also PROVOST, supra n.96, at 58-59 (stating that human rights law imposes an obliga-
tion on states, rather than individuals). In human rights law, there is a State obligation
corresponding to every individual right. Id. at 59. The State is obligated to protect
people's enjoyment of individual rights. Id. at 60. The State must also respect and
ensure respect for people's fights. IL In a recent Inter-American Court of Human
Rights Case ("IACHR"), the Court noted that the duty to ensure enjoyment of rights
also meant a duty to, with due diligence, prevent, investigate and punish any violation
of such rights, through the enactment of appropriate legislation and reorganizing the
state apparatus. Id. Failing to do this, a State may be in breach of its international
obligation, even though the State did not commit the actual violation. Id. See also Inter-
national Committee of the Red Cross ("ICRC"), National implementation of international
humanitarian law: International humanitarian law and international human rights law -
Similarities and Differences, available at http://www.icrc.org (commenting that human
rights law applies at all times - in peace and times of armed conflict. Id. Some human
rights law treaties allow governments to curtail certain rights during public emergencies
that threaten the nation, but the curtailment must be in proportion to the crisis, cannot
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paramilitary groups, cannot violate human rights norms under
International law because they are not subject to the obligations
laid out in human rights treaties for governments and their
agents. 10 2 IHL, on the other hand, clearly contemplates respon-
sibility for individuals, non-State actors, and government offi-
cials, who act in breach of IHL provisions during armed con-
flict.1 03
1. Geneva Conventions of 1949 and common Article Three
The four Geneva Conventions were passed on August 12,
1949.""4 Geneva Conventions anticipated two types of conflict:
the first includes all cases of war or armed conflict arising be-
tween two or more parties or States, in which one of the four
Geneva Conventions applies in its entirety - international
be discriminatory, and must not contravene other rules of international law, including
international humanitarian law. Id.
102. See Carrillo, supra n.95 (discussing obligations of guerrillas under IHL). See
also LINDSAY MOIR, supra n.101, at 45 (commenting that human rights obligations are
not binding on insurgents). The law has not reached that stage where insurgents are
bound to observe the human rights of government forces, much less those of opposing
insurgents. Id. at 194. See also PROVOST, supra n.96, at 59 (stating that if tinder human
rights law individual obligation existed, activities of non-state armed group could be
covered by human rights law). See also ICRC, supra n.101 (stating that while there is
growing body of opinion according to which non-state actors must also be expected to
respect human rights norms, issue is unsettled).
103. See Carrillo, supra n.95 (explaining differences between HR law and IHL as
pertains to responsibility of non-state actors). See also PROVOST, supra n.96, at 78 (stating
that imposition of humanitarian law obligations directly on individual appear in two
instances). First, when a non-combatant carries out the act during an international
conflict. Id. Second, when behavior is caused by insurgents not connected to the State,
fighting in an internal conflict. Id. In past cases in the International Criminal Tribunal
for Rwanda ("ICTR') and International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia ("ICTY") it
has been held that acts of individuals can and do fall within class of relationships gov-
erned by humanitarian law. Id. at 89. Since neither Tribunal offers a reason to restrict
humanitarian law to the State, then there seems to be no public policy reason not to.
Id. In its 1999 Report on Human Rights in Colombia, The Inter-American Commission
on Human Rights, found that paramilitaries were bound by humanitarian law through
their participation in the conflict, which is separate from the issue as to whether these
groups acted as State agents. Id. at 94.
104. See Geneva Conventions, supra n.94 See also ILENE COHN & Gus GOODWIN-
GItL, CHII)D SOL-DIERS: THE RoLE OF CHII DREN IN ARMED CONFLIc-I 56-57 (1994)
(describing scope of Geneva Conventions). See also Colleen C. Maher, Note, The Protec-
tion of Children in Armed Conflict: A Human Rights Analysis of the Protection Afforded to Chil-
dren in Warfare, 9 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 297, 301 (1989) (describing historical back-
ground to Geneva Conventions of 1949). The Conventions came about after the out-
rage expressed at the Third Reich's treatment of Civilians during the Second World
War. Id.
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armed conflict.1 5 The second category includes armed conflict
of an internal (non-international) character occurring in the ter-
ritory of one of the parties, in which the minimum standards of
common Article 3 to all four Geneva Conventions, apply.'0 6 Arti-
105. See generally Geneva Conventions, supra n.94, arts. I & 2. Articles I and 2 read,
in part:
Chapter I. General Provisions:
Ai-t. 1. The High Contracting Parties undertake to respect and to ensure re-
spect for the present Convention in all circumstances.
Art. 2. In addition to the provisions which shall be implemented in peacetime,
the present Convention shall apply to all cases of declared war or of any other
armed conflict that may arise between two or more of the High Contracting
Parties, even if the state of war is not recognized by one of them.
The Convention shall also apply to all cases of partial or total occupation of
the territory of a High Contracting Party, even if the said occupation meets
with no armed resistance.
Although one of the Powers in conflict may not be a party to the present
Convention, the Powers who are parties thereto shall remain bound by it in
their mutual relations. They shall furthermore be bound by the Convention in
relation to the said Power, if the latter accepts and applies the provisions
thereof.
Id. See also COHN & GoonwlN-GILL, supra n.104, at 56-57 (stating and describing two
types of conflict anticipated at time of Geneva Convention drafting).
106. See Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions, supra n.94. Article 3 reads:
In the case of armed conflict not of an international character occurring in
the territory of one of the High Contracting Parties, each Party to the Conflict
shall be bound to apply, as a minimum, the following provisions:
1) Persons taking no active part in the hostilities, including members of armed
forces who have laid down their arms and those placed hors de combat by sick-
ness, wounds, detention, or any other cause, shall in all circumstances be
treated humanely, without any adverse distinction founded on race, colour,
religion or faith, sex, birth or wealth, or any other similar criteria.
To this end the following acts are and shall remain prohibited at any time and
in any place whatsoever with respect to the above-mentioned persons:
a) violence to life and person, in particular murder of all kinds, mutilation,
cruel treatment and torture;
b) taking of hostages;
c) outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and degrading
treatment;
d) the passing of sentences and the carrying out of executions without previ-
ous judgment pronounced by a regularly constituted court, affording all
the judicial guarantees which are recognized as indispensable by civilized
peoples.
Id. See also COHN & GOODWIN-GILL, supra n.104, at 58-59 (stating that some internal
conflicts do not meet requirements of Protocol 11 and are governed instead by Article
Three). See also Charles Lysaght, The Scope of Protocol II and Its Relation to Common Article
3 of the Geneva Conventions and Other Human Rights Instruments, 33 AM. U. L. REv. 9, 11
(1983) (stating that Common Article 3 was compromise reached at 1949 Diplomatic
Conference between those who believed that Geneva Conventions should apply to all
wars of sufficient scale and those that felt it should have no application except in armed
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cle 3 generally calls for the humane treatment of individuals not
taking active part in the hostilities - mainly prohibiting the use
of all types of violence, degrading and humiliation, extra-judicial
executions, and allowing for the care of the sick and injured.10 7
conflicts between states). It affords some protection, but much less than the remaining
Articles of the four Geneva Conventions provide for international conflict victims. Id.
The Article purports to impose obligations on any party to a non-international armed
conflict, not just governments. Id. at 12. It could be argued that when a government
ratifies a convention it does so on behalf of all its nationals, even those who revolt
against the government. Id The methods of enforcement for Common Article 3 are
unclear. Id. Under the article, an impartial body like the International Committee of
the Red Cross ("ICRC") may offer its services to the conflicting parties. Id Another
problem is whether the enforcement provisions of the Conventions govern Common
Article 3. Id. One view of Article 3, after reading Common Article 2, is that it is an
isolated provision and not related to the Conventions other provisions. Id. Yet in an-
other Article that is common to the four Conventions, it is provided that "[e]ach High
Contracting Party shall take measures for the suppression of all acts contrary to the
provisions of the present Convention." Id. at 12. Prior to the Additional Protocols, the
ambiguous wording of Article 3 permitted states to deny that they breached its provi-
sions except in the most obvious cases. Id at 14.
107. See Common Article 3 to the Geneva Conventions, supra n.94.
Article 3 states:
In the case of armed conflict not of an international character occurring in
the territory of one of the High Contracting Parties, each Party to the conflict
shall be bound to apply, as a minimum, the following provisions:
1) Persons taking no active part in the hostilities, including members of armed
forces who have laid down their arms and those placed hors de combat by
sickness, wounds, detention, or any other cause, shall in all circumstances be
treated humanely, without adverse distinction founded on race, colour, relig-
ion or faith, sex, birth or wealth, or any other similar criteria.
To this end, the following acts are and shall remain prohibited at any
time and in any place whatsoever with respect to the above-mentioned per-
sons:
a) violence to life and person, in particular murder of all kinds, mutilation,
cruel treatment and torture;
b) taking of hostages;
c) outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and degrading
treatment;
d) the passing of sentences and carrying out of executions without previous
judgment pronounced by a regularly constituted court, affording all the
judicial guarantees which are recognized as indispensable by civilized peo-
ple.
2) The wounded and sick shall be collected and cared for.
An impartial humanitarian body, such as the International Committee on
the Red Cross, may offer its services to the Parties to the conflict.
The Parties to the conflict should further endeavour to bring into force,
by means of special agreements, all or part of the other provisions to the pre-
sent Convention.
The application of the preceding provisions shall not affect the legal status of
the Parties to the conflict.
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Common Article 3 states that each party to the conflict is bound
to its provisions, and the latter have been extended to non-State
armed groups, although they are not explicitly mentioned in the
Article."0 8 Yet, common Article 3 does not affect the legal status
of these insurgent groups.0 9
Il See also Lysaght, supra n.106, at 11 (commenting that Article 3 was a compromise
provision between those that felt Geneva Conventions should apply to all armed con-
flicts and those that felt the Conventions should apply only to conflicts between states).
It affords victims of internal conflict some protection, but less than that afforded to
victims of international armed conflict. Id. Common Article 3 purports to impose obli-
gations on any party to an internal conflict. Id. at 12. Although the jurisdictional basis
for imposing legal obligation on parties, other than the government is questionable, or
could be argued that when a government ratifies a convention it does so in the name of
all its citizens, even the insurgents. Id. at 12. Since Common Article 2 does not men-
tion internal conflicts, some advance that Common Article 3 is an isolated provision
and unrelated to other provisions in the Convention. ld. Critics felt that Article 3 was
defective because it protected those that were already victims of armed conflict - pris-
oners, sick and wounded. It was felt that provisions regulating combat methods in in-
ternal conflicts, and safeguarding the civilian population were needed. Id. at 14. This
lead to the initial drafting of Protocol I1 in 1974. Id. See also Rosemary Abi-Saab, Hu-
manitarian Law and Internal Concerns: The Evolution of Legal Concern, in HUMANITARIAN
LAW AND ARMED CONFLICT: CHALLENGES AHEAD 217 (Delissen and Tanja, eds. 1991)
(stating that Article 3 provides basic protection of human rights and physical integrity
of individuals, prohibiting torture, murder, mutilations, crel treatment, hostage tak-
ing). These acts are prohibited against those not actively involved in the hostilities. Id.
This provision is what sets Article 3 apart from the rest of the Geneva Conventions. Id,
Article 3 does not discuss combatants or prisoners, nor does it provide immunity from
punishment. ld.
108. See MOIR, supra n.101, at 52 (commenting that non-State insurgent parties
never agreed to Convention, and have no capacity to become parties to Convention).
Commentators believe that Article 3 binds insurgents, since APII was meant to develop
and supplement Common Article 3, and it binds both States and rebels. Id. The legal
justification used is the doctrine of legislative jurisdiction. Id. at 53. The doctrine pro-
vides that insurgents are bound because of their State's acceptance of the Convention,
since upon ratification it is binding on all of a State's citizens. lId Another justification
for binding non-State forces to Common Article 3 is asserting that treaties entered into
by States and binding on insurgents provided they exercise control over a part of na-
tional territory. Id. at 55. Yet not all rebel groups claim to represent the State - in fact
they may wish to create a new State. Id. at 55-56. A third justification would be to hold
insurgents bound by Article 3 as individuals under international law, since Conventions
treat individuals as subjects of international rights and duties. Id. at 56. See also Abi-
Saab, supra n.107, at 216 (stating that Common Article 3 vague formulation, considered
at the time of drafting, major defect, is now one of its main advantages). It does not
exclude a broad interpretation. Id.
109. See text of Common Article 3(2) to the Geneva Conventions, supra n.94. Arti-
cle 3(2) reads, in pertinent part: "The Application of the preceding provisions shall not
affect the legal status of the Parties to the conflict." See also MOIR, supra n.101, at 65
(commenting that inclusion of this provision was vital because it eased fears that gov-
ernment's power to contain internal revolt would be interfered with). Article 3 does
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2. Additional Protocol II of 1977
There are two Additional Protocols to the Geneva Conven-
tions - AP I and AP II.1 "' Both resulted from an initiative of the
International Committee of the Red Cross ("ICRC") to actualize
the laws of war and, in particular, to encourage States to recog-
nize and accept the changing face of warfare."' AP II, the appli-
cable provision in internal armed conflict, includes provisions
limiting the permissible means of combat, strengthening protec-
tion of the civilian population, and extending the applicability of
IHL within State boundaries. 1 2 AP II applies a limited range of
international standards to situations of internal armed conflict
not bestow recognition on the insurgents of any authority or of belligerency. Id. An
insurgent group remains an insurgent Linder national law. Id.
110. SeeAP I and AP i to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, supra n.95.
11. See CoHN & GOODWIN-GIiu, supra n.104, at 57 (commenting on particular in-
cidence of wars of national liberation and increased use of guerrilla tactics). See also
Lysaght, supra n.106, at 21 (stating that story of AP II was one of disappointed expecta-
tions). Initially, there were hopes that prisoner-of-war status would be conferred on
combatants in non-international armed conflicts. Id. Yet few governments were willing
to relinquish the right to punish those rebelling in arms against their authority. Id.
The ICRC draft placed before the Diplomatic Conference covered a wide range of
rights relating to methods of combat, protection of civilians, and the care of the sick
and wounded. Id. The application of APII as adopted was much more limited than
Common Article 3, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and the
American Convention, because it limited armed conflicts to those between forces of a
High Contracting Party and other armed forces under "responsible command,[and]
exercise such control over a part of its territory as to enable them to carry out a sus-
tained and concerted military operations and to implement this Protocol." Id. at 22.
112. See AP II, supra n.95, art. 4. Article 4, "Fundamental Guarantees," states:
1. All persons who do not take direct part or who have ceased to take part in
hostilities, whether or not their liberty has been restricted, are entitled to
respect for their person, honour and convictions of religious practices.
They shall in all circumstances be treated humanely, without any adverse
distinction. It is prohibited to order that there shall be no survivors.
2. Without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing, the following acts
against the persons referred to in paragraph I are and shall remain prohib-
ited at any time and in any place whatsoever:
a. violence to the life, health and physical or mental well-being of persons,
in particular murder as well as cruel treatment such as torture, mtutila-
tion or any form of corporal punishment;
b. collective punishments;
c. taking of hostages;
d. acts of terrorism;
e. outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and degrading
treatment, rape, enforced prostitution and any form of indecent assault;
f. slavery and the slave trade in all their forms;
g. pillage
i. threats to commit any of the foregoing acts.
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of the intensity most people would classify as "civil war.""1 3
Id. See also Part IV Civilian Population, art. 13 "Protection of the Civilian Population."
Artcle 13 states:
1. The civilian population and individual civilians shall enjoy general protec-
tion against the dangers arising from military operations. To give effect to
this protection, the following rules shall be observed in all circumstances.
2. The civilian population as such, as well as individual citizens, shall not be
the object of attack. Acts or threats of violence the primary purpose of
which is to spread terror among the civilian population are prohibited.
3. Civilians shall enjoy the protection afforded by this part, unless and for
such time as they take direct part in hostilities.
Id. See also art. 17 "Prohibition of Forced Movement of Civilians." Article 17 states:
1. The displacement of the civilian population shall not be ordered for rea-
sons related to the conflict unless the security of the civilians involved or
imperative military reasons so demand. Should such displacements have to
be carried out, all possible measures shall be taken in order that the civilian
population may be received under satisfactory conditions of shelter, hy-
giene, health, safety, and nutrition.
2. Civilians shall not be compelled to leave their own territory for reasons
connected to the conflict.
Id. See also COHN & GoODWiN-GILL, supra n.104, at 57 (discussing evolution and scope of
Additional Protocols).
V13. See Preamble to AP II, supra n.95. The Preamble states:
The High Contracting Parties, Recalling that the humanitarian principles
enshrined in Article 3 common to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949,
constitute the foundation of respect for the human person in cases of armed
conflict not of an international character,
Recalling furthermore that international instruments relating to human rights
offer a basic protection to the human person,
Emphasizing the need to ensure a better protection for the victims of those
armed conflicts,
Recalling that, in cases not covered by the law in force, the human person
remains under the protection of the principles of humanity and the dictates
or the public conscience,
Have agreed on the following...
Id. See also Part 1. Scope of this Protocol, art. I "Material field of application." Article I
reads:
1. This protocol, which develops and supplements Article 3 Common to the
Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 without modifying its existing con-
ditions or application, shall apply to all armed conflicts which are not cov-
ered by Article I of the Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of
12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of International
Armed Conflicts (Protocol I) and which take place in the territory of one of
a High Contracting Party between its armed forces and dissident armed
forces or other organized armed groups which, under responsible com-
mand, exercise such control over a part of its territory as to enable them to
carry out sustained and concerted military operations and to implement
this Protocol.
2. This protocol shall not apply to situations of internal disturbances and ten-
sions, such as riots, isolated and sporadic acts of violence and other acts of a
similar nature, as not being armed conflicts.
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AP II can only be applied if an internal conflict reaches a
certain level of intensity, and the armed opposition, in turn,
meets the criteria of responsible command and control over ter-
ritory, and capacity to implement the AP 11.114 AP II is binding
on insurgents, as is Common Article 3115 Many situations fall
short of the AP II threshold, and remain governed by the mini-
mal conditions of Common Article 3116 Common Article 3 also
Id. See also COHN & GOODWIN-GILL, supra n.104, at 57 (stating applicability of AP II).
114. SeeAP II, supra n.95, art. 1(1). Article 1(1) reads:
This Protocol ... shall apply to all armed conflicts which are not covered by
Article I of ... [Protocol I] and which take place in the territory of a High
Contracting Party between its armed forces and dissident armed forces or
other organized armed groups which, under responsible command, exercise
such control over a part of its territory as to enable them to carry out sustained
and concerted military operations and to implement this Protocol.
Id. See also COHN & GOODWIN-GILL, supra n.104, at 58 (discussing applicability of AP I1);
PROVOST, supra n.96, at 267 (stating that as opposed to AP II, where State needs to be
involved in order for its provisions to apply, Common Article 3 makes no such require-
ment). In addition, control of a portion of national territory is also unnecessary under
Common Article 3. Id.; Sylvie Junod, Additional Protocol II: History and Scope, Am. U.L.
REV. 29, 35 (1983) (stating that Protocol II develops and supplements Common Article
3 "without modifying its existing conditions of application"). The Diplomatic Confer-
ence drafting AP II chose to adapt the scope of the Protocol to the degree of intensity
of the conflict. Id. In those situations where the conditions for the application of AP II
are fulfilled, both AP II and Common Article 3 apply at the same time, because the
scope of AP II is included in Article Three's wider scope. Id. See also David Matas, Armed
Opposition Groups, 24 MAN. L.J. 621, 627 (1997) (stating that unlike Additional Protocol
I, there is no provision in Additional Protocol II, to allow armed opposition groups
involved in conflict of internal character to declare accession to Protocol). It applies
only in the signatory's territory, and where the dissident armed forces are able to imple-
ment the Protocol. Id. There is an element of reciprocity in ability. Id. States which
have acceded to the Protocol are supposed to apply it where dissident armed forces are
able to implement the Protocol, whether the dissident armed forces are willing to im-
plement the Protocol or not. Id.
115. See MOIR, supra n.101, at 97 (commenting that Common Article 3 binds both
parties to internal conflict and since AP II supplements Common Article 3 it must do so
as well). It would be strange if AP II did not provide the same conditions as Common
Article 3, since AP II develops Article 3, which actually confers rights and obligations on
insurgents. Id. See also PROVOST, supra n.96, at 160 (stating that in internal armed con-
flict neither Common Article 3 nor AP II draws distinctions between regular or irregu-
lar combatants). Insurgents are required to comply with humanitarian law, regardless
of compliance by the State's armed forces. Id. at 161. See also THE HANDBOOK OF Hu-
MANITARIAN LAw IN ARMED CONFLIUcrs 211 (Dieter Fleck, ed. 1995) (commenting that
Common Article 3 and APII are two instruments that apply exclusively to internal
armed conflicts). AP II applies with equal force to all parties-government and rebels
alike. Id.
116. SeeAP II, supra n.95, art. 1(2). Article 1(2)reads:
This protocol shall not apply to situations of internal disturbances and ten-
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has a threshold, without which it does not apply.'17 The applica-
bility of some rules of international humanitarian law depends
on whether the State has ratified the Geneva Conventions or the
Additional Protocols, and whether the conflict falls within one of
sions, such as riots, isolated and sporadic acts of violence and other acts of a
similar nature, as not being armed conflicts.
Id. See also COHN & GOODWIN-GILL, supra n.104, at 58-59 (commenting that these situa-
tions remain governed by minimal provisions of Common Article 3 and other human
rights provisions that have not been derogated). See also PROVOST, supra n.96, at 261
(discussing evolution of APII from Common Article 3). Some felt that rules of internal
armed conflicts should be expanded to cover more situations, or clarified to increase
chances of application, while others preferred a narrower field because it would allow
for better regulation of conflicts. Id. Two regimes were created, under Article 3 -
which was wider in scope but narrower in content, and APII - with more limited appli-
cability but more detailed rules. Id. Common Article 3 also governs all conflicts appli-
cable to APII. I. The field of application of AP II is set out in Article 1, and Article
1(2) sets out the lower threshold where APII does not apply. Id. It is not an exception
to what defines conflict, but describes the opposite conditions listed in Article 1 (1). Id.
See alsojunod, supra n.114, at 35 (stating that in low-intensity conflict, which does not
fulfill requirements of Protocol I1, Common Article 3 applies alone). See also text of
Common Article 3. Four minimum provisions under Art. 3(1) are:
a) violence to life and person, in particular murder of all kinds, mutilation,
cruel treatment and torture;
b) taking of hostages;
c) outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and degrading
treatment;
d) the passing of sentences and the carrying out of executions without previ-
ous judgment pronounced by a regularly constituted court, affording all
the judicial guarantees which are recognized as indispensable by civilized
peoples.
Id.
117. SeeCOHN & GOODWIN-GILL, supra n.104, at 59 (commenting that even though
Common Article 3 may not apply, local law and prevailing human rights obligations
do). See also Matas, supra n.] 14, at 628 (maintaining that Common Article 3 states that
in cases of internal armed conflict occurring in territory of one of signing parties, each
party to conflict is bound to apply listed minimum provision). There are only two limi-
tations on the obligation: that the conflict be in the territory of the signing party and
that it be an armed conflict. Id. According to commentary on the Conventions, any
conflict is an armed one once there are armed forces engaged in hostilities. Id. They
are conflicts like an international war confined to a single country. Id See also Laura
Lopez, Note, Uncivil Wars: The Challenge of Applying International Humanitarian Law to
Internal Armed Conflicts, 69 N.Y.U. L. REv. 916, 927 (1994) (stating that unlike Protocol
II, Article 3 does not define characteristics of "armed conflicts not of international char-
acter"). Yet, authoritative ICRC commentary states that the conflicts referred to in Arti-
cle 3 "are armed conflicts, with armed forces on either side engaged in hostilities -
conflicts, in short, which in many respects are similar to an international war, but take
place within the confines of a single country." Id. at 927-28. Article 3 applies to some
civil disputes, which do not fall under Protocol II, like when a dissident group engages
in armed conflict but does not attain the required level of control over a territory con-
trol to trigger Protocol II. Id. at 928.
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five categories." 8
B. Applicability of Geneva Conventions of 1949, and the
Additional Protocols of 1977 to the Child Soldier
The Geneva Conventions of 1949 do not prohibit a child
from becoming involved in armed conflict, but provide for the
general protection of children, alongside women, during armed
conflict.'"' AP I does not explicitly state that a child may never
become a combatant in an international armed conflict. 120  In-
stead, Article 77 of AP I placed restrictions on those parties that
118. See COhN & GOODWIN-GILL, supa n.104, at 57. The five categories of conflict
are: 1) traditional international arned conflicts, 2) AP I conflicts, 3) AP 11 conflicts
between a State and organized armed groups under responsible command, 4) Com-
mon Article 3 conflicts under the 1949 Conventions, 5) and riots and internal disor-
ders. Id.
119. See id. at 61 (stating limitations of Geneva with regards to child participation
in armed conflict). See also Maher, supra n.104, at 302 (commenting that Article 3 to
Geneva Conventions left many of the dangers confronted by civilians today unad-
dressed). Modern guerrilla warfare often results in insurgents looking to the civilian
population for support. Id. Traditionally, children were protected by "cultural pre-
sumptions" that were not combatants. Id. The use of children by the Nazis, and those
in opposition to them was the first widespread uses of children in modern conflict. Id.
Article Three's blanket protection is not sufficient to protect children in modern war-
fare. Id. at 303. Modern warfare has destroyed the presumption of innocence of chil-
dren, and allowed for active recruitment. Id. at 304. But seeTHE RIGHTS OF -THE CHILD:
INTERNATIONAL INSTRUMENTS 717 (1995) (pointing out that Part II of Geneva Conven-
tion (IV) for the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, General Protection of
Populations Against Certain Consequences of War, provides for overall child children -,
in Article 13, which reads "The provisions of Part II cover the whole of the population
of the countries in conflict, without any adverse distinction [...] and are intended to
alleviate the sufferings caused by war"). Id. There is also a provision in Article 14 that
calls for designating "safety zones" for the protection of the wounded, sick, elderly,
children under the age of fifteen, expectant mothers and those with children under the
age of seven. Id. The same can generally be said for Article seventeen and twenty-three.
Id. at 718. See also Alison Dundes Renteln, The Child Soldier: The Challenge of Enforcing
International Standards, 21 WHITTIER L. REV. 191, 193 (1999) (stating that Fourth Geneva
Convention gave general protection to women and children as civilians in territories,
occupied or unoccupied).
120. See COHN & GOODWIN-GILL, supra n.104, at 61 (stating limitations of API with
regards to children in armed conflict). See also Maher, supra n.104, at 308 (commenting
that draft articles provided "explicit" protection of children, rather than including chil-
dren by "implication" in blanket civilian protection). Some of the delegates felt that
documented increase in use of child soldiers eliminated international obligation to pro-
vide them with special protection. Id. Modifications were proposed to create standards
that apply to children in participating in armed conflicts rather than bar all child partic-
ipation in armed conflicts. Id. at 309. They appeared to decrease actual child protec-
tion, but were an attempt to insure some adherence by participating nations. Id. These
modifications were rejected in favor of the present form. Id.
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recruit children. 121 In particular, Article 77(2) reads that all par-
ties shall take "feasible measures" to ensure that children who
have not attained the age of fifteen do not take a "direct part" in
hostilities, and shall refrain from "recruiting" them into the
armed forces. 122
Under AP II, the formal immunity of children from recruit-
121. See AP 1, supra n.ll0, art 77. Article 77 "Protection of Children" reads:
1. Children shall be the object of special respect and shall be protected
against any form of indecent assault. The Parties to the conflict shall pro-
vide them with the care and aid they require, whether because of their age
or for any other reason.
2. The Parties to the conflict shall take all feasible measures in order that
children who have not attained the age of fifteen years do not take a direct
part in hostilities and, in particular, they shall refrain from recruiting them
into their armed forces. In recruiting among those persons who have at-
tained the age of fifteen years but who have not attained the age of eigh-
teen years, the Parties to the conflict shall endeavour to give priority to
those who are oldest.
3. If, in exceptional cases, despite provisions of paragraph 2, children who
have not attained the age of fifteen years take a direct part in hostilities and
fall into the power of the adverse Party, they shall continue to benefit from
the special protection accorded by this Article, whether or not they are pris-
oners of war.
4. If arrested, detained, or interned for reasons related to the armed conflict,
children shall be held in quarters separate from the quarters of adults, ex-
cept where families are accommodated as family units as provided in Article
75, paragraph 5
5. The death penalty for an offence related to the armed conflict shall not be
executed on persons who had not attained the age of eighteen years at the
time of offence was committed.
Id. See also COHN & GoODWIN-GILL, supra n.104, at 61 (pointing out that with respect to
international armed conflicts in which State and/or armed opposition have declared
their adherence to AP I, Article 77(2) imposes certain limitations on freedom to re-
cruit). It is less restrictive than the measure originally proposed by the ICRC to the
Diplomatic Conference, which would have obliged parties to take "all necessary mea-
sures" to prevent participation. I& The text now reflects the wish of governments "to
avoid entering into absolute obligations with regard to the voluntary participation of
children in hostilities." Id. States rejected the draft Article, which would have prohib-
ited even indirect participation in hostilities, like transmission of information, trans-
porting of arms and supply provisions, as "unrealistic." Id. at 61-62. See also MC-
CouBREY, supra n.96, at 93 (commenting that Article 77 is most extensive provision
affording protection for children in armed conflict, aside from general provisions for
civilian protection from which they benefit). See also Renteln, supra n.119, at 193 (stat-
ing that Article 77 prohibited all types of child involvement in armed conflict in territo-
ries of states in conflict).
122. See AP 1, supra n.10, art. 77(2). Art. 77(2) reads:
The Parties to the conflict shall take all feasible measures in order that chil-
dren who have not attained the age of fifteen years do not take a direct part in
hostilities and, in particular, they shall refrain from recruiting them into their
armed forces. In recruiting among those persons who have attained the age of
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ment and "involvement" is stronger in civil war situations, as is
evident in article 4(3).23 Article 4(3)(c) of AP II provides that
children under the age of fifteen shall neither be recruited in
the armed forces or groups, nor allowed to take part in hostili-
ties. 124 Under AP II, two distinct obligations of conduct apply,
and voluntary or indirect participation of those under fifteen is
fifteen years but who have not attained the age of eighteen years, the Parties to
the conflict shall endeavour to give priority to those who are oldest.
Id. See also COHN & GOODWIN-GILL, supra n.104, at 62 (noting that according to some
interpretations word recruit, as used in Article covers both compulsory and voluntary
recruitment). It defines "feasible" as "that which is capable of being done and, by defi-
nition, whatever is under the jurisdiction and control of a party is prima facie capable of
being done." Id; Astrid J.M. Delissen, Legal Protection of Child-Combatants After the Proto-
cols: Reaffirmation, Development or a Step Backwards?, in HUMANITARIAN LAW OF ARMED
CONFLICr: CHALLENGES AHEAD 154 (Dellisen & Tanja eds., 1991) (contending that Arti-
cle 77 is weak provision for child protection). It fails to protect children older than
fifteen, it uses "feasible measures" instead of "necessary measures," and there is no ban
on non-combat participation of children. Id. See also Renteln, supra n.119, at 193 (com-
menting that Additional Protocols deal directly with role of children in armed conflict
and regulate it for first time). Article 77 prohibits all types of child involvement in
armed conflict in territories of the states in conflict. Id.
123. SeeAP II, supra n.l0, art. 4(3). Article 4(3) reads:
Children shall be provided with the care and aid they require, and in particu-
lar:
a) they shall receive an education, including religious and moral education,
in keeping with the wishes of their parents, or in the absence of parents, of
those responsible for their care;
b) all appropriate steps shall be taken to facilitate the reunion of families tem-
porarily separated;
c) children who have not attained the age of fifteen years shall neither be
recruited in the armed forces or groups nor allowed to take part in hostili-
ties;
d) the special protection provided in this Article to children who have not
attained the age of fifteen years shall remain applicable to them if they
take direct parting hostilities despite the provisions of subparagraph (c)
and are captured;
e) measures shall be taken, if necessary, and whenever possible with the con-
sent of their parents or persons who by law or custom are primarily respon-
sible for their care, to remove the children temporarily from the area in
which hostilities are taking place to a safer area within the country and
ensure they are accompanied by persons responsible for their safety and
well-being.
Id. See also COHN & GOODWIN-GILL, supra note 104, at 64, n.26 (stating that difference in
treatment is possibly attributable to fact that provisions for child protection were under-
taken by different committee and before drafting of parallel provisions in Protocol I).
See also Renteln, supra n. 119, at 193 (comparing children in armed conflict provisions
of APII to API and noting difference in scope as to child participation in armed con-
flict).
124. SeeAPII, supra n.ll0, art. 4(3) (dealing with children). Article 4(3) reads, in
pertinent part:
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equally ruled out. 125 This is a total prohibition, for a child can-
not be recruited, or enlist himself, but furthermore will not be
allowed to "take part in hostilities" i.e. to indirectly participate in
military operations such as gathering information, transmitting
orders, transporting ammunition and foodstuffs, or committing
acts of sabotage.
1 26
There is no rule that forbids youth from participating in
non-international armed conflicts; instead, AP II places the re-
sponsibility not on the children, but on the parties to the con-
Children shall be provided with the care and aid they require, and in particu-
lar:
a) they shall receive an education, including religious and moral education,
in keeping with the wishes of their parents, or in the absence of parents, of
those responsible for their care;
b) all appropriate steps shall be taken to facilitate the reunion of families tem-
porarily separated;
c) children who have not attained the age of fifteen years shall neither be
recruited in the armed forces of groups nor allowed to take active part in
hostilities;
d) the special protection provided by this Article to children who have not
attained the age of fifteen years shall remain applicable to them if they
take direct part in hostilities despite the provisions of subparagraph (c)
and are captured;
e) measures shall be taken, if necessary, and whenever possible with the con-
sent of their parents or persons who by law or custom are primarily respon-
sible for their care, to remove children temporarily from the area in which
hostilities are taking place to a safer area within the country and to ensure
that they are accompanied by persons responsible for their safety and well-
being.
Id. See also COHN & GOODWIN-GILL, supra n.104, at 64 (emphasizing stronger language
of AP II as opposed to Geneva and AP I). See also Renteln, supra n.119, at 193 (com-
menting on provision prohibiting all types of in child participation in armed conflict).
125. See COHN & GOODWIN-GILL, supra n.104, at 64, n.25 (explaining that "obliga-
tions of conduct" call for action at level of direct relations between States- it requires
specifically determined course of conduct, and to determine whether it has been ful-
filled turns on whether State's action or omission is/not in conformity with internation-
ally required conduct). See also Renteln, supra n.119, at 194 (stating that Article is inno-
vative provision because it contains total prohibition of participation, including even
voluntary enlistment). But see Delissen, supra n.122, at 157 (commenting on differing
interpretations of word "recruitment" in Article 77). The Chairman of the Working
Group involved in Article 77s drafting claims that the ban on recruitment includes vol-
untary enlistment. Id. While others believe that not including an explicit ban on ac-
cepting children who volunteer, essentially permits parties to allow child volunteers. Id.
126. See Renteln, supra n.1 19, at 194 (stating that children are not to be involved in
any military operations). See also Chen Reis, Trying the Future, Avenging the Past: The
Implications of Prosecuting Children for Participation in Internal Armed Conflict, 28 COLUM.
HUM. RTS. L. REV.629, 641 (1997) (commenting that Protocol II contains no "prisoner
of war" category). Therefore, children who participate in internal armed conflicts are
subject to penalties under the domestic laws of their countries. Id.
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flict - those with the power and/or authority on either the gov-
ernment or opposition side to recruit. 2 7 The parties to the con-
flict - government or insurgent - have a duty to continue
protecting children who actually participate in the hostilities. 128
An insurgent group, like the government, will only be formally
bound by APII, if the State has ratified the treaty, or if it is recog-
nized as having made a valid unilateral declaration of intent to
respect international humanitarian law rules. 12 9 It will be bound
by the rules of customary international law ("CIL"), regardless of
whether they relate to conduct during conflict or protect vulner-
able groups, like children.3 0
127. See COHN & GOODWIN-GLL, supra n.104, at 64 (stating that commentators be-
liefs perhaps reflects practical difficulties of regulating or controlling self-willed activi-
ties of those under fifteen). See also Reis, supra n. 126, at 641-42 (stating that language of
Protocol 11 seemingly puts responsibility on those who allow child's participation and
not on child). See also Renteln, supra n.1 19, at 194 (stating that language of Protocol
"ascribes" responsibility to those who allow children to participate rather than child).
128. See alsoAP II, art. 4(3)(d). Article 4(3)(d)reads:
The special protection provided by this Article to children who have not
attained the age of fifteen years shall remain applicable to them if they take
direct part in hostilities despite the provisions of subparagraph (c) and are
captured.
Id. See also COHN & GOODWIN-GILL, supra n. 104, at 64 (commenting that parties to con-
flict are responsible for protecting children). See also Reis, supra n.126 at 642 (stating
that special protection afforded by Article remains effective even if child becomes in-
volved in armed conflict). This protection, includes, but is not limited to, measures
regarding education and family reunification. Id. See also Article 4(3) (e), which reads:
measures shall be taken, if necessary, and whenever possible with the consent
of their parents or persons who by law or custom are primarily responsible for
their care, to remove children temporarily from the area in which hostilities
are taking place to a safer area within the country and to ensure that they are
accompanied by persons responsible for their safety and well-being.
Id.
129. See COHN & GOODWIN-GILL, supra n.104, at 65 (commenting on legal responsi-
bilities of government and insurgency with respect to children and CIL). See also
Renteln, supra n.119, at 194 (stating that Protocol II is binding on States Parties and
armed opposition groups equally).
130. See COHN & GOODWIN-GILL, supra n.104, at 65 (stating that in dynamic circum-
stances of civil war and internal armed conflict, rules that can be realistically applied
must be identified, and distinction between formal application of rules and conse-
quences of breaching them). See also Christopher Greenwood, Customary Law Status of
the 1977 Geneva Protocols, in HUMANITARIAN LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT: CHALLENGES
AHEAD, supra n.107, at 96 (commenting that it is generally assumed that multilateral
treaties are treated as authoritative statements of customary international law). This
applies in two cases: 1) when principles are codified that are already part of customary
international law prior to the end of the treaty, and 2) even though they go beyond
current customary law, the principles laid down by treaties are accepted as applicable
and become part of customary international law. Id. See also Hans-Peter Gasser, Negoti-
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1. Convention on the Rights of the Child
The Convention on the Rights of the Child ("CRC"), a doc-
ument which upholds children's rights, entered into force in
1990, and offers general support for the argument against re-
cruitment of children.'' Article 4 of the CRC obliges States Par-
ties to implement the rights recognized in the Convention.
32
ating the 1977 Additional Protocols: Was it a Waste of Time?, in HUMANITARIAN LAW OF
ARMED CONFLICar: CHALLENGES AHEAD, supra n.107, at 85 (commenting that it is also
commonly agreed that major parts of both Additional Protocols give expression to cus-
tomary law). Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions is part of customary law.
Id. AP II goes farther than, and codified important human rights law. Id. APIL
strengthened basic human rights protection, more so than create new humanitarian
obligations. Id. AP II has clarified current customary law relating to protection of per-
sons during armed conflict, and it well help to interpret customary law in States were
APII is not applicable due to its non-ratification. Id.
131. See CRC, supra n.97, Preamble. The Preamble reads, in part:
The States Parties to the present Convention,
Considering that, in accordance with the principles proclaimed in the Charter
of the United Nations, recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal
and inalienable rights of all members of the human family is the foundation of
freedom, justice, and peace in the world, [...]
Recalling that, in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the United Na-
tions has proclaimed that childhood is entitled to special care and assis-
tance,[...]
Recognizing that, in all countries of the world, there are children living in ex-
ceptionally difficult conditions and that such children need special considera-
tion,
Taking due account of the importance of the traditions and cultural values of
each people for the protection and harmonious development of the child,
Recognizing the importance for improving the living conditions of children in
every country, in particular in the developing countries [...]
Id. See also COHN & GOODWIN-GILL, supra n.104, at 67-68 (commenting that CRC also
deals with education, particularly in article 29, which is platform "almost incompatible"
with child involvement in armed conflict). See also Hick, supra n.2, at 118 (stating that
CRC had been endorsed by 191 States, making it most widely ratified international
instrument in history). See also A. GLENN MOWER, JR., THE CONVENTION ON THE RIGHTS
OF THE CHILD: INTERNATIONAL LAW SUPPORT FOR CHILDREN 3 (1997) (stating that Con-
vention's significance lies in fact that it is first global instrument to "explicitly recog-
nize" children as having rights that states must "respect and ensure" (Article 1).
132. See CRC, supra n.97, art. 4. Article 4 reads:
States Parties shall undertake all appropriate legislative, administrative and
other measures for the implementation of the rights recognized in the present
Convention. With regard to economic, social and cultural rights, States Parties
shall undertake such measures to the maximum extent of their available re-
sources and, where needed, within the framework of international co-opera-
tion.
Id. See also MOWER, supra n.131, at 7 (stating that CRCs potential impact on world, stems
partly from fact it increases possibility that children will not be left behind, regardless of
geographic location).
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Article 38 of the Convention refers to the applicable humanita-
rian law and the limits of recruitment and participation of chil-
dren in armed conflicts in the familiar language. 133 While incor-
porating most of Article 77(2) of AP I, Article 38(2) of the CRC
curbed article 4(3) of AP II, by requiring States Parties to take all
feasible measures to prevent direct participation of children
under the age of fifteen in hostilities. 34 Yet, CRC Article 41 en-
133. See CRC, supra n.97, art. 38. Article 38 reads:
1. States Parties undertake to respect and to ensure respect for the rules of
international humanitarian law applicable to them in armed conflicts
which are relevant to the child.
2. States Parties shall take all feasible measures to ensure that persons who
have not attained the age of fifteen years do not take direct part in hostili-
ties.
3. States Parties shall refrain from recruiting any person who has not attained
the age of fifteen years into their armed forces. In recruiting among those
persons who have attained the age of fifteen years but who have not at-
tained the age of eighteen years, States Parties shall endeavour to give pri-
ority to those who are oldest.
4. In accordance with their obligations under international humanitarian law
to protect the civilian population in armed conflicts, States Parties shall
take all feasible measures to ensure the protection and care of children
who are affected by armed conflict.
Id. See also COHN & GOODWIN-GILL, supra n.104, at 67, 68-69 (stating that 25th Interna-
tional Conference of Red Cross, held in Geneva in 1986, stressed that the protection to
be provided to children under CRC, which was at that time under consideration,
'should be at least the same as that accorded by the Geneva Conventions and the two
Additional Protocols"). It did not work out quite that way. Id. The U.N. Special Repre-
sentative took the position that a provision of international humanitarian law should
not be altered by a human rights instrument. Id. See also Renteln, supra n.119, at 196
(discussing controversy and innovative aspects of article). Article 38 was the most con-
troversial provision largely because of the age limit question. Id. When the lower of
fifteen was chosen, several States objected and preferred to use the higher age of eigh-
teen. Id. When these States ratified the CRC, they attached declarations stating they
would not allow children to participate in armed conflict until the age of eighteen. Id.
The Article was also considered innovative because it based human rights law on hu-
manitarian law. Id. at 197. It is claimed that Article 38 of CRC employs a double stan-
dard, in that it makes requirements of CRC applicable to conduct of States parties and
others. Id. The United States objected to having humanitarian law inserted into a
human rights instrument. Id. See also MOWER, supra n.131, at 40 (stating that major part
of CRC deals with child's right to protection from threats to their safety and well-be-
ing). The Articles that define this right were drafted at a time when the need for child
protection was "beyond doubt." Id. The need to protect was most acute for children in
rural areas who lacked access to the services, resources and infrastructure that would
allow them to reach full potential. Id.
134. See CRC, supra n.97, for text of art. 38(2). See also COHN & GOODWIN-GILL,
supra n.104, at 69 (paraphrasing text of Article 38(2)). See also SHARON DETRICK, A
COMMENTARY ON THE UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE RIGHTS OF THE CHILD 646
(1999) (pointing to Article 38(2) which directs States Parties to "refrain from recruiting
any person who has not attained the age of fifteen years into their armed forces"). See
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sures that the discrepancies in the wording noted above will not
diminish the protection afforded to children.13 The CRC, in
Article 39, puts the onus on States Parties, to take "all appropri-
ate measures to promote the recovery and social integration of
these children."1 3 16 Commentators have noted that like most
human rights treaties, the CRC is limited in application only to
States, rather than to the parties in a conflict.1 37
also LAWRENCE J. LEBLANC, THE CONVENTION ON THE RIGHTS OF THE CHILD: UNITED NA-
TIONS LAWMAKING ON HUMAN RIGHTS 150 (1995) (discussing why some countries and
organizations insisted on keeping age limit at fifteen, instead of raising it to eighteen).
Supporters of the lower age limit pointed to the Additional Protocols to Geneva and the
age limit of fifteen that it set. Id. If Article 38(2) specified the same age limit it would
be "consistent" with existing international humanitarian law. Id. at 150-151. This was
the easiest way to deal with the issue, but it did not meet with the approval of those
individuals who believed treaties and conventions should be used to advance interna-
tional law development. Id, at 151. See also Article 4(3) of AP 11 (1977) to the Geneva
Conventions (1949) supra 123, for text ofArticle). See also AP I, supra n.121, for text of
Article 77. See also Reis, supra n.126, at 643 (stating that language of Article 38(2) is
weaker than that of article 4(3) (c) of Protocol II). Id.
135. See CRC, supra n.97, art. 41. Article 41 reads:
Nothing in the present Convention shall affect any provisions which are more
conducive to the realization of the rights of the child which may be contained
in:
a) The law of a State party; or
b) International law in force for that State.
Id See also COHN & GOODWIN-GILL, supra n.104, at 69 (commenting that children's
rights monitors will need to check State's compliance with CRC against the highest
protective standard, nationally or internationally).
136. See CRC, supra n.97, art. 39. Article 39 reads:
States Parties shall take all appropriate measures to promote physical and psy-
chological recovery and social reintegration of a child victim: any form of neg-
lect, exploitation, or abuse; torture or any other form of cruel, inhuman or
degrading treatment or punishment; or armed conflicts. Such recovery and
reintegration shall take place in an environment which fosters the heath, self-
respect and dignity of the child.
Id. See also DETRICK, supra n.134, at 646 (commenting that Article 38(4), which calls on
States Parties "in accordance with their obligations under international humanitarian
law to protect civilians" in armed conflict, and to take all feasible measures to ensure
"protection and care" for children affected by armed conflict," is closely related to Arti-
cle 39, which deals with child's right to recovery and re-integration).
137. See COHN & GOODWIN-GILL, supra n.104, at 6 (stating that when conflict is
beyond reach of IHL, CRC may be way to bring those standards "through the back-
door" when State is party to Convention). In situations where children participate in
armed opposition groups and AP II does not apply, the fact that the State ratified the
CRC, presents the challenge of extending the law to NGEs and monitoring them. Id.
See also Renteln, supra n.]19, at 197 (stating that CRC has serious limitation in that it
generally limits only States' conduct). See also DETRICK, supra n.134, at 651 (comment-
ing that wording of Article 38(1) one is based on Article I of Geneva Conventions).
The wording may imply positive and negative obligations on the State party regarding
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2. Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the
Child: Children in Armed Conflict (2002)
On May 25, 2000, the U.N. General Assembly adopted two
Protocols to the Convention on the Rights of the Child: the Pro-
tocol on the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict
("Armed Conflict Protocol") and the Protocol on the Sale of
Children, Child Pornography and Child Prostitution ("Sale of
Children Protocol"). 38 The Armed Conflict Protocol requires
States Parties to take all feasible measures to ensure that chil-
dren who have not reached the age of eighteen do not take part
in direct military operations.' It stipulates that States Parties
not impose obligatory military service on persons not yet eigh-
teen years of age. 4 ' It raises the minimum age for military con-
its own conduct and that of others. Id. It is argued that Article 1 of Geneva implies that
States Parties should insure respect for the Convention's provisions by their own armed
forces, and the universal application of underlying humanitarian principles. Id.
138. See Optional Protocols to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the
involvement of children in armed conflict and on the sale of children, child prostitu-
tion and child pornography, G.A. Res. 54/263, 54th Sess., Annex I & II, U.N. Doc. A/
54/49 (2000), entered into force Feb. 12, 2002. See also MichaelJ. Dennis, Current Develop-
ment: Newly Adopted Protocols to the Convention of the Rights of the Child, The American Journal
International Law 94 AM. J. INTL L. 789, 789 (2000) (commenting that Protocols repre-
sented major advances in international effort to strengthen and enforce protective
norms for children). Id. See also DETRICK, supra n.134, at 658 (discussing how the con-
troversy surrounding the age limits of child recruits in armed conflict during the draft-
ing of article 38, quite possibly propelled the U.N. Commission on Human Rights, by
resolution 1994/91, to decide to establish open-ended Working Group to draft optional
Protocol to the CRC on child involvement in armed conflict). Through resolution
1997/78, the Commission requested the group work on a draft optional protocol. Id.
139. See OP-CRC on Children in Armed Conflict, supra n.98, art. 1. Article I reads:
States Parties shall take all feasible measures to ensure that members of
their armed forces who have not attained the age of 18 years do not take a
direct part in hostilities.
Id. See also Dennis, supra n.138, at 789 (commenting that Children in Armed Conflict
Protocol raises conscription age to eighteen, as stipulated by existing international law).
See also DETRICK, supra n.134, at 660 (discussing opinions of working group for draft
protocol concerning direct and indirect involvement in military operations). Most of
the delegations felt that direct and indirect participation should be prohibited. Id.
They thought that including "direct" would weaken the protocol, since many children
in war zones were performing dangerous tasks that placed their lives at risk. Id. Others
felt that the word "direct" was necessary. Id.
140. See OP-CRC on Children in Armed Conflict, supra n.98, art. 2. Article 2 reads:
States Parties shall ensure that persons who have not attained the age of 18
years are not compulsorily recruited into their armed forces.
Id. See also Dennis, supra n.138, at 789 (stating that OP-CRC on Children in Armed
Conflict states that Parties should not recruit minors under age of eighteen into their
military).
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scription from fifteen to eighteen, as stipulated under existing
international law. 14 1 It asks non-government armed groups to
not recruit or use children. 142 States parties must also take mea-
sures to prohibit the recruitment and use of persons below the
age of eighteen by these non-government armed groups. 4 ' It is
also the States' obligation to take the necessary measures to im-
plement the provisions of the Protocol. 144
141. See OP-CRC on Children in Armed Conflict, supra n.98, art. 3. Article 3
reads:
1. States Parties shall raise the minimum age for the voluntary recruitment of
persons into their national armed forces from that set out in article 38,
paragraph 3, of the Convention on the Rights of the Child, taking into
account the principles contained in that article and recognizing that under
the Convention persons under 18 are entitled to special protection.
2. Each State Party shall deposit a binding declaration upon ratification of or
accession to this Protocol that sets forth the minimum age at which it will
permit voluntary recruitment into its national armed forces and the
description of the safeguards that it has adopted to ensure such recruit-
ment is not forced or coerced.
3. States Parties that permit voluntary recruitment into their national armed
forces under the age of 18 shall maintain safeguards to ensure, as a mini-
mum, that:
a. Such recruitment is voluntary;
b. Such recruitment is done with the informed consent of the person's par-
ents or legal guardians;
c. Such persons are fully informed of the duties involved in such military
service;
d. Such persons provide reliable proof of age prior to acceptance into na-
tional military service.
Id. See also Dennis, supra n.138, at 789 (stating that Protocol raised conscription age to
eighteen years). See also DETRICK, supra n.134, at 660 (discussing that many of partici-
pants in writing of draft protocol felt that "voluntary" recruitment was in many cases not
a free choice, but product of indoctrination, incitement to vengeance, poverty, destitu-
tion, severe pressure, prospect of protection, or immaturity). The requirement of pa-
rental consent, it was believed, was not a safeguard and irrelevant in most situations. Id.
It also felt that having recruitment and participation be different ages would make
monitoring and enforcement more difficult. ld.
142. See OP-CRC on Children in Armed Conflict, supra n.98, art. 4(1). Article 4(1)
reads: "Armed groups that are distinct from the armed forces of the State should not,
under any circumstances, recruit or use in hostilities any persons under the age of 18
years." Id.
143. See id. art. 4(2). Article 4(2) reads "States Parties shall take all feasible mea-
sures to prevent such recruitment and use, including the adoption of legal measures
necessary to prohibit and criminalize such parties." Id. See also id. art. 4(3), which
reads: "The application of the present article under this Protocol shall not affect the
legal status of any party to an armed conflict." Id. See also Dennis, supra n.138, at 789
(commenting that Protocol contains provision that puts responsibility on States to pre-
vent recruitment of children into insurgent groups).
144. See OP-CRC on Children in Armed Conflict, supra n.98, art. 6. Article 6 reads:
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Each Protocol, although styled as a Protocol to the CRC,
operates as an independent multilateral agreement under inter-
national law.1"' States may ratify either Protocol without becom-
ing a party to the CRC or being subject to its provisions."' 6 The
Protocols complement the ILO Convention (No. 182) on the
Worst Forms of Child Labor, adopted by the International La-
bour Conference on June 17, 1999.147 That Convention re-
1. Each State Party shall take all necessary legal, administrative and other mea-
sures to ensure the effective implementation and enforcement of the provi-
sions of this Protocol within its jurisdiction.
2. States Parties undertake to make the principles and provisions of the pre-
sent Protocol widely known and promoted by appropriate means, to adults
and children alike.
3. States Parties shall take all feasible measures to ensure that persons within
their jurisdiction recruited or used in hostilities contrary to this Protocol
are demobilized or otherwise released from service. States Parties shall,
when necessary, accord to these persons all appropriate assistance for their
physical and psychological recovery and their social reintegration.
Id.
145. See Dennis, supra n.138, at 789 (commenting that each protocol operates as a
separate agreement).
146. See OP-CRC on Children in Armed Conflict, supra n.98, art. 9. Article 9 reads:
1. The present Protocol is open for signature by any State party that is a party
to the Convention or has signed it.
2. The present Protocol is subject to ratification and is open to accession by
any State. Instruments of ratification or accession shall be deposited with
the Secretary-General of the United Nations.
3. The Secretary-General, in his capacity as depositary of the Convention and
the Protocol, shall inform all States Parties to the Convention and all States
that have signed the Convention of each instrument of declaration pursu-
ant to article 13.
Id. See also Dennis, supra n.138, at 789 (stating that State can ratify either of Optional
Protocols without becoming party to CRC). See also Cris R. Revaz, The Optional Protocols
to the U.N. Convention on the Rights of the Child on Sex Trafficking and Child Soldiers, 9 HUM.
RTS. BR. 13 (2001) (stating that both Optional Protocols expressly permit those who
have signed CRC to ratify Protocols although States have not ratified CRC).
147. See Child Labour Convention, supra n.99, arts. 3(a)(d), 7. Article 3(a)(d)
reads:
For the purposes of this Convention, the term "the worst forms of child la-
bour" comprises:
all forms of slavery or practices similar to slavery, such as the sale and traffick-
ing of children, debt bondage and serfdom and forced or compulsory labour,
including forced or compulsory recruitment of children for use in armed con-
flict.
work which, by its nature or the circumstances in which it is carried out, is
likely to harm the health, safety or morals of children.
Id. Article 7 (1) reads:
Each Member shall take all necessary measures to ensure the effective imple-
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quires, inter alia, that States Parties take immediate action to se-
cure the elimination of the forced or compulsory recruitment of
children for use in armed conflict, among other areas. 148
A difficult issue during the negotiation process among dif-
ferent States for the CRC was the liability of non-State actors.149
mentation and enforcement of the provisions giving effect to this Convention
including the provision and application of penal sanctions or, as appropriate,
other sanctions.
Id. Article 7(2) reads:
Each Member shall, taking into account the importance of education in elimi-
nating child labour, take effective and time-bound measures to:
a) prevent the engagement of children in the worst forms of child labour;
b) provide the necessary and appropriate direct assistance for the removal of
children from the worst forms of child labour and for their rehabilitation
and social integration;
c) ensure access to free basic education.
Id. See also Dennis, supra n.138, at 790 (commenting that ILO Convention provisions
dealing with children in armed conflict are complemented by OP-CRC Children in
Armed Conflict).
148. See Child Labour Convention, supra n.99, art. 3(a). Article 3(a) reads:
For the purposes of this Convention, the term "the worst forms of child la-
bour" comprises:
a. all forms of slavery or practices similar to slavery, such as the sale and traf-
ticking of children, debt bondage and serfdom and forced or compulsory
labour, including forced or compulsory recruitment of children for use in
armed conflict.
b. the use, procuring or offering of a child for prostitution, for the produc-
tion of pornography or for pornographic performances.
c. the use, procuring or offering of a child for illicit activities, in particular for
the production and trafficking of drugs as defined in the relevant interna-
tional treaties
d. work which, by its nature or the circumstances in which it is carried out, is
likely to harm the health, safety or morals of children.
Id.
149. See Report of the Working Group of a draft optional protocol to the Conven-
tion on the Rights of the Child on involvement of children in armed conflict on its
third session, E/CN.4/1997/96, at paras. 43-44, Mar. 13, 1997 [hereinafter Third Ses-
sion Report]. Paragraphs 43 and 44 read:
43. The Committee took the opportunity to reaffirm its position in relation to
the different draft provisions under discussion by the working group and em-
phasized what it considered to be the most important elements. These were:
that persons below the age of 18 years should never be allowed to be involved
in hostilities, either directly or indirectly, as such involvement was physically
and psychologically harmful to children and affected the full enjoyment of
their fundamental rights; that persons below the age of 18 should neither be
recruited on an involuntary basis nor allowed to enlist as volunteers into the
armed forces of States parties or nongovernmental armed groups; that even in
situations where voluntary enlistment would be accepted by States, training of
such persons should incorporate and pay due regard to education on human
rights and humanitarian law; and that the optional protocol should not admit
846 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 26:785
Evidence presented during the negotiation process, demon-
strated the use of children by insurgent groups. 151 Some States
proposed that the Protocol create a binding international legal
obligation for insurgent groups, in line with existing IHL, which
places equal obligations on each party to an armed conflict.15 1
Other States did not want to include obligations for insurgents
any reservations in view of its aim, which was to allow State parties to the Con-
vention on the Rights of the Child which were in a position to do so, to clearly
commit themselves not to recruit children below 18 years of age or allow their
participation in hostilities.
44. Clarification was sought about the Committee's comments on the impor-
tance of including in the optional protocol an article on recruitment of mi-
nors by nongovernmental armed groups. Another question was directed to the
Committee about the situation of children attending military schools.
Id. See also Dennis, supra n. 138, at 792 (stating that liability of non-State actors was
another isste in negotiation).
150. See Third Session Report supra n.149, at para. 45. Paragraph 45 reads:
In answer, it was stated that in some 28 ongoing situations of armed conflict,
nongovernmental groups in hostilities were using persons below the age of 18
heavily, both directly and indirectly. It was, therefore, most important that the
optional protocol should address the issue, obliging States parties to take all
possible steps to prevent the recruitment of children by such insurgent groups
in their territory. It was also recommended that the terminology of the op-
tional protocol should not go beyond that contained in the Protocol 11 Addi-
tional to the 1949 Geneva Conventions. With regard to military schools, the
Committee felt that such institutions should be supervised by the Ministry of
Education rather than by the Ministry of Defence and that provisions protect-
ing students below the age of 18 from being used as tools in armed conflict
should be included in the new instrument. In any case, the Committee warned
that in emergency situations there was often a temptation to use students as
soldiers.
Id. See also Dennis, suln'a n.138, at 792 (commenting that there were approximately
twenty-eight armed conflict situations, where children under age of eighteen forced to
take arms).
151. See Report of the Working Group of a draft optional protocol to the Conven-
tion on the Rights of the Child on involvement of children in armed conflict on its
second session, E/CN.4/1996/102, para. 31, Mar. 21, 1996 [hereinafter Second Session
Report]. Paragraph 31 reads:
It was pointed out that most armed conflicts nowadays were not interna-
tional wars but rather internal civil conflicts in which non-State armed 7forces
were involved. It was felt that the protocol would be failing in its aim of pro-
tecting children from involvement in armed conflicts tnless it addressed the
problem of children serving in non-governmental armed forces or groups.
The view was expressed by many participants that the use of children as
soldiers by any group should be prohibited by the optional protocol. At the
same time, many delegations were cautious, wishing to avoid equating armed
groups with States parties and not to provide recognition to such groups in an
international legal document.
Id. See also Dennis, supra n.138, at 792 (commenting on position of certain States as to
insurgent groups obligations under Optional Protocol).
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in an international human rights treaty like the Protocol, not
wanting to equate rebel groups with States Parties or to confer
recognition on those groups. 152
The States reached a compromise under which the States
Parties would take "all feasible measures" to prevent the recruit-
ment and use in hostilities of persons under the age of eighteen
by non-governmental groups, including enacting national legis-
lation to ensure that this recruitment is punishable as a criminal
offense.1"3 Commentators note that the term "feasible mea-
sures" was used to recognize the frequent lack of control that
these States have over insurgent groups. 54 Yet, it also recog-
nized that in certain situations, armed groups recruit from the
territories of States that are not parties to the conflict. 155 Article
152. See Second Session Report, supra n.151, at para. 32. Paragraph 32 reads:
While some delegations felt it necessary for the protocol to cover non-govern-
mental armed forces since they could be a party to a conflict, others preferred
to refer only to the responsibility of States as subjects of international law. It
was argued that States would not be in a position to guarantee that non-gov-
ernmental armed groups would abide by the protocol, and that the fact of
mentioning them in the protocol could give them a legal status and interna-
tional ambitions. The general feeling was that the obligation of a State party
should be to take all feasible measures to ensure that armed groups in its
territory abided by the protocol, and that a reference to non-governmental
armed forces should therefore be made in the protocol.
Id. See also Dennis, supra n.138, at 792-93 (commenting that other States preferred to
not make insurgent groups responsible under law fearing this would give groups legal
recognition).
153. See text of para. 32 in Second Session Report, supra n.151. SeealsoOP-CRC on
Children in Armed Conflict, supra n.98, at art.4(2). Article 4(2) reads: "States Parties
shall take all feasible measures to prevent such recruitment and use, including the
adoption of legal measures necessary to prohibit and criminalize such practices." Id.
See also Dennis, supra n.138, at 793 (commenting on compromise reached regarding
responsibility of insurgent groups).
154. See Third Session Report, supra n.149, at paras. 36-37. Paragraphs 36-37 state:
36. A reference was also made to the international humanitarian law applica-
ble in situations of non-international armed conflicts which binds all parties to
a conflict, including armed groups, without giving them a legal status.
37. Other participants felt that implied recognition should not be given to
non-governmental armed groups and that it would be preferable to see the
issue covered in the preamble to the draft optional protocol, rather than in its
operative part. It was further stated that it was important to be realistic about
limits to the measures which might be taken by Governments, particularly as
regards legislation, as non-governmental armed groups were already beyond
the pale of law.
Id. See also Dennis, supra n.138, at 793 (discussing reason as to why drafters chose term
"feasible measures" in text of Optional Protocol).
155. See Third Session Report, supra n.149, at paras. 51-53. Paragraphs 51-53 read:
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51. Following her statement, the expert was asked to comment further on the
appropriateness and effectiveness of addressing the issue of nongovernmental
armed groups in a protocol to be ratified or acceded to by States. She was also
asked how the international community could really come to grips with re-
cruitment by nongovernmental armed groups, particularly when some States
had provided support to safe havens for and exerted influence on such
groups.
52. The expert stated that, without facing up to real problems, standards and
norms would lose their relevance. She appealed to the working group to re-
spond in a timely manner to today's challenge, namely situations of internal
conflict. Failing to do this for political reasons would be tantamount, in her
opinion, to taking half-measures to deal with the problem. Moreover, the ex-
pert felt that the working group would fail completely if it did not address the
situation of children in nongovernmental armed groups.
53. The expert expressed the view that ratification of the instrument would
entail an obligation for States parties to respect and implement its provisions
with respect to nongovernmental armed groups operating both inside and
outside of their countries. Further, she referred to a moral responsibility con-
tained in the commitment of States to the international community to protect
all children. She added that in civil society all forms of pressure should be
brought to bear on eradicating the use of child soldiers; public opinion would
isolate the abusers and render the phenomenon unacceptable and intolerable
to the collective human and social consciousness.
Id. See also Report of the Working Group of a draft optional protocol to the Convention
on the Rights of the Child on involvement of children in armed conflict on its sixth
session, E/CN.4/2000/74, at paras. 35-40, Mar. 27, 2000 [hereinafter Sixth Session Re-
port]. Paragraphs 35-40 provide:
35. At the 2nd meeting, on 10 January 2000, the working group began its
consideration of the issue of non-State actors, on the basis of article 3 of the
"Chairperson's perception" paper (E/CN.4/1998/102, annex II). The work-
ing group also had before it article 5 of the text proposed by the United States
of America (E/CN.4/2000/WG.13/2/Add.1) and the joint proposal of Ca-
nada and Norway which read as follows:
1. To the extent compatible with national legal systems and relevant interna-
tional human rights standards, State Parties shall take all possible measures
to prevent recruitment and use of persons under the age of 18 years by
armed groups distinct from the armed forces of a State.
2. The application of the present provision under the Protocol shall not affect
the legal status of any party to an armed conflict.
36. It was generally felt that all three proposals were constructive and could
serve as a good basis for future work. Several delegations expressed their pref-
erence for the text contained in the "Chairperson's perception" paper,
though it was admitted that it could be strengthened by merging the different
proposals.
37. While some speakers argued that non-State parties could not be bound by
an inter-State treaty and that it was therefore a matter to be dealt with through
domestic law, another view was that the optional protocol should address non-
State actors directly and provide for criminalization of their actions in cases
where they were in violation of the protocol.
38. According to another opinion, the issue of non-State actors should only be
addressed in the preambular part of the protocol. Several participants empha-
sized the importance of retaining in the text the provisions of paragraph 2 of
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7 of the Armed Conflict Protocol further obligates States Parties
to cooperate internationally "in the prevention of any activity
contrary to the Protocol," which would include the recruitment
and use of persons under eighteen in hostilities by armed insur-
gent groups.' 56 The OP-CRC entered into legal force on Febru-
ary 12, 2002.157 The U.N. Committee on the Rights of the Child
("UNCRC") will chiefly monitor implementation of the treaty.'58
C. The Colombian Response to International Law and
National Legislation
Colombia, through its national legislation, adopted the
world's most important children's rights Convention, the CRC,
through Ley 12 ("Law 12")."' Colombia's most important legal
article 3 of the "Chairperson's perception" paper concerning the legal status
of parties to an armed conflict. It was also felt that the optional protocol
should apply to all situations, not only those of armed conflict. At the same
time, it was stated that nothing in the protocol should be in conflict with inter-
national humanitarian law.
39. Following consideration of the issue in the informal drafting group, the
working group, at the 6th meeting, on 12 January 2000, approved ad referen-
dum the text of an article on non-State actors.
40. Consideration of this issue was continued during the discussion of the
compilation of texts submitted by the Chairperson-Rapporteur (see para. 34
above). For the final text, see the Annex, Article 4.
Id. See also Dennis, supra n.138, at 793 (commenting that insurgent groups may recruit
outside home territory).
156. See text of Article 7 of the OP-CRC on Children in Armed Conflict, supra n.98.
See also Dennis, supra n.138, at 793 (discussing provisions of Article 7).
157. See Special Representative U.N. Press Release, supra n.98.
158. See id. See also The Child Soldiers Project, Ratifications of OP-CRC as ofJan. 2,
2003, available at http://www.childsoldiers.org. To date, 111 countries have signed the
Protocol and forty-five countries have ratified. Id.
159. See Law 12 of January 21 1991(Col.), Dtkiuo OFICIAL No. 39640 (Jan. 21,
1999), available at http://www.bib.minjusticia.gov.co/biblioteca/consulta.htm. Law 12
reads, in pertinent part:
Through Law 12 of 1991 the Congress of the Republic approved the Conven-
tion on the Rights of the Child, adopted by the United Nations Assembly on
November 20 of 1989. Consequently, the Convention obligates the country to
respect and comply effective the date of publication, January 21, 1991.
Id. (author's trans.). It was through this law, that the Colombian Congress approved
the CRC. The text of Law 12 embodied the CRC in its entirety. See also U.N. Colombia
Report, supra n.92, at 87 (discussing Colombia's apparent progress under Article 38 of
CRC, in signing of CRC on January 26, 1990 and its incorporation into Colombian
legislation under Law 12 ofJanuary 1991). In addition, it also discussed that Colombia,
upon signing the CRC, made a declaration in which it considered that
while the minimum age of 15 years for taking part in armed conflicts, set forth
in article 38 of the Convention, is the outcome of serious negotiations which
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document, its 1991 Political Constitution, features children and
their rights, prominently. i61 In addition, Colombia has taken
steps to combat the child soldier problem in its national legisla-
tion, beginning in 1997, when it passed Ley 418 ("Law 418"),
which called for both the military and insurgency to refrain from
recruiting minors. 6 ' In 1999, Colombia passed Ley 548 ("Law
548"), which amended Law 418, and extended its observance for
another three years - until December 23, 2002.162 President
Pastrana also issued an Executory Decree, which not only gave
recognition to the international conventions ascribed to by Co-
lombia, but also gave effect to its national laws. 1"3
1. 1991 Political Constitution (with amendments as of 2001)
In Colombia, children are prominently featured in the Na-
tion's most important legal document - its 1991 Political Con-
stitution, amended in 1997, and again in 2001.164 The Colom-
bian Constitution places high importance on the family unit.'
It recognizes the sanctity of human life and outlaws the death
penalty.' It outlaws torture and other inhumane treatment. 167
reflect various legal, political and cultural systems, it would have been prefera-
ble to fix that age at 18 years in accordance with the principles and norms
prevailing in various regions and countries, including Colombia, for which
reason the Government of Colombia, for the purposes of article 38 of the
Convention, shall construe the age in question to be 18 years.
Id.
160. See CONSTITUcION POLITICA DE COLOMBIA DE 1991, actualizada hasta Reforma
de 2001, available at www.georgetown.edu/pdba/Constitutions [hereinafter CONSTITU-
ION].
161. See Ley 418 of 1997 of December 26, 1997, DIARJO OFICIAL No. 43201 (Dec. 26,
1997), available at www.bib.minjusticia.gov.co/biblioteca/consulta.htm [hereinafter
Law 418].
162. See Ley 548 de 1999 of December 23, 1999 (Col.), amending Law 418 of 1997,
DIARIO OFICIAL No. 43827, Edici6n Extraordinaria (Dec. 23 1999), available at www.
bib.minjusticia.gov.co/biblioteca/consulta.htm [hereinafter Law 548].
163. See Executory Decree: Through which laws are expedited concerning the
treatment of children and adolescents demobilized from the Armed Conflict, available
at http://www.mindefensa.gov.co [hereinafter Executory Decree].
164. See CONSTITUTION, supra n.160.
165. See CONSTITUTION, supra n. 160, art. 5. Article 5 provides: "The State recog-
nizes, without any discrimination, the importance of a person's inalienable rights and
considers the family to be the basic institution of society." Id. (author's trans.).
166. See id. art. 11. Article 11 reads: "The right to life is guaranteed. There shall be
no death penalty." Id. (author's trans.).
167. See id. art. 12. Article 12 reads: "No one shall be subjected to forced disap-
pearance, torture nor maltreatment or cruel, inhumane, or degrading punishment."
Id. (author's trans.).
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Article 44 recognizes the fundamental rights of children to life,
physical integrity, health, social security, adequate nutrition, ed-
ucation, and freedom of expression, as Well as the right to have
families and not be separated from them. 6 ' The Article goes on
to state that children shall be protected from abandonment,
moral or physical violence, kidnapping, trafficking, sexual abuse,
economic and labor exploitation, and dangerous work.1 69 Chil-
dren will also enjoy the other rights contained in the Constitu-
tion, in the national laws, and in international treaties ratified by
Colombia. 7 ° The family, society and the State must assist and
protect children's rights, and anyone can demand from the State
authorities compliance and criminal punishment. 17' The rights
of children prevail above the rights of all others. 1 72 Article 93
echoes the message of Article 44 - treaties and conventions rati-
fied by the Colombian Congress recognizing and protecting
human rights, are national law and Constitutional rights and
privileges are interpreted as being in conformity with the inter-
national human rights treaties ratified by Colombia. 73
2. Law 418 of 1997
In 1997, the Colombian Congress passed Law 418 with the
objective of giving the State the necessary instruments to assure
168. See id. art. 44. Article 44 states: "Fundamental rights of children: life, physical
integrity, health and social security, balanced nutrition, their name and nationality, to
have a family and not be separated from them, to care, love, education and culture,
recreation and free expression of opinion ..." Id. (author's trans.).
169. See id. art. 44. Article 44 goes on to say: "They shall be protected against all
types of abandonment, physical or moral violence, kidnapping, sale, sexual exploita-
tion, economic or labor exploitation and dangerous work ..." Id. (author's trans.).
170. See id. art. 44. Article 44 also reads: "They shall also enjoy all the other rights
contained in the Constitution, in the laws and international treaties ratified by Colom-
bia ..." Id. (author's trans.).
171. See id. art. 44. Article 44 also reads: "The family, society and the State are
obligated to assist and protect children to guarantee their full and harmonious develop-
ment and the full exercise of their rights. Any person can demand compliance from the
authorities and sanctions for the individuals who violate those rights..." Id. (author's
trans.).
172. See id. art. 44. Article 44 ends with: "The rights of children are superior to the
rights of all others." Id. (author's trans.).
173. See Constitution, supra n.160, art. 93. Article 93 reads:
The treaties and conventions ratified by Congress, that recognize human
rights and prohibit their limitation prevail in the internal order. The duties
and rights in this Constitution are to be interpreted as being in conformity
with international human rights treaties ratified by Colombia.
Id. (author's trans.).
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the State's effectiveness and guarantee the many laws, rights, and
liberties in the Constitution and/or the international treaties rat-
ified by Colombia. t 74
Article 13 of Law 418 provides that males under the age of
eighteen will be conscripted into the national armed forces. 175
The Article also provides this exemption for males in the elev-
enth grade, who under an earlier Colombian law were selected
for obligatory military service unless they voluntarily, or with ex-
press and written consent of their parents, opted to comply with
their constitutional duty and provide military service. 176  How-
ever, these minors cannot be sent to areas where there are ongo-
174. See Law 418, supra n.161, art. 1. Article 1 of Law 418 reads:
The rules enacted in the present law have as their objective to endow the Co-
lombian State with effective instruments to secure the enforcement of a social
and democratic State of law and guarantee all the fundamental laws and liber-
ties recognized in the Political Constitution and/or International Treaties ap-
proved by Colombia.
Id. (author's trans.). See also U.N. Colombia Report, supra n.92, at 88 (discussing the ori-
gins of Law 418). On October 26, 1997, elections were held for town councils, depart-
ment assemblies, mayors, and governors. Id. The "Mandate for peace, life and free-
dom" campaign was organized on that same day and 8 million Colombians voted for
items of the mandate's agenda, such as the non-involvement of Colombian minors in
the armed conflict, and in essence saying "no" to violence. Id. In view of the declara-
tion made regarding the CRC and to respond to the "Mandate for peace," articles 13
and 14 were added on to Law 418, regarding coexistence and public order, which was
approved on December 26, 1997. Id. See also Children in Colombian Armed Conflict, supra
n.64, at 34 (stating that Law 418, as is pertains to children is to "offer an instrument in
search for peaceful coexistence). Efficacious justice establishes ICBF duty to apply the
necessary resources to guarantee protection to child victims of the armed conflict, and
the recognition that they are victims, and are afforded the same benefits as those con-
templated for adults. Id.
175. See Law 418, supra n.161, art. 13. Article 13 reads:
Minors under the age of eighteen will not be incorporated for military service.
The incorporation of those who fall under a select class pursuant to Law 48
1993 will be postponed-except if voluntarily or with the express and written
authorization of their parents, they opt for immediate compliance with their
constitutional duty. In the latter case, these recruited minors will not be
deployed to zones under war operations nor employed in armed confronta-
tion [...]
The civil or military authority that ignores this present disposition will be
charged with misconduct, which is conduct sanctionable, by dismissal.
Id. (author's trans.). See also Child Soldiers, supra n.8 (commenting that Law 418 also
established that minors should not voluntarily join army). See generally Ley 48 of 1993
(Mar. 3, 1993), DIAR1O OFICIAL No. 40777 (Mar. 4, 1993), available at http://
bib.minjusticia.gov.co/biblioteca/consulta.htm [hereinafter Law 48] (providing regula-
tions for recruitment and mobilization in national armed forces, including males in
high school).
176. See Law 418, supra n.161, art. 13.
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ing war operations, nor could they be utilized in direct armed
conflict.'7 7 The Article goes on to state that any civil or military
authority ignoring the order would be subjected to discharge
from his or her post.' 7
Article 14 states that those who recruit minors into insur-
gent and auto defense groups, or induce them to join, or train
them militarily, are subject to three to five years in prison.1 79 It
also states that members of these groups who were found to have
recruited minors, would not receive the judicial benefits found
under the present law."" Article 17 states that the ICBF will pro-
vide priority assistance to minors who are without family or have
a family not capable of caring for them, due to violent acts re-
177. See id.
178. See id.
179. Id. art. 14. Article 14 reads:
Those who recruit minors to integrate insurgent groups or auto defense
groups, or induces them to be a part of, or admits them into these groups, or
those that with this end in mind provide military training, shall be sanctioned
with a three to five year prison term.
Id. (author's trans.). See also Colombia 1379 Report, supra n.47, at 24 (stating that Law 418
criminalized recruitment of minors (under the age of eighteen) by rebel or self-defense
groups, as well as training for that purpose and sanctioned those responsible with three
to five year prison terms). See also Child Soldiers, supra n.8 (stating that Law 418 would
hold any person who recruits minors into rebel of self-defense groups, forces them, or
receives them, or militarily trains them for this purpose would be liable to a three to five
year prison term). See also Law 599 of Jul. 24, 2000 (Col.), DIARIO OFICIAL No. 44097
(Jul. 24, 2000) [hereinafter New Penal Code]. Article 162 of the New Penal Code
states:
Those who during armed conflict recruit minors under the age of eighteen or
obligate them to participate directly or indirectly in the hostilities or in armed
combat, will receive a six to ten year prison term and a fine in the amount of
six hundred to one thousand minimum monthly salaries.
Id. (author's trans.). See also Colombian Defense Ministry Report 2001, supra n.54, at 33.
(stating that the New Penal Code examined and addressed illegal recruitment of mi-
nors in subversive groups). See also Children in Colombian Armed Conflict, supra n.64, at 34
(stating that New Penal Code passed in 2000 and laid out punishable conduct commit-
ted against children). The recruitment of children, in article 162, is a crime. Id. See
also Children's Rights in Colombia 2001, supra n.62, at 33 (commenting that Article 162 of
New Penal Code incorporates into national laws the international dispositions in Worst
Forms of Child Labour Convention (1999) and the Optional Protocol to the Conven-
tion on the Rights of the Child).
180. See Law 418, supra n.161, art. 14. Article 14 states:
The members of armed insurgent organization, which incorporate into
these groups, minors under the age of eighteen (18), will not be deserving of
none of the judicial benefits granted by this present law.
Id, (author's trans). See also Child Soldiers, supra n.8 (stating that Law 418 states that
members of insurgent groups who recruit minors under age of eighteen would not be
entitled to legal benefits that Law 418 provides as whole). Id.
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sulting from internal armed conflict."' The Article further
states that children involved in any way in armed conflict will
enjoy special protection and will be the first to obtain the bene-
fits contemplated. 82
3. Law 548 of 1999
On December 23, 1999, Law 548 came into effect and
amended Article 13 of Law 418.18 " Article 13 remained virtually
unchanged, except that males under the age of eighteen could
no longer enlist in the military - even if their enlistment was
voluntary or there was parental consent.' 8 ' More importantly,
181. See Law 418, supra n.161, art. 17. Article 17 reads:
The Colombian Institute on Family Welfare, in developing their prevent-
ative and protective programs, will give priority assistance to those minors that
were either left orphaned or having a family, the family is not in the condition
to care for the child by reason of the events referred to in Title Two [Violent
Events Arising within the framework of internal armed conflict] of this Act.
The National Government will provide funds to the Colombian Institute of
Family Welfare to develop this program.
182. id. (authors' trans.).
See Law 418, art. 17, para. 1. Paragraph 1 reads: "The minors who in any condition
participate in the armed conflict shall enjoy special protection and shall be the benefi-
ciaries of the benefits contemplated by this law." Id. (author's trans.).
183. See Law 548, supra n.162, which states, in part: "Through which the obser-
vance of Law 418 of December 26, 1997 is extended and other orders are proclaimed."
Id. (author's trans.). See also Article 1, which "extends the observance of Law 418 of
1997 for a term of three (3) years, as of the approval date of this present law." Id.
(author's trans.).
184. See Law 548, supra n.162, art.2. The new Article 13 reads:
Article 13 of Law 418 of 1997, will read:
"Article 13. Minors under the age of 18 years will not be mandated to military
service. Incorporation of students in the eleventh grade, under the age of
eighteen, who according to Law 48 of 1993, should be chosen to serve, will be
postponed until they reach the required age."
Id. (author's trans.). See also Law 642 of 2001, DIARIO OFICIAL No. 44282, Edici6n
Ordinaria, Jan. 5, 2001 (clarifying Article 2 of Law 548 to explain that the Article also
applies to minors who turn age eighteen and are still in high school). Article I reads:
Clarifying Article 2 of Law 548 of 1999 in that the option in Article 2 will also
apply to those who turn eighteen (18) years old while they are still in high
school, which is the moment they usually decide their military situation.
Id. (author's trans). See also MINISTERIO DE DEFENSA NACIONAL, REPUBLICA DE COLOMBIA,
lnjbrmne Anual Derechos Humanos y DIH 2000, Jan. 21, 2001, at 35, available at http://www.
mindefensa.gov.co [hereinafter Ministty of Defense 2000 Report]. It states, in part:
The National Government, in applying its policy of defense of human rights
and promoting international humanitarian law, in 1999 ordered the demobili-
zation of all minors under eighteen that were presently in the armed forces. As
a result of this measure, more than 1000 minors were demobilized. Law 548 of
1999, in realization of international agreements subscribed to by Colombia,
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Law 548 extended the observance of Law 418 for a period of
three years, effective December 23, 1999."'5
4. Executory Decree
The Executory Decree from the Colombian government is
meant to properly execute the laws and provisions dealing with
children who have been demobilized from the armed conflict.'
86
The Decree takes into consideration Article 39 of the CRC,
which was ratified and adopted in the form of Law 12.187 The
Decree also points to Article 44 of the Constitution, holding the
rights of children paramount above all others, as demonstrating
the necessity of establishing special mechanisms and instruments
that guarantee the protection required for ex-child soldiers. 88
prohibited the recruitment of a minor under the age of 18 into the armed
forces, going beyond what was recently established in the Additional Protocol
to the Convention on the Rights of the Child.
Id. (author's trans.). See also 1379 Report, supra n.47, at 24 (discussing adoption of Law
548 on December 23, 1999). The law prohibited the voluntary and compulsory recruit-
ment of minors under the age of eighteen in government forces. Id. It also stated that
this policy was reinforced by an internal policy, Instructivo No. 8 of January 19, 2000,
which stated that no minors would be incorporated into the National Police. Id.
185. See Law 548, supra n.162, art.1. Article 1 reads: "The extended observance of
Law 418 of 1997 for a term of three (3) years, as of the approval date of this present
law." (author's trans.). See also Children's Rights in Colombia 2001, supra n.62, at 33 (stat-
ing that Law 418 was expedited in temporary form only and is in observance until De-
cember 2002). Id.
186. See Executory Decree, supra n.163. The Decree reads, in part, that the Presi-
dent, in "exercise of the faculties conferred on him by Article 189, subpart 11 of the
Colombian Constitution and in development of Article 17, its paragraph and the sec-
ond paragraph of Article 50 of Law 418 of 1997, amended by Law 589 of 2000 ..." Id.
(author's trans). See also Constitution, supra n.164, art. 189(11). Article 189 reads: "It
corresponds to the President of the Republic, as Head of State, Head of Government
and Supreme Administrative authority: ... 11. the regulatory power to enact decrees,
resolutions and orders necessary for the proper execution of the laws." Id. (author's
trans.).
187. See text of Executory Decree, supra n.163, which reads, in part:
Considering :
That Article 39 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child, ratified by Co-
lombia in Law 12 of 1991, establishes that 'the State Parties shall adopt all
appropriate measures to promote physical and psychological recuperation
and social reintegration of a child victims of: any form of neglect, exploitation
or abuse; torture or another form of cruel, imhumane or degrading treatment
or punishment; or armed conflicts. This recovery and reintegration shall take
place in an environment which fosters the health, self-respect and dignity of
the child.'
Id. See also text of Article 39 of the CRC, supra n.136.
188. See generally Executory Decree, supra n.163, the Decree states, in part:
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It also recognizes Article 17 of Law 418, amended by Law 589 of
2000, where the ICBF was to provide priority assistance to chil-
dren affected by the armed conflict.18 9
Keeping in mind Article 44 of the Constitution declares the prevalence of
children's rights above the rights of others,it is necessary to establish special
mechanisms and instruments that will guarantee the protection of children
demobilized from the armed conflict.
Id. (author's trans.).
189. See id., reading, in part:
That article 17 of Law 418 of 1997, amended by Law 589 of 2000 states that the
'The Colombian Institute of Family Welfare, in developing its preventative and
protective programs, will give priority assistance to minors who are without
family, or whose families cannot care for them as a result of the acts men-
tioned in this present title.'
Id. (author's trans.). See also Law 418, supra n.161. See generally Law 589 of July 6 2000
(Col.), DIARIO OFICIAL No. 44073 Uul. 7, 2000), available at http://www.bib.minjusticia.
gov.co/biblioteca/consulta.htm. This is the law that amends the Penal Code, adding
new crimes and their punishments including: genocide (Article 322A), forced disap-
pearances (Article 268A), forced displacement (Article 284A) and torture (Article 279).
Article 322A reads:
Those who with the intent to destroy a nationality, ethnicity, race, religious, or
political group that is acting within the law, because of their membership in
these groups, and kills them, will incur a forty-five (45) to sixty year (60)
prison term, a monetary fine from five-hundred (500) to two thousand (2,000)
minimum monthly salaries, and suspension of their rights and public func-
tions from five (5) to ten (10) years.
The prison sentence will run from twenty-five (25) to forty (40) years, the
monetary fine will run between one hundred (100) to five hundred (500)
minimum monthly salaries and the suspension of rights and public functions
from one (1) to five (5) years, if with the same goal in mind, the following acts
are committed:
A) Severe injury to physical and mental integrity of any member of these
groups;
B) Forced pregnancy;
C) Forcing group members to conditions of existence that will cause their
partial or total physical destruction;
D) Taking measures that prevent births within the group;
E) The forced transfer of children from one group to another.
Id. (author's trans.). Article 268A reads:
An individual belonging to an armed group who submits a person to a depri-
vation of their liberty in any form, who hides them, denies their disappearance
or provides no information as to their whereabouts, depriving them of the
law's protection, will be subject to a prison term of between twenty-five (25) to
forty years (40), a fine of five hundred (500) to two thousand (2,000) mini-
mum wage salaries and the suspension of rights and public functions from five
(5) to ten (10) years.
A public servant, or anyone acting under their determinations or acquies-
cence, will be subject to the same prison terms and fines for the conduct de-
scribed above.
Id. (author's trans.). Article 284A reads:
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The Decree holds that children who had in any way partici-
pated in the internal armed conflict will receive from the State
specialized attention in order to reintegrate them into their fam-
ilies and society. 9 ° Demobilized children who are no longer
part of the armed conflict, are defined under the following crite-
ria: those children who were captured; those who voluntarily sur-
rendered - individually or as a group; and those who were sur-
rendered to the State by the insurgent armed groups. 9' The
ICBF will take custody of child soldiers no later than thirty-six
hours after demobilizization from the conflict.' 92 The ICBF is
Who in an arbitrary manner, by way of violent or other acts directed at a sector
of the population, occasions that one or more of its members change their
place of residence, will incur a prison term of fifteen (15) to thirty (30) years,
a fine of five hundred (500) to two thousand (2,000) minimum monthly sala-
ries and suspension of rights and public functions from five (5) to ten (10)
years.
Id (author's trans.). Article 279 reads:
Those who inflict pain or severe physical or psychological suffering with the
objective of obtaining from that person or another information or a confes-
sion, or to punish the person for an act committed or thought to be commit-
ted by this person or to intimidate or to compel them to do or say something
that will cause some sort of discrimination will incur a prison term of between
eight and fifteen years, a monetary fine of eight hundred (800) to two thou-
sand (2000) minimum monthly salaries, and the suspension of their rights or
public functioning for the length of the prison term.
The same prison terms and fines apply to those who inflict grave physical
torture for reasons distinct from the ones above.
Torture will not be construed to mean the pain and suffering derived
only from legal sanctions or those that are a normal or fortuitous consequence
of them.
Id (author's trans.).
190. See Executory Decree, supra n.163, art. 1. Article 1 reads:
All the children under the age of eighteen who under any condition partici-
pate in the internal armed conflict, are considered victims, as such it is the
responsibility of the State through the National Institute of Family Welfare, to
guarantee specialized attention that will permit their adequate reintegration
into their family and society.
Id. (author's trans.).
191. See Executory Decree, supra n.163, art. 2. Article 2, para. 1 reads:
For the purposes of this decree, it will be understood that boys, girls and ado-
lescents demobilized from illegal armed groups those that demobilize from
the armed conflict, in the following circumstances:
Those that were captured;
Those that voluntarily surrendered, individually or as a group;
Those that were surrendered to the State by illegal armed groups.
Id. (author's trans.).
192. See Executory Decree, supra n.163, art. 3. Article 3 reads:
Children and adolescents who under any circumstance demobilize from inter-
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called to protect these children under Title 3 of Law 418.1'9
III. THE COLOMBIAN GOVERNMENT MUST PROVIDE BASIC
SERVICES TO ITS CHILDREN AND ENSURE STRICT
ENFORCEMENT OF INTERNATIONAL AD NATIONAL LAW
TO EFFECTUATE CHANGE
It is recognized that internal armed conflicts take an enor-
mous toll on a country's ability to protect its citizens and enforce
its laws.' 9 4 This has certainly been the case with Colombia.19
Yet, it must be recognized that a long-standing weak and cor-
rupt government is to blame for Colombian citizens' current
predicament - they are prisoners and victims in a conflict they
did not create, but where they have suffered the most harm.196
Colombians face a beleaguered and overwhelmed government
nal armed conflict, should be surrendered by the Military, the Police, or any
other State authority who certifies the demobilization, to the National Insti-
tute of Family Welfare, no later than 36 hours after demobilization.
The National Reinsertion Program should begin the legal and judicial
proceedings to quickly dispose of the benefits to which the children and ado-
lescents demobilized from the conflict are entitled to.
Id. (author's trans.).
193. See Executory Decree, supra n.163, art. 4. Article 4 reads: "The National Insti-
tute on Family Welfare will protect in a special form children who avail themselves of
the protections established in title three of Law 418 of 1994 and Decree 1385 of 1994."
Id. (author's trans.). See also Law 418, supra n.161, Title III "Reasons for dismissing the
cause of action and punishment in cases of political crimes," art. 50, para. 2 1/4. Para.
2 1/4 reads:
When dealing with minors under the age of eighteen who are tied to insur-
gent armed groups who have a legally recognized political character, judicial
authorities shall send all documentation to the Operative Committee for de-
mobilization from armed conflict, who will decide to expedite the certification
that is referred to in Decree 1385 of 1994, under the terms pronounced by this
law.
Id. (author's trans.). See generally Decree 1385 of 1994, DIARIO OFICIAL No. 41420,Jul. 5,
1994, available at http://www.pahd.org.co/body-1385.html (stating that decree expe-
dites norms concerning concession of benefits to those that voluntarily abandon armed
subversive groups).
194. See supra nn.4, 13-17 and accompanying text (commenting that most of mod-
ern warfare is civil war, which has been characterized by increased use in high technol-
ogy weaponry, involvement of more than one armed group, and widespread social
breakdown). In addition, these conflicts tend to last longer and this increases the
chances of child recruitment Id.
195. See supra nn.26-28 and accompanying text (discussing that Colombia is only
country in Americas where guerilla warfare remains significant phenomenon).
196. See supra nn.56-63 and accompanying text (discussing Colombian govern-
ment's current state as product of years of corruption and inability to effectively govern
and how this has allowed violence to claim lives of hundreds of thousands of Colombi-
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who is seemingly unable to assist them.'97 The Colombian gov-
ernment may truly be incapable of controlling the movements
and actions of the armed insurgents because of the groups' ad-
mitted military and financial strength,198 but the government
does have control when it comes to what is first on its national
agendas. Alongside the much publicized peace process' 99 and
multi-billion U.S. dollar war against narcotics trafficking,200 the
Colombian government should be concerning itself with the wel-
fare and peace of its children.2 1
In a country where fifty percent of the population lives be-
low the poverty line and lack of access to basic education is com-
mon, many Colombian children, especially those in rural areas,
struggle to make it through childhood.20 2 The armed internal
conflict and the resulting forced displacements of people, have
only aggravated the already precarious situation by preventing
Colombian children from living in stable environments, where
education and basic amenities are readily available. °3 While it is
noteworthy that the Colombian government has taken steps to
ans and perpetuate massive displacements of over million Colombian citizens through-
out country).
197. See supra nn.50-63 and accompanying text (discussing not only pervasive links
and cooperation between Colombian military and paramilitary group activities, but slow
and unresponsive justice system and continuing human rights abuse perpetrated by
insurgency and government against Colombian citizenry as reasons for Colombian gov-
ernment's ineffectiveness)
198. See supra nn.28-29, 32-38 and accompanying text (discussing not only military
strength of guerilla and paramilitary groups, but also what has allowed them to grow in
number - mainly income derived from drug trade and other activities and prolifera-
tion of high tech, light-weight weaponry).
199. See supra nn.44-46, 78 and accompanying text (discussing great, but failed,
efforts made during Pastrana Presidency to attain dialogue and peace, as well as efforts
by civilian population to entertain dialogue - mainly Mainz Agreement with ELN).
200. See n.49 and accompanying text (discussing specific provisions of US$7.5 bil-
lion dollar plan, of which U.S. contributed US$3.5 billion, of which US$390 million is
going towards counter-narcotics operations).
201. See id. (commenting that out of billions being provided to rebuild Colombia,
politically and economically, only US$2.5 million is being directly used to assist child
soldiers)
202. See supra nn.62-63, 69 and accompanying text (commenting that conflict has
displaced massive numbers of children, interrupting their childhoods and education as
well as fact that many children who could or have become child soldiers grew up in
dysfunctional families and in rural areas where there was no infrastucture, lack of ser-
vices and education, governmental authority, abundant insurgent activity).
203. See supra nn.62-63 and accompanying text (commenting that forced displace-
ments have disproportionately affected Colombian children).
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protect the rights of its children in national legislation, 20 4 it must
be acknowledged that these are merely first steps.
Colombia's most significant legal instrument, its Constitu-
tion, emphasizes, promotes, and guarantees Colombian chil-
dren's basic and inalienable rights. 20 5 In addition, it proclaims
that Colombian children will enjoy the rights contained within
international treaties ratified by the country.t 6 It declares that
Colombian children's rights are above those of all other Colom-
bian citizens. 201  Unfortunately, the rights of the "others," Co-
lombian civilians, have been repeatedly violated during the past
fifty years of internal armed conflict. 28 The rights of Colombian
children have not fared any better, for they have been repeatedly
trampled on and ignored. °9 Colombian children have yet to en-
joy the rights set forth in their own Constitution, much less those
in international treaties.
Yet, the Colombian government should be credited for sign-
ing and ratifying some of the most important international hu-
manitarian law treaties. 1 ) By ratifying these treaties, Colombia
has held itself up to the world as a Nation that will protect the
rights of its citizens during armed conflict.211  Unfortunately,
proclaiming to do something and actually following through are
two different things - and Colombia is failing in the latter re-
spect.
IHL conforms to the Colombian situation perfectly in that it
holds government actors, private individuals, and non-State ac-
204. See supra nn.159-193 and accompanying text (discussing Colombian legisla-
tion specifically adopted for child soldier).
205. See supra nn. 168-169 and accompanying text( commenting that Article 44 pro-
vides for such inalienable rights as the right to life, physical integrity, a family, love,
education, and protection from all kinds of violence).
206. See supra n.170 and accompanying text (discussing provisions of Article 44 of
Colombian Constitution).
207. See supra n.172 and accompanying texts (discussing text of Article 44 of Co-
lombian Constitution).
208. See supra nn.5, 7, 32, 33, 39, 4042, 50, 53, 54, 57-61 and accompanying text
(detailing abuses suffered by Colombian civilians in fifty years).
209. See nn. 10, I1, 62, 63 and for general discussion, see also Part L.C (addressing
in detail abuses children face at hands of insurgency).
210. See supra nn.94-99 and accompanying text (listing IHL treaties and conven-
tion ratified or signed by Colombia).
211. See supra n.100 and accompanying text (describing obligations of Colombia
under IHL).
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tors liable for violent acts.'1 2 Common Article 3 of the 1949 Ge-
neva Conventions, which applies to conflicts not of an interna-
tional character,21 3 asks that the parties refrain from violence of
all kinds, including murder, cruel treatment and torture, hos-
tage taking, and degrading treatment.214 All of this is still a terri-
fying reality for Colombia's children, who continue to be
targeted due to their direct or indirect participation in the con-
flict.2 15 Although it is contended that the majority of children
"volunteer ' 2 16 to go with these groups, once conscripted, they
are veritable hostages of war who are psychologically manipu-
lated into staying within the ranks. 2 7 They are also subjected to
physical maltreatment and abuse at the hands of their superi-
ors.2  Additionally, Common Article 3 also prohibits the pass-
ing of sentences and carrying out of executions without a judg-
ment from a government court.2 9 But as mentioned previously,
escaping the ranks of insurgent groups is difficult, and those that
do face execution, as traitors, at their former comrades'
hands.2 Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions binds
each party of the conflict to apply, "as a minimum," these provi-
sions. 22 ' Although the guerillas, in the past, have promised to
stop recruiting children, they continue to unapologetically do
212. See supra nn.100-103 and accompanying text (discussing how IHL holds gov-
ernment and insurgency equally accountable for actions during armed conflict).
213. See supra nn.106-109 and accompanying text (discussing applicability of Com-
mon Article 3 provisions to internal armed conflicts).
214. See supra n.107 and accompanying text (noting that Common Article 3 asks
for abstention from violence).
215. See supra nn.64-66 and accompanying text (describing that of forty-six rebels
killed in one skirmish in December 2000, twenty were children).
216. See supra nn.19, 20, 85-87 and accompanying text (discussing psychological
manipulation used by insurgent grups as well as psychological aftermath).
217. See supra nn.85-87 and accompanying text (describing physical abuse and
mental indoctrination that child soldiers are forced to undergo once they have joined
ranks of insurgent armed groups).
218. See supra nn.84 and 85 and accompanying text (describing sexual abuse suf-
fered by girl child soldiers at hands of older male soldiers and commanders and the
physical abuse child soldiers endure as part of ranks).
219. See supra n.107 and accompanying text (describing text of Article 3(d) which
deals with preserving peoples judicial guarantees).
220. See supra nn.ll and 86 and accompanying text (discussing rationale used by
armed insurgent groups to justify killing of "traitorous" child soldiers).
221. See supra n.107 and accompanying text (commenting that Common Article 3
provisions are minimal requirements and that States can do more).
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SO. 2 2 2 Therefore, if they refuse to be bound by international
standards, it is the responsibility of the Colombian government
under human rights law to safeguard its own children. 223 Al-
though Colombia ratified the Geneva Conventions and is bound
to apply these provisions, it has failed to do so. 224 Colombian
children continue to form a part of the ranks and still suffer
from the effects of this situation. 225 And while the government
has provided for services through the ICBF, these programs are
not of a preventative nature.2 2"
Colombia is also a party to AP I and AP II to the Geneva
Conventions of 1949.27 The Colombian conflict, which could
be categorized as amounting to a "civil war," aptly fits under the
rubric of AP 11.228 It specifically addresses "dissident armed
forces," or "other organized groups" like the FARC, ELN and
paramilitary groups. 22 It places the onus of preventing the re-
cruitment of children on the parties, not the children.2 0 Article
4(3) (c) states that children under fifteen years of age shall not
be recruited nor allowed to take part in hostilities.2 11 Colombian
children continue to be recruited by armed insurgent groups,
despite false promises from the guerillas,232 and not only fight
alongside the older combatants, but also serve as valuable spies
222. See supra nn.70, 71, 73, 78, 79 and accompanying text (describing Mainz
"Heaven's Gate" agreement signed by ELN in 1998).
223. See supra nn. 101-102 and accompanying text (discussing obligations of Colom-
bia under human rights law to protect rights of individuals even when government is
not to blame for its violation).
224. See supra nn. 129-130 and accompanying text (describing obligation of govern-
ment and non-governmental entities (NGEs), like insurgent groups, under IHL).
225. See supra no.62, 63, 72, 81, 84, 86, 87 (discussing abuses suffered by children
during armed conflict and consequences).
226. See supra nn.91-93 and accompanying text (describing ICBF and programs
that it oversees to assist demobilized children).
227. See supra n.95 and accompanying text (stating date Colombia acceded to both
Additional Protocols).
228. See supra n.l 13 and accompanying text (describing application of AP 11).
229. See siupra n. 114 and accompanying text (defining what is considered to be
dissident armed forces under AP 11).
230. See supra nn.124-127 and accompanying text (stating that both of these
groups - government and opposition - have necessary power and authority).
231. See supra n.124 and accompanying text (describing that taking part in hostili-
ties also means non-combat roles, like gathering information, transmitting orders,
transporting ammunition and foodstuffs, or acts of sabotage).
232. See supra nn.73 and 78 and accompanying text (discussing past admissions of
wrongdoing by guerrillas and purported attempts to rectify them).
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and messengers. 233  Although the children play non-combat
roles, they are still in harm's way.2 3 4 Placing the onus on armed
dissident groups, at least in Colombia's case, has not produced
results. Therefore it is the Colombian government's responsibil-
ity to enact effective national legislation.
The CRC was ratified by Colombia. 235 Article 38 of the CRC
states that States Parties shall "respect" and "ensure respect" for
international humanitarian law applicable to children in armed
conflict.236 It requires that States Parties take "all feasible mea-
sures" to ensure that children under the age of fifteen do not
take direct part in hostilities, 27 and that they ensure ex-child
soldiers physical and psychological recovery and re-integration
into society.2 38 President Pastrana's "goodwill" gesture of ceding
42,000 square kilometers of Colombian land to the guerillas, left
many thousands of Colombians, including children, within this
demilitarized zone, at the mercy of guerilla and paramilitary
groups. 239 Not only were citizens subject to guerrilla "govern-
ance," but also to their violent acts, 2 4 0 as well as paramilitary ret-
ribution. 241  As a result of this gesture, and the action and inac-
tion perpetrated by the government and the military, Colombian
citizens' rights remain violated.2 4 2 Many .have been forced to
233. See supra nn.80-84, 88-90 and accompanying text (setting forth tasks carried
out by children in Colombian illegal armed forces).
234. See supra nn.72, 80, 83, 84 (discussing various non-combat roles occupied by
children and dangers associated with them).
235. See supra n.97 and accompanying text (reporting date Colombia ratified
CRC).
236. See supra n.133 and accompanying text (providing text of Article 38(1) of
CRC).
237. See supra n.133 and accompanying text (providing text of Article 38(2) of
CRC).
238. See supra n.136 and accompanying text (providing text of Article 39, which
makes States responsible for ex-child soldier rehabilitation).
239. See supra nn.47, 48, 59-62 and accompanying text (commenting on demilita-
rized zone ceded by Colombian government to FARC and forced movement of people
as a result of violence).
240. See supra nn.32-41, 47 and accompanying text (describing affinity insurgent
groups have for towns and villages, how they are able to gain control of these regions,
use of violence to silence, and implementation of their own government police and
judiciary within guerrilla-controlled areas).
241. See supra nn.39-41 and accompanying text (explaining that paramilitaries at-
tack guerrillas through civilians whom they consider guerrilla sympathizers - regard-
less of whether they are or not).
242. See supra nn.40, 50, 57, 58 and accompanying text (describing persistent con-
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flee their towns and villages.2" 3 This has proven seriously detri-
mental to the educational opportunities of the displaced chil-
dren.244 The Colombian government has taken measures that
have only served to secure the armed groups' ability to continue
their reign of terror in the Colombian mountains. The Colom-
bian government's priorities have, until now, seemingly focused
on appeasing the opposition and foreign interests, 245 rather than
promoting the rights of its closest allies - its own people.
Colombia has signed, but not ratified the OP-CRC. 246 The
OP-CRC calls on States Parties to take all "feasible measures" to
not enlist children under the age of eighteen and to raise the
recruitment age to eighteen. 47 More importantly, it calls on
both, States Parties and armed insurgent groups to prohibit the
recruitment and use of children by insurgent groups.2 48 It calls
on States Parties to adopt legal measures "necessary to prohibit
and criminalize such parties. "249 The OP-CRC directly holds
States Parties responsible for the welfare of children at the hands
of the insurgent groups. 251 It puts the onus on Colombia to re-
spect and enforce respect for the rights of its children. Although
Colombia has not ratified the treaty, it has signed and already
implemented similar provisions in its national legislation, which
is indicative of its intent to be bound by CIL.25 ' For all intents
nection of the armed forces to paramilitary groups, as well as continuing commission of
human rights abuses by armed forces).
243. See supra nn.59-62 and accompanying text (discussing statistical information
that is available concerning displaced Colombians and main perpetrators).
244. See supra nn.62-63 and accompanying text (stating that Colombian children
comprise 48% of displaced population and that 75% of displaced youth, who previously
attended school, do not return).
245. See supra nn.42, 47, 49 and accompanying text (discussing peace process, de-
militarized zone ceded to FARC, as well as U.S. economic aid plan whose main objective
is eradication of narcotics).
246. See supra n.98 and accompanying text (reporting date Colombia signed OP-
CRC).
247. See supra nn.140-141 and accompanying text (setting forth text of Articles 2
and 3 of OP-CRC).
248. See supra nn.140, 143 and accompanying text (describing text of Article 3 (1)
that applies to States Parties and Article 4(1) which applies directly to armed insurgent
groups).
249. See supra nn.139-143 and accompanying text (setting forth the text of Article
4(2), which asks States to criminalize child soldier recruitment).
250. See supra n.144 and accompanying text (setting forth provisions of Article
6(3) which mandates that States Parties set up appropriate mechanisms to aid in child
soldier recovery).
251. See supra n.130 and accompanying text (discussing CIL and its application).
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and purposes, Colombia has attempted to follow through with its
own national legislation, which purports to criminalize the insur-
gents' acts. 2  Yet, recognizing that Colombia is a weak State,
where impunity exists in every corner of the government, can
help explain why these laws remain ineffective. 53
Law 418 of 1997 formally outlawed the conscription of Co-
lombian males under the age of eighteen into national armed
forces. 2 54 Yet, it made an exception for those who enlisted vol-
untarily or with parental permission. 55 Here, the Colombian
government as following the provisions of AP II of 1977,256 the
CRC,257 and lent one step further by outlawing the enlistment
of males under the age of eighteen, rather than fifteen - which
was the age limit imposed at the time.258 A few years later, in
2002, the OP-CRC, raised the enlistment age to eighteen.25 9 Law
418 also addressed insurgent groups and stated that those found
to have recruited or trained minors would be subject to between
three and five years in prison.211° Colombia had decided to
criminalize the use of children in insurgent groups, as was pre-
scribed by Article 38 of the CRC.261 Another Article provided
that the ICBF would provide priority assistance to demobilized
minors, and that they would obtain protection.2 6 2 This is also
mandated by the CRC, which asks States Parties to take all "ap-
propriate measures to promote physical and psychological recov-
252. See supra nn.159-193 and accompanying text (detailing analysis of national
legislation in particular Law 418 and Law 599 - the new Penal Code).
253. See supra nn.51-56 and accompanying text (describing how high ranking gov-
ernment and military officials are rarely prosecuted).
254. See supra n.175 and accompanying text (discussing Article 13 of Law 418).
255. See supra n.176 and accompanying text (discussing parental consent excep-
tion to Article 13 of Law 418).
256. See supra n.124 and accompanying text (discussing prohibition on use of chil-
dren under fifteen in Article 4 (3)).
257. See supra n.133 and accompanying text (discussing the CRC and Article
38(2)).
258. See supra nn.133-134, 159 and accompanying text (discussing Article 38 of
CRC and declaration made by Colombia reserving age of enlistment at eighteen, not
fifteen).
259. See supra nn.139-141 and accompanying text (describing text of Article 3 of
OP-CRC and how it expands on Article 38 of CRC).
260. See supra n.179 and accompanying text (discussing criminal penalties set forth
in Article 14).
261. See supra n.136 and accompanying text (describing provisions for children
made under Article 38(4)).
262. See supra nn.138-140, 180-182 and accompanying text (describing purpose
and activities of ICBF).
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ery and psychological recovery and social reintegration of the
child victim . . .,,26' Law 548 of 1999 amended Law 418 by out-
lawing the recruitment of males under the age of eighteen into
the national armed forces, even if their enlistment was voluntary
or with parental consent.264 The passage of Law 548 in 1999 ex-
ceeded current international norms in that the OP-CRC, passed
in 2000, and in force in 2002, still allows for either voluntary
enlistment or parental consent enlistment.2 65 Another intended
benefit of Law 548 - its extending the legal observance of Law
418 for additional three years - has been lost, as Law 418 ex-
pired on December 23, 2002.266 The promise of Law 418 and
548 as potentially meaningful and effective tools to curb child
recruitment and execute punishment represents a lost opportu-
nity for the Colombian government and its citizens. In order for
Colombia to effectively ensure respect for its children, the gov-
ernment must execute and implement laws effectively and per-
manently - children's rights are never temporary nor do they
ever expire.
In the Executory Decree, the former President Andr~s Pas-
trana Arango, not only acknowledged the prominent place of
children in the Colombian Constitution, Article 39 of the CRC,
and Law 418 of 1997, but made these documents legally enforce-
able in order to provide for ex-child soldiers. 267 The Decree was
specifically directed to provide for demobilized children and
their specialized care and attention.268
All of the above laws reflect two things: a well-intentioned
government's efforts, and the glare of the international humani-
tarian community at the Colombian situation. Colombia's adop-
tion of international treaties and national legislation is an at-
263. See supra n. 133 and accompanying text (setting forth text of Article 39 of
CRC).
264. See supra nn.183-184 and accompanying text (discussing amendment of Arti-
cle 13 of Law 418 in Law 548 prohibiting voluntary enlistment and enlistment by paren-
tal consent).
265. See supra n.141 and accompanying text (setting forth text of Article 3(3) of
CRC).
266. See supra n.185 and accompanying text (discussing temporary nature of Law
418 and its expiration in 2002).
267. See supra nn.186-188 and accompanying text (discussing constitutional power
given to Presdient in order to promulgate laws, resolutions, and decrees).
268. See supra nn.190-193 and accompanying text (setting forth requirements and
procedure for care and recovery of demobilized child soldiers)
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tempt to appease the international community. 26 9 This is made
more evident in that the Colombian child soldier epidemic has
yet to find any kind of resolution and there has been no marked
improvement, despite laws like 418 and 548.27 0
What else besides legislation, could help alleviate the child
soldier problem? The implementation of educational and social
welfare programs, like those administered by the ICBF, whose
aim is to provide basic and necessary services to Colombian chil-
dren.27' Since many of these child soldiers come from impover-
ished backgrounds, 72 educational opportunities may prevent
them from falling prey to insurgent groups' enticing offers.273
Yet, programs of this nature require an enormous expendi-
ture of capital. Under "Plan Colombia," the economic aid plan,
large amounts of money have been earmarked for Colombia.2 7 4
Unfortunately, a comparatively small fraction of the aid package
is directly benefitting human rights institutions and Colombian
children - a mere US$2.5 million will directly benefit demobil-
ized child soldiers. 5 Normally, this is considered a large sum of
money, but under these exigent circumstances, it pales in com-
parison to what is being spent to combat the drug trade in the
country.276 It could be argued that narcotics is the most critical
issue facing Colombia and deserves most of the funding; how-
ever, hundreds of thousands of Colombian children are literally
caught in the crossfire of the Colombian narcotics trade.277 The
insurgent armed groups that recruit children derive a large per-
269. See supra nn.100-103 and accompanying text (commenting on Colombia's re-
sponsibility upon ratification HR and 1HL instruments and obligations to legal organi-
zations that monitor compliance).
270. See supra nn.12, 64-67, 88 and accompanying text (providing current statistical
information on number of child soldiers as recently as 2001).
271. See supra nn.91-93 (describing work of ICBF).
272. See supra n. 69 and accompanying text (discussing lack of access that hun-
dreds of thousands of Colombian children have to an education).
273. See supra nn. 17, 69, 70, 74, and 76 and accompanying text (discussing not
only social and economic conditions of children but enticements offered by insurgents
that lure children to join).
274. See supra n.49 and accompanying text (discussing Plan Colombia and listing
amounts of aid being provided).
275. See id. (describing amounts of humanitarian aid being provided and specific
purpose it will be put toward).
276. See id. (stating that approximately US$300 million is being spent on combat-
ing Colombian drug cultivation).
277. See supra nn.65, 69, 88 and accompanying text (discussing that not only are
there are at least 6,000 and 3,000 children currently forming part of guerrilla and
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centage of their income from taxing narcotics production. 8
Furthermore, the violence that has erupted between the guerril-
las, paramilitaries, and the military due to the drug trade, has
had a serious adverse effect on Colombian children. 27 Due, in
part, to the serious attention that has been focused on the plight
of child soldiers worldwide, it would make sense that Colombian
child soldiers form an integral part of any aid plan for the coun-
280try. It is only hoped that whatever money has been earmarked
for the children will benefit them, as money earmarked for Co-
lombia has not always gotten into the right hands.281 Ideally, in-
ternational aid should be provided expressly to implement pro-
grams to prevent the recruitment of at-risk children and aid
them after they have been demobilized. Colombia has at-
tempted to do the latter through the programs administered by
the ICBF.282 True initiative and financial expenditures are
needed in order to effectively implement new laws and pro-
grams. For this to happen, Colombian children must take their
rightful place in the peace process, where attention can be fo-
cused on their plight.
CONCLUSION
The exploitation of Colombian children in the internal
armed conflict is a crime that deserves not only the scrutiny of
the international community, but of the Colombian govern-
ment. In order to eradicate the use of children as soldiers, the
government must critically examine the social and economic ills
that have disadvantaged its children and made them such easy
prey for armed groups. The next step would be to strengthen or
install educational and social welfare programs that would ad-
paramilitary groups, respectively, but that an alarming number of 200,000 children are
involved in cultivation of illegal narcotics).
278. See supra nn.34, 43-45 and accompanying text (discussing importance that
drug trade plays in continuing growth of armed insurgent groups in Colombia).
279. See supra nn.57-63 and accompanying text (discussing impact of internal con-
flict on lives and stability of Colombian civilians and children).
280. See supra n.2 and accompanying text (providing statistical information regard-
ing child soldier epidemic).
281. See supra n.50 and accompanying text (discussing incidents where high rank-
ing military personnel have engaged in corrupt activities, like stealing funds earmarked
to combat drug trade).
282. See supra nn.91-93 and accompanying text (describing coordinative efforts be-
tween ICBF, government agencies and armed forces to aid demobilized children).
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dress and hopefully alleviate the problems - which is no small
task. In addition to these preventative measures, existing and
future legislation regarding children in armed conflict would
need to be strictly enforced, widely disseminated, and perma-
nently observed. Perpetrators - individuals or groups - must
be aggressively pursued and effectively punished. The criminal
penalties would also need to be significantly stiffened, so that the
punishment truly fits the magnitude of the loss of innocence
and childhood. Colombia must reclaim its children, but in or-
der to do that, the Colombian government must take back its
country.

